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Abstract 
State actors have adopted policies which they claim will enable the provision of public 
services including mass transportation. In most global cities, dedicated strategic transport 
authorities are employed for the purpose of planning and implementing strategies to sustain 
mass transportation. While such bodies play key roles, not only planning mass transport 
policies, but also coordinating the system, not much is known about the dynamics of the 
relations among the actors who constitute the governance system responsible for sustaining 
mass transportation. This thesis therefore explores the systems of governance of mass 
transportation in London and Lagos with the aim of evaluating the role of collaborative modes 
of governance in affecting and sustaining better transportation for the mass public. While it is 
claimed by the political leadership of both London and Lagos that ‘partnership’ is employed 
in delivering mass transportation, the cases investigated show that what really exists ranges 
from a few relatively genuine partnerships to relationships that are driven more by contracts 
and mandatory arrangements. The research is an analysis of two cases, employing a 
qualitative approach for data gathering through the use of semi-structured interviews. The 
primary evidence gathered from both cases is validated by the secondary data. The thesis 
contributes to the literature on collaborative governance by emphasising the importance of 
political and strategic leadership, the relevance of the nature of funding regime, accountability 
and the socio-cultural context for sustaining service delivery. A key finding from the study is 
that most of the partnerships in both cases are influenced by political leaders (the Mayor of 
London and the Governor of Lagos state). Furthermore, actors in both governance systems do 
not agree on the organisation that should take the lead in the system, although there is a fair 
measure of agreement that the Mayor is best placed to take the lead in London. Also, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, in both systems there exist conflicts and partnerships. The discussion of the 
findings, together with an analysis of the recurring themes in this study, offer significant 
insights into the factors that shape and influence the systems of governance of mass 
transportation in both cases, and the degree to which collaborative governance exists. 
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Chapter One:  
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Drawing upon Dahl (1976: 5), ‘system’ in this study is interpreted as a collection of 
elements that interact in some ways with each other. The study focuses upon the systems of 
governance of mass transportation (hereafter referred to as ‘the system’) in London and Lagos 
in order to evaluate the role of collaborative modes of governance in affecting better 
transportation services for the mass public. The study seeks to test the model of collaborative 
governance posited by Ansell and Gash (2008) by applying it to the two cases. While 
exploring both systems, it was clear that a variety of internal actors, such as the Mayor of 
London, the Governor of Lagos state, Transport for London (TfL) and Lagos Metropolitan 
Area Transport Authority (LAMATA), all play different leadership roles in order to sustain 
mass transportation. 
1.2 Rationale 
 
A number of scholars including Ansell and Gash (2008), Rogers and Weber (2010), 
Chapman et al. (2010), Evans (1995), Healey (2006), Newman et al. (2004), Sullivan and 
Skelcher (2002), and Rhodes (1996, 1997) have offered suggestions on the nature of 
collaborative governance and on how it can be employed for sustaining public services. 
Nevertheless, there is a dearth of information available on the dynamics of the relations 
among actors in a mass transport system, including any consideration of both the negative and 
positive effects of collaboration and conflicts in the system.  
The concept of collaborative governance began to feature in political science 
discourses from the 1990s, often being employed in relation to responses to the challenges of 
public service delivery (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Furthermore, during that period, the 
multiscalar nature (acting across more than one geographical scale) of decision making 
showed the opening up of new issues that needed to be addressed by the state, especially to 
deal with the challenges of public service delivery (Somerville, 2011: 81-82). In the UK, for 
example, Sullivan and Skelcher suggest that, due to the range of challenges that central 
government faced, reforms were introduced to improve the delivery of public goods and 
services especially through the establishment of partnerships and networks among 
stakeholders (2002: 15-16). Arguably, as discussed in Chapter 3, it could also be argued that 
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the reforms introduced were for ideological reasons. In contrast, in the 1990s Nigeria 
witnessed further military rule, leading to serious socio-economic and political problems and 
institutional sclerosis, as little attention was paid to building the capacity necessary to sustain 
mass transportation and other public services at federal and state government level. 
London and Lagos can both be regarded as global cities as defined by Sassen, who 
saw global cities as functioning in four ways: first, as concentrated points in the organisation 
of the world economy; second, as important locations for finance and for specialised service 
firms; third, as sites of production; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations 
produced (2001: 3-4).  Furthermore, London and Lagos can be seen as mega cities according 
to the classification of the United Nations, which proposes that cities with a population of 
between 5 and 20 million inhabitants could be referred to as mega cities. Both cities were thus 
chosen for a number of reasons, including: their possession of features synonymous with 
other global cities; their possession of a functioning mass trans transport system and also 
complex urban systems; their different stages of development of mass transportation; the 
presence of a governance system responsible for sustaining public services such as mass 
transportation; and, lastly, they allowed the testing of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model of 
collaborative governance in states with different systems of government. 
In managing the movement of people in global cities, there is the need for a system to 
plan, coordinate and implement schemes which will sustain mass transportation. Having 
defined a system according to Dahl (1976: 5), as a collection of interacting elements, 
similarly, interacting elements can be observed in systems such as those in London and 
Lagos. For instance, Chapter 5 shows that while conflicts may sometimes exist among the 
goals of some organisations, for example between London Travel Watch and the Transport 
Committee of the London Assembly, other bodies work in partnership, for example in 
delivering the Barclays cycle scheme. Also, in the case of Lagos, Chapter 7 demonstrates that 
there is competition among actors, especially between LAMATA and the State Ministry of 
Transport, but also that they have collaborated with others, such as the World Bank, French 
Development Agency (FDA), and Federal Government agencies, to deliver the Lagos Urban 
Transport Project (LUTP) which implemented the BRT-Lite scheme. 
Thus, by exploring both primary and secondary data related to the systems in London 
and Lagos, the study enhances our understanding of the relevance, if any, of collaborative 
governance to both systems. The study also focuses on the processes by which actors in the 
systems are held to account, what they are held to account for and how. Furthermore, the 
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study examines the role of leadership as it exists in the systems, and the funding regime 
responsible for financing schemes. While drawing on evidence from the systems discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 7, the study goes on to establish that both conflict and cooperation can 
contribute to enabling the sustenance of both systems.  
1.3 Thesis structure 
 
Chapter Two outlines the research methodology employed. It discusses the process 
employed for the study, including the development of the research questions listed in Chapter 
2, the approach used in collecting evidence from interviewees, the rationale for using case 
studies, and the means of data gathering and analysis. The chapter then moves on to discuss 
the components of the study in order to show the process that led to the emergence of the 
themes and findings discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. To address the objectives of the study, 
qualitative research using semi-structured interviews was employed to collect evidence from a 
number of strategic actors in the organisations that constitute the systems in Lagos and 
London. The research also made extensive use of secondary data, such as government 
publications, and reports of organisations which play significant roles in both systems, in 
order to validate and expand upon the results from the primary data gathered.  
Chapter Three presents a review of the concepts of ‘collaboration’, ‘governance’, 
‘collaborative governance’, and ‘urban transport governance’. It outlines and explains the key 
concepts employed in this thesis, and then goes on to critique the arguments of key scholars in 
the field of collaborative governance. This provides the analytical framework (see Figure 1) 
used in analysing the case studies. As collaborative governance can be argued to be both a 
framework for an analysis, and a means to an end, a working definition of collaborative 
governance was generated for the purposes of the study.  
Chapter Four explores the historical background to the current governance structure of 
London. It traces how and when relevant democratic institutions were established in London, 
and the factors that led to their creation. The role of government, institutions, and other 
relevant stakeholders was examined in order to explain the processes by which public needs 
are met. The chapter goes on to examine the relationship between the Greater London 
Authority (GLA) and central government, and the role of partnership in sustaining mass 
transportation, especially in delivering the Barclays Cycle scheme and Crossrail 1. The 
chapter concludes by linking the evolution of government structures in London with the 
emergence of the present GLA which incorporates the Mayor and London Assembly. 
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 Chapter Five discusses the findings and themes relating to the system in London. It 
begins with an explanation of the government and governance structures in London and how 
they relate to relevant actors, in particular to the organisations concerned with mass 
transportation governance. Thereafter, the goals of a number of key organisations are 
considered (the selection criteria are discussed in Chapter 2). Furthermore, conflicts, 
especially between organisations, and also between different aspects of the Mayor’s role, are 
discussed. Thereafter, there is a discussion of the key themes of the case study and their 
relevance to the model of collaborative governance posited by Ansell and Gash (2008). 
Chapter Six examines the historical background to the current governance structure of 
Lagos, which has always been an amalgam of various ethnicities and commercial interests as 
in any other global city. Lagos was chosen because the way the system functions shares some 
similarities and differences with the system in London, as is discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 8. The chapter shows that, while various governments have governed Lagos, Lagos 
has remained the commercial and financial capital of Nigeria. The chapter goes on to examine 
the relationship between the state and federal government, and the role of partnership in 
sustaining mass transportation, especially in delivering the BRT-Lite project. 
Chapter Seven discusses the findings and themes related to the system in Lagos. In 
order to aid analysis and comparison the structure generally follows that used with regard to 
London. Building upon the information provided in Chapter 6, the discussion begins with an 
explanation of the government and governance structure in Lagos and how they relate to 
appropriate organisations, especially those concerned with mass transportation governance. 
Thereafter, the goals of a number of key organisations are considered (the selection criteria 
are discussed in Chapter 2). The existence of conflicts linked to competition among 
organisations is also explored. Subsequently, there is a discussion of the key themes of the 
case study and their relevance to the Ansell and Gash (2008) model. 
Finally, Chapter Eight draws together the findings and themes discussed in the thesis 
to address the research questions. The idea and practice of collaborative governance are also 
evaluated. The chapter then engages in a comparative analysis of both systems for a more 
robust collaborative governance model. The researcher then highlights the implications of the 
study for future research and policy makers in systems similar to London and Lagos. 
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Chapter Two: 
Research methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter describes the methodology employed in addressing the research questions 
guiding the study. The majority of the information and data needed to address the research 
questions falls into three categories: theoretical, conceptual and empirical (Bloomberg and 
Volpe, 2008: 69-70). The literature review in the following chapter (Chapter 3) provides the 
theoretical and conceptual grounding for this study, while the empirical aspect is outlined in 
this chapter. In achieving the aim of the study (answering the research questions), case study 
and comparative research designs were chosen. Semi-structured interviews were then 
employed to gather data from the actors who constitute the systems in both London and 
Lagos. Additional secondary forms of data, such as publications of the GLA, Transport for 
London (TfL), Department for Transport (DfT), Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport 
Authority (LAMATA), government bodies and online resources were also utilised. 
Furthermore, newspapers, and the websites of different organisations in and outside the 
systems, were consulted for the purpose of gathering and verifying data for triangulation in 
order to obtain in-depth understanding of the systems. The process of the research, research 
questions including the case study research design, and semi-structured interview
1
 questions 
used in collecting evidence from actors (most of whom were members of organisations that 
play significant roles in the system in both cases), argument for the study, interviewee 
consent, method of data sampling, component of the research process, criteria for interpreting 
and analysing findings, and the summary of the methodological process are also discussed in 
this chapter.  
 
2.2 Research questions guiding the study 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, this study focuses upon the systems of governance of 
mass transportation in London and Lagos (global cities). It provides new insight on the 
workings between elements constituting each of the systems and the relevance of the 
                                                          
 
1
 See Appendix 2a (Semi-structured Questions for Actors in London) and 2b (Semi-structured Questions for 
Actors in Lagos) 
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occurrence of collaborative governance in both systems. To achieve this, the following three 
primary research questions and a number of supplementary research questions were 
developed to help understand the practice of collaborative governance in both cases. While 
some questions were developed before the commencement of the study, others were generated 
in the course of the literature review and before the field work. 
Question 1: What is meant by collaborative governance? 
This question aims to understand what is meant by collaborative governance by identifying 
and discussing the factors that led to its emergence, use and relevance, in addition to an 
evaluation of propositions on the concept.  
Question 2: How useful is the concept of collaborative governance for understanding mass 
transportation in London and Lagos? 
Drawing on the discussion of collaborative governance, this question looks at the occurrence 
and usefulness of the concept in both cases. It explores the incidence of collaboration and 
governance, in addition with their limitations as relating to both cases. 
Question 3: How far can collaborative governance improve mass transportation? 
This question has been designed to investigate the degree to which collaborative governance 
can improve mass transportation in London and Lagos. The question thus provides the 
medium for reflection on the usefulness, of the concept to the sustenance of mass 
transportation. 
 In addition to the three primary research questions developed for the study and 
indicated above, additional five supplementary questions were generated to provide empirical 
evidence and insight on how collaborative governance exist in both cases, and on the 
problems and capacities existing within and outside each system related to mass 
transportation. These questions shaped the semi-structured interview questions designed for 
the study and available in Appendix 2a and 2b. The supplementary questions include: 
What forms of collaborative governance can be identified? 
What are the mass transport problems? 
What capacity (within each city) exists to solve these problems? 
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2.3 Case study research  
 
In defining a case, Gerring (2007) and Yin (2009) suggest that it refers to the unit of 
analysis, and that can represent an individual, organisation, city or nation-state. In this study, 
the unit of analysis as with other cases was seen to have an identity, boundary and name. 
Thus, the system of governance of mass transportation was selected as the unit of analysis 
because of the roles it plays in sustaining mass transportation in both cities. A ‘system of 
governance’ is construed in this research as including strategic policy makers and actors who 
influence and shape the making and implementation of transport policies. By investigating the 
two systems in London and Lagos, additional knowledge is gained on the relations among 
actors in each system and on how and why the system sustains mass transportation policies in 
both cities. 
The case study approach as employed in this study primarily uses qualitative data 
while drawing on other methods due to its ability to describe and explain a phenomenon 
within its real-life context as observed by Yin (2009: 2). The method was adopted due to its 
capability in allowing the understanding of any given context as it seeks to understand any 
particular phenomenon in its uniqueness. Two cases (Lagos and London) provided the focus 
for gathering, analysing and comparing data. These cases were chosen for a number of 
reasons including: their desirability for testing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model of 
collaborative governance in states with different systems of government, the global city status 
of both cities as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the different stages of 
development of mass transportation in London and Lagos, and the cases operating within 
countries at different levels of political and institutional development (the UK as a developed 
country and Nigeria as a developing country). This helped provide a variety of evidence on 
how the system of governance affects the delivery of mass transportation, including how 
stakeholders relate with other actors in states with varying levels of institutional development. 
In gathering data from the cases, the main tool employed was semi-structured interviews. In 
addition to the interview data, some of the interviewees in both cases also provided secondary 
data in the form of reports and publications. 
Yin has defined a case study as a pragmatic inquiry which investigates a phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident (2009: 18). Burnham et al. (2008: 63-64) suggest that a case 
study methodology allows researchers to focus on a particular individual, group, institution, 
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and study it in depth. This reflects the activities that were engaged in while investigating the 
systems in Lagos and London. Burnham et al. (2008) also argue that a researcher proposing to 
carry out case study research should have developed research questions to guide the study and 
the process of data collection, analysis and presentation. 
From the review of the literature on the case study approach, it was clear that a case 
study method can generate both quantitative and qualitative data-sets in order to further our 
understanding of the unit of analysis in any given study; and generalisations can be achieved 
through the analysis of similarities and differences among cases. This research also draws on 
Gillham’s definition of a case study approach as investigating cases to answer specific 
research questions which demand the use of a variety of evidence in the domain of the case, 
as no single piece of evidence on its own will be sufficient to address the research questions 
(2000: 1-2).  
Gerring (2007: 20) suggests that a case study approach involves the rigorous study of 
a single case where the purpose of that study is aimed at shedding light on a larger class of 
cases (research population). Drawing on the work of Yin (2009) and Gerring (2007), it is 
clear that a case study approach relies on multiple sources of evidence (such as interviews, 
secondary data from reports and literature review) to enhance the reliability and validation of 
data. However, Burns (2000: 473) notes that the case study approach has limitations, some of 
which are also applicable to other methods, focusing in particular on reliability and 
generalisation. As regards the limitation of making generalisations from case study research 
due to the specific nature of the cases investigated, Stake (2000: 3) suggests that case study 
research is important because it presents cases in their uniqueness instead of using cases for 
wider generalisation thereby presenting evidence related and arguably exclusive to particular 
cases. While both cases in the study are unique in their own right, the study suggests that 
there are some generalisations which can be drawn from the two cases, and these are 
highlighted in Chapter 8. Given the information on case study research as discussed above, 
and the relevance of such characteristics in addressing the research questions in this study, the 
methodology was adopted as the framework for this thesis. 
2.4 Comparative analysis 
 
The selection of two cases enabled the use of comparison in order to examine the 
governance structure, available capacities and the relations among actors in London and 
Lagos, and hence to better understand the two systems in particular the role of collaborative 
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modes of governance in affecting mass transport services. Thomas (2011: 171) suggests that 
the basic principle governing the act of comparing is to capture or summarise the essence of 
the data collected through contrasting. Burnham et al. (2008: 66) claim that political processes 
are often clarified by comparing them with similar events and processes in other contexts. 
However, it is also emphasised that there are differences between the two cities, for example, 
in the level of infrastructural development, and the capacity existing for effective transport 
delivery in and around the cities.  
 
2.5 The study process and its commencement 
 
The study commenced in January 2010 with a comprehensive review of literatures 
focusing on collaborative governance and the governance of both cities (Lagos and London). 
After identifying the unit of analysis for the study, an attempt was made to ensure that there 
would be sufficient access to sources and potential data (interviewees, literatures and 
secondary documents). A review of potential interviewees and the possible data such research 
participants would contribute was conducted before the commencement of the fieldwork. This 
included the identification and listing of key stakeholders drawn across the spectrum of mass 
transport governance in London and Lagos (a list of all the persons contacted for interview is 
included in Appendix 4).  
From the review and electronic searches focused on collaborative governance and both 
cases, it was apparent that there was a dearth of research on how the concept of collaborative 
governance might be used to sustain mass transportation, and also enable the understanding of 
the systems in Lagos and London. The study thus aimed to bridge this gap. 
Following the literature review, semi-structured interview questions were generated to 
address the research questions and the objectives of the study (the template of the semi-
structured interview questions is presented in Appendix 2a and 2b). Before the primary data 
gathering process commenced, the researcher identified the actors known to play key strategic 
roles relating to mass transportation in both cases using a combination of snowball sampling 
and opportunistic sampling (DePoy and Gitlin, 1998: 172 and 2005: 153). Through 
opportunistic sampling, the researcher established inclusion and exclusion criteria and selects 
those individual who fit these factors and volunteer to participate in the study. The snowball 
sampling was also employed in asking research participants to provide access to others who 
meet study criteria (DePoy and Gitlin, 2005: 153). After consultation with the supervisory 
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team, it was agreed that data would be collected from organisations that play roles relating to 
mass transport strategy in both cases. While 52 actors (individuals and bodies) from across 
the organisations that play strategic roles in both cases were contacted (see Appendix 4 for a 
list of the actors contacted), the researcher was able to interview fifteen individuals from both 
cases; others sent their apologies for not being able to take part in the study due to their work 
commitment and limited time availability.  
The fieldwork in London took about 4 months (August to November 2011), largely 
due to the difficulty of getting interviews scheduled. The fieldwork in Lagos saw data 
collected from interviewees in February 2012. In some respects this was more straightforward 
as the researcher was able to use his network of contacts in getting interviews scheduled. As 
regards the issue of identifying data/interviewee sources and gaining access to the sources, the 
researcher found access to most data, including policy documents, available online on the 
website of organisations constituting the system in London. In contrast, there was little data 
available online or in hard copy relating to actors in the system in Lagos. In addressing the 
data gap in Lagos, the evidence gathered by the researcher from relevant actors through in-
depth semi-structured interviews and observations provided sufficient data useful for 
analysing the case. The interviews were transcribed verbatim from a dictaphone recorder and 
analysed in order to identify themes and findings that recurred in the study. The researcher 
used his interview notes to corroborate transcribed data in order to minimise the possibility of 
data loss or misinterpretation.  
Overall, the researcher communicated with potential interviewees an average of three 
times. The main means of communicating with participants was through an introductory 
letter
2
 (email) which introduced the researcher and some of the objectives of the study while 
also seeking an appropriate time to meet the potential interviewee to conduct the interview. In 
a few instances the researcher’s first communication with interviewees was through mobile 
phone communication. The second communication aimed to remind potential interviewees 
about the need for them to be involved in the study while reassuring participants that the data 
they provided would be treated with confidentiality
3
. Some interviews were also scheduled at 
                                                          
 
2
 See Appendix 3 – Introductory letter sent to potential interviewees 
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this stage. The third communication to research participants mainly thanked them for 
participating in the study. 
Attempts were made to compensate for the limited response rate through the use of 
secondary data (strategic documents such as the Mayor’s Transport Strategy, London Plan 
and the Report of the Presidential Committee on the Redevelopment of Lagos State), most of 
which contained evidence related to the roles of individuals who declined to be interviewed 
and the organisations that they represented. This secondary data supported most of the 
evidence presented by the interviewees, so it was concluded that the interviews provided a 
good representation of the views of actors in the systems. 
 
2.6. Semi-structured interviews 
 
At the commencement of every interview, the researcher acknowledged some of the 
past achievements of the interviewee or that of the interviewee’s organisation in order to 
establish a rapport with the interviewee. This is consistent with the suggestion of Arksey and 
Knight, that it is important to build rapport at the beginning of an interview (1999: 122). 
During the interview process, it was observed by the researcher that the semi-structured 
interview approach was useful due to its flexibility in terms of being able to probe 
interviewees with follow-up questions. These follow-up questions allowed the researcher to 
keep asking the interviewee questions until satisfactory answers were given. It was therefore 
possible to gather data which might have been almost impossible to access if a structured 
interview was employed. The interviews enabled the gathering of key evidence, both in terms 
of providing insights as primary data for the analysis in the empirical chapters, and in terms of 
adding to and validating the secondary data gathered for the study. 
As one might expect, some of the data provided by interviewees in each of the cases 
contradicted the evidence provided by other interviewees in the same case. For instance, the 
answers provided to the question: ‘In your opinion which organisation should be responsible 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
3
 Confidentiality and ethical considerations as relating to the wishes of interviewees to be anonymous was 
considered important in the study in order to protect interviewees while also assuring them of their safety. In 
protecting interviewees, Sieber suggests that a researcher could change the identifiable characteristics of the 
interviewee in order to protect the research participants (1992: 32-33). 
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for the overall strategy policy making of mass transportation in London?’ varied, as 
interviewees identified single and in some instances a mix of actors to lead the system. The 
diverse nature of the responses therefore added to the quality of data gathered in the study as 
it led to one of the findings of the study, namely that ‘actors involved in the systems of both 
London and Lagos do not agree on the organisation that should take the lead’ in the system. 
Overall, the researcher was able to ask each interviewee twenty-six questions, spanning 
government’s role in service delivery, public involvement, partnerships, accountability, 
performance, available capacity, funding, leadership, conflicts and challenges of mass 
transportation. 
The organisations from which interviewees originated were: the Greater London 
Authority (GLA), Transport for London (TfL), London Underground, City of London 
Corporation, London First, London Travel Watch, Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport 
Authority (LAMATA), Lagos State Water Authority (LASWA), Ministry of Transportation 
Lagos State, Lagos State University and the Office of the President of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. Evidence was gathered from individuals well placed to provide data representing 
these organisations due to the significant roles the organisations play as regards mass 
transportation. 
In seeking to secure interviews in London, forty-four individuals working for strategic 
organisations in the system were contacted by emails and telephone calls, of whom seven, 
representing six different organisations in the system, agreed to be interviewed. While this 
number of interviewees is relatively small, they provided clear and extensive data sufficient 
for addressing the research questions and objectives of the study relating to the case of 
London. Furthermore, the majority of the seven individuals interviewed in London provided 
additional substantial secondary data in the form of organisational reports and policy 
documents, which corroborated the primary evidence given while also providing extensive 
additional information on other actors in the system who were not interviewed. In Lagos the 
system is smaller, and has fewer actors than in London. Following requests made to 
individuals in ten strategic organisations, eight interviews were conducted with actors 
representing six bodies which play roles that sustain mass transportation in Lagos. While it 
could also be argued that the numbers of interviews conducted in the case of Lagos is also 
relatively low, the quality of the data provided by the interviewees, in addition to other 
secondary data gathered, such as publications by the Lagos state government, LAMATA, and 
other actors such as Nigeria’s Presidency, was sufficient to address the objectives and 
24 
 
research questions related to the case of Lagos. Thus although the numbers of interviewees 
was low, however, the primary data gathered were from twelve different organisations (six in 
each case) in the cases explored therefore presenting a more variety of data representative of 
the cases investigated. Furthermore, although all the interviewees were the most familiar with 
the subject of the study, nonetheless, it was noted that they emphasised some of the 
information already accessed by the researcher in policy documents such as the Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy, London Plan and the Report of the Nigerian Federal Government on the 
redevelopment of Lagos state. This further demonstrate that the numbers of interviews 
conducted was just enough for each of the cases.  
 
2.7 Interviewee consent 
 
Before conducting all the interviews in both cases, the researcher asked interviewees 
whether they would be willing to be quoted verbatim in future write-ups and also to complete 
a consent form
4
. While the University’s consent form lacked some information, such as a 
section explaining the purpose of the research and a description of how confidentiality or 
anonymity would be assured, as proposed by Sieber (1992: 33), the researcher included that 
information in the introductory letter sent to research participants. Of all the interviews 
conducted, only one interviewee requested to be quoted anonymously. In addition, a 
significant number of interviewees requested a copy of the thesis when it is completed, and 
these will be provided to those individuals.  
 
2.8 Method of data sampling 
 
 In selecting research samples, the researcher established selection criteria (research 
samples must come from organisations that play roles linked to mass transportation strategy 
making and its governance) that must be met by the organisation of the interviewee. Once 
identified organisations in both systems were seen to possess this criterion, they were 
included in a list of possible research samples generated by the researcher and contacted for 
scheduling an interview. After carrying out the last interview in both cases, it was clear to the 
                                                          
 
4
 See Appendix 5 – Consent form for Interviewees. 
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researcher that there was unlikely to be new additional significant primary data which might 
emerge from the study as the last interviews conducted in both cases substantially reflected 
most of the data collected from previous interviews. Nonetheless, the researcher observed 
after the analysis of the evidence and findings from the case of London that additional 
interviews aimed at gathering evidence on the incidence of blurred boundary among actors 
and in their roles, including the effects of such blurring to the workings of the system, could 
have further enhanced the findings from the study. In Lagos, the researcher encountered the 
unavailability of some key data, such as the budgets of the main organisations in the system. 
This arguably reflects the degree to which the system in Lagos is open yet to adequate 
scrutiny and accountability. In contrast, the study of the system in London demonstrated the 
availability of key policy documents such as the budgets of the organisations playing roles 
relating to the sustenance of mass transportation. Nevertheless, it was observed in the system 
in London that some aspects of lines of accountability lines were blurred. This was seen to 
have an effect on the overall functioning of the system as some actors queried how others use 
their powers and resources. The researcher was also surprised by the way actors in both 
systems employed the word ‘partnership’ even when what such actors meant was contracting 
or imperative coordination. 
 
2.9 Components of the research process and the research questions.  
 
The research process employed in this study has four key components. The first is the 
review of literatures, focused on collaboration, governance, collaborative governance and 
mass transport in Lagos and London; the second involved the use of semi-structured 
interviews to gather data from relevant stakeholders; the third was the analysis of secondary 
data, such as institutional stakeholders’ publications and transport committee reports, to 
corroborate the data gathered; and the final part involved the development of ideas and new 
knowledge.  
The first component of the research process reviewed key literatures focused on the 
theory and practices of collaborative governance. Following this, research questions 1, 2, 3 
were partly addressed (1 - What is meant by collaborative governance? 2 - How useful is the 
concept of collaborative governance for understanding mass transportation in London and 
Lagos? 3 - How far can collaborative governance improve mass transportation? and 
supplementary question such as, What capacity (within each city) exists to solve these 
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problems?). The conclusion of the first component led to the second, which was mainly 
concerned with the collection of primary data.  
During the second component, seven semi-structured interviews with an average 
duration of fifty-three minutes each were conducted in London across organisations in the 
system and analysed. Eight semi-structured interviews with an average duration of forty-two 
minutes each were conducted in Lagos across organisations in the system and analysed. By 
the end of this component, the research questions and supplementary questions were 
addressed with data gathered (see section 2.2 for a list of the research questions and 
supplementary questions).  
The third component involved the analysis of secondary data (publications) including 
that provided by some of the interviewees. Also, during this stage, references were made to 
some of the literatures examined in the first stage of the research, while some of the 
transcripts of the interviews conducted were also used in validating arguments. It is important 
to mention that further understanding was gained about the complexities and dynamics of 
both systems. 
The final phase of this study involved the development and application of new ideas 
based on evidences from the data collected, analysed and evaluated. At this stage, the concept 
of collaborative governance was critiqued while relevant lessons linked to the dynamics of the 
system, in particular why and how organisations collaborate with certain actors in the system 
including the factors that shape such collaboration, were examined.  
 
2.10 Data analysis 
 
The data gathered were examined, analysed and categorised into themes to allow for 
the drawing of empirical conclusions. Themes emerged during the process of data analysis, 
with the researcher identifying the dominant issues and ideas emphasised by relevant 
literatures and most interviewees as crucial for sustaining the two systems. Thus, there was 
the emergence of meaningful patterns which supported the creation of themes during the 
process of data analysis, thereby enhancing what Yin (2009: 128) labelled research output. 
The themes identified as recurring in the study included leadership, accountability, culture 
and funding regime.  
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The data gathered for this study were analysed on three levels (Creswell, 2009: 185-
186). The first level featured the transcription of all the interviews and their arrangement into 
different categories. The researcher also read through all the data in order to familiarise 
himself with the information and reflect on their meanings vis-a-vis the ideas (quality, tone 
and depth) presented by the research samples. This process was followed by the addressing of 
research questions and the establishment of new facts.  
The second level was the use of the themes generated to describe the setting of the 
systems in London and Lagos while giving detailed information about relations among the 
stakeholders in the system and issues relating to how they collaborated. Thereafter, there was 
a discussion of how the stakeholders in the system as a whole functioned in the narrative. In 
discussing the themes that recurred in the study, illustrations (cases, figures and tables) and 
quotations from interview transcripts were used to sustain or contest arguments. This was 
followed by the third level, in which the lessons learnt from the second level were applied to 
answering the research questions and to inform and reflect on the approach and the 
methodological process employed in the study. 
The components of the study and the process of data analysis thus illustrate the 
sequence of how the researcher distilled primary and secondary data to identify the themes 
that recurred in the study and the subsequent findings which arguably contribute to our 
understanding of the theory and practice of collaborative governance in the systems 
investigated. 
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2.11 Chapter conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the research process that supports the study focused on the 
cases of the systems in London and Lagos including how the evidence employed for analysis 
was gathered. One of the strengths of this study is that it takes a cross-system case study 
approach, as this provides insights into how systems in different contexts function. The study 
not only provided new data on the systems in both cases but also highlighted features of the 
complex relations among actors in each of the systems. The actors who took part in the semi-
structured interviews provided a mix of answers to many of the questions asked. For instance, 
it was observed from the responses of interviewees in both cases that while they all supported 
the presence of a leader for the system, they had contrasting views as to the factors that should 
be considered for choosing the leader for the system, and also on the issue whether the leader 
must be an individual or a mix of actors. Thus, due to the variation in the arguments of 
interviewees and the need to assure the quality of the data collected, other secondary data 
were employed in order to achieve the objectives of the study and address all the research 
questions generated. At the final stage of the research process, it was clear that the evidence 
gathered and employed in the study had provided significant insight into the workings of the 
systems in London and Lagos. 
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Chapter 3:  
Problematising collaborative governance 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter explores concepts central to this study, including collaboration 
(partnership), governance and collaborative governance. It begins with an overview of the 
concept of collaboration and its key characteristics, and an exploration of the concept of 
governance and its features. Section 3.4 then discusses some of the definitions of 
collaborative governance and its characteristics, and the factors that shape the success or 
failure of collaborative governance. The Ansell and Gash (2008) model was adopted for the 
study initially due to its identification of key variables, argued by its proponents as playing 
crucial roles in ensuring the success of collaborative mode of governance. The model is 
presented in section 3.8 and is used as a comparative framework for examining both cases in 
Chapters 5 and 7.  This is followed by the discussion of a range of ideas from the literature 
that focus on transport governance so as to better understand some of the factors that can 
sustain mass transportation. A working definition of collaborative governance is generated in 
section 3.6 since the latter can be argued to be a framework for analysis, or a means to an end, 
for example, the delivery of public services or the implementation of projects or policies in 
order to deal with problems. The chapter ends with section 3.9, which summarises key 
findings from the literature and links them with some of the research questions. 
The chapter is particularly concerned with the concept of collaborative governance in 
relation to how it might or might not sustain the delivery of public goods, especially mass 
transportation. The arguments of authors such as Rogers and Weber (2010), Chapman et al. 
(2010), National Policy Consensus Centre (2010), Siriani (2008), Ansell and Gash (2008), 
Evans (1995), Healey (2006), Newman et al. (2004), Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), Cope and 
Goodship (1999), and Rhodes (1996, 1997) are examined in respect of how they inform the 
definition and practicability of collaborative governance in the context of this research.  
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3.2 The concept of collaboration 
Collaboration as a concept is examined in this section, particularly in relation to how it 
fits with, and informs, the notion of a collaborative governance framework. It is, however, 
important to emphasise here that concepts such as ‘partnership’ and ‘collaboration’ are used 
interchangeably in the bulk of the literature. This thesis follows the practice of treating the 
concepts as having the same meaning even though they can be used by some authors to have 
slightly different meanings. In the 1990s, the New Labour Government used the concept of 
partnership interchangeably with other concepts like collaboration to refer to a new way of 
working in the public sector, during a time when various reforms including New Public 
Management (NPM) were implemented in the UK public sector. Collaboration is construed as 
shared effort undertaken by two or more people in order to achieve collective goals which 
none of the parties can achieve alone. 
In this thesis collaboration shall also be interpreted in the context of its usage in public 
governance and evidenced during the reform programmes of the New Labour Government 
from the 1990s. It can be recalled that the New Labour Government from the 1990s invested 
resources in initiatives such as Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) in order to encourage the 
public sector, private sector and third sector to work together across tiers of society in tackling 
problems of public service delivery (Chapman et al., 2010: 613). In justifying the use of 
collaborations, Blair argued that: 
“If local people are to enjoy a sound economy and a better quality of life and if 
communities are to deal with cross-cutting issues like youth justice, drug abuse and 
social exclusion, we have to harness the contribution of businesses, public agencies, 
voluntary organisations and community groups and get them working to a common 
agenda” (Blair, 1998: 10). 
It is thus clear that the use of collaboration from the 1990s is linked, on the one hand, to the 
inability of government to single-handedly fund the provision of public goods and services, 
and also to the desirability of collaboration as an ideology of the government. 
Collaboration is discussed and examined here based on three themes developed from a 
review of the literature: collaboration as a means (strategy) to overcome the challenges and 
inflexibilities generated by organisational, sectoral and national institutions; collaboration as a 
means to address policies; and collaboration as a collective action shaped by relevant cultures. 
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Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 1) claim that collaboration is a new word in the 
discourse of public governance, a word that relates to the sharing of responsibilities and 
overcoming the inflexibility created by organisational, sectoral and even national boundaries. 
However, they did not indicate how the responsibilities would be shared equally in 
collaborations or identify the person who would be tasked with this role. They did however go 
further and discuss three types of collaboration: public-private collaboration, public-voluntary 
sector collaboration, and multi-level ‘vertical’ collaboration, for example, as seen in the EU 
(Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002: 80-93). They further suggested that these types of 
collaborations have issues which affect collaboration in the public sector. The identified 
issues include capacity issues, dynamics and organisational issues, and the way in which 
citizens participate or refuse to participate in collaborative governance schemes. From this 
categorisation, it was noted that while public-private collaboration has the potential for 
delivering relevant capacities as constituting actors have both strategic and funding powers, 
public-voluntary sector collaboration lacks this same degree of strategic expertise.    
Along a similar line, Miliband (2006) argued that in order to enable collaboration, the 
government has a key role to play, especially pertaining to enabling voluntary organisations to 
deliver public goods and services in partnership with the public and private sectors, that is, 
ensuring the environment is conducive by guaranteeing security, established copyright 
system, and providing needed infrastructures. This affirms the steering role a government can 
play in the delivery of public goods. In addition, it can be noted that huge emphasis was 
placed on the use of partnerships under New Labour, while the government used area-based 
initiatives to involve the community and voluntary organisations in order to respond to 
emergent problems. 
Harding (1997: 74), while suggesting that collaboration is a means (strategy) to 
overcome challenges in the governance process, classified collaboration into three types: 
defensive collaboration, offensive collaboration, and shotgun collaboration. He argued that a 
defensive collaboration materialises due to a reduction in the resource base of organisations 
thereby causing an incapacitation of operational functions and targets. The need to address the 
incapacitation of operational functions and targets often leads to the establishment of a 
defensive collaboration. An offensive collaboration, on the other hand, emerges when a 
particular organisation cannot achieve set targets independently without recourse to other 
organisations that have the necessary expertise and knowledge. Thirdly, shotgun collaboration 
is determined by the need of an organisation to ensure that organisational targets are met. 
Hence, it can be noted that the management or constituted authority of any particular 
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organisation is responsible for determining the relevant institution(s) or agency(s) it might 
partner with in order to achieve its organisational goals. In general, it is important to note that 
political, economical, social, technological, environmental and legal (PESTEL) factors affect 
the organisational capacity and institutional operation of relevant stakeholders in any given 
collaboration. This view is illustrated in the argument of Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 11-12), 
which states that the success of collaboration is dependent on the prevalence of contextual 
factors. While the conceptualisation of Harding (1997) has shed light on how collaboration 
can be employed to attain the aims of partnering bodies, it is not clear as to how the particular 
aims of individual members could be separated from the overall partnership goals so as to 
avoid conflicts occurring among the collaborating actors. 
In order to reduce the influence of the complexities inherent in the process of 
establishing and operating partnerships, especially in the public sector, the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) (2000: 44-46) proposed that: partnerships 
must have a clear goal which incorporates a credible and coherent strategy; stakeholders 
(government, civil society, private and public sectors) involved in partnerships must learn to 
establish targets that are time-bound while also allowing a point in time which allows for the  
development of ways of working; and necessary consideration should be given to the 
functions of stakeholders and how they will shape the design of the partnership. While the 
propositions of DETR (2000) as pertaining to partnerships being goal orientated are consistent 
with the view of Harding (1997), the researcher is of the view that some of the preconditions 
suggested by DETR might not work, or work differently in various contexts, as demonstrated 
in the discussion of the study of Lagos in Chapter 7 where culture shapes policy related 
factors. Furthermore, the propositions of the DETR (2000) fail to consider other significant 
factors such as a sustainable funding regime and established rules in establishing and 
operating partnerships.  
March and Olsen (1995), Kooiman (2003), and Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) have argued 
that collaboration represents a means whereby people or bodies achieve a goal. Kooiman 
(2003: 102-103) argued that collaboration gained more prominence from the 1980s as it was 
desired by governments for the delivery of public goods and services.   Consequently, 
governments entered into collaborations in order to use the market know-how, expertise and 
other qualities present in the private sector to respond to the challenges experienced in the 
public sector. In the same way, the private sector benefitted from increased profits and the 
removal of various legal or administrative bottlenecks in its operations while entering into 
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partnerships with the government and other stakeholders. Furthermore, the private sector 
benefitted from an established long-term relationship with the government, which was 
especially useful for competitive reasons and gaining of insight about the operation of public 
administration (Ibid). Nevertheless, the evidence from the discussion of partnerships in 
Chapters 4 and 6 shows that, while it can be argued that the private sector does benefit more 
than the public sector to some degree from partnerships, the public sector does not always 
benefit from partnerships; this was demonstrated by the failure of a transport partnership in 
London (Metronet partnership, discussed in Chapter 4), resulting in government payment of 
the debt accruing from the partnership while the private sector partners walked away. 
The study of partnerships also demonstrates that collaboration can be vertical or 
horizontal. For instance, while referring to Rhodes’ (1997b: xv) comment which suggest that, 
‘messy problems demand messy solutions’, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 315) commented 
that the apparently tidy hierarchy of public bureaucracy should be reshaped to establish 
diagonal and vertical relationships with other bodies operating at different tiers and in 
associated policy ﬁelds. This then indicates how modes of collaboration are developed and 
employed to address policy problems. 
Whittington’s (2003: 15-16) conceptualisation of collaboration as an active form of 
‘working together’ qualifies the understanding of collaboration as a collective action shaped 
by relevant cultures. Whittington (2003) argued that the process of collaboration involves the 
collection of knowledge, skills, values and motives which are applied by practitioners and 
relevant persons in transforming several plans and ideas into practice. He further stated that, 
while an institution or individual may promote collaboration using norms and cultures, the 
same institution or individual may also constrain the collaborative process due to personal or 
institutional goals. Newman (2001) offered an example while arguing that even as New 
Labour attempted to promote collaborative governance, the government controlled the 
collaborative process by centralising key governmental functions, such as funding and 
revenue generation. Furthermore, central government was also seen to steer the collaborative 
process through the use of goals, targets and performance management cultures. Hence, it 
makes sense to establish that in understanding any given collaboration, there is a need to 
determine its mode and sphere of operation. 
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3.3 Summary of the key characteristics of collaboration 
 
In summing up the arguments of authors pertaining to the interpretation of 
collaboration, different themes were found to relate to different definitions. For instance, 
Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), Kooiman (2003), and Harding (1997) all suggest that 
collaborations exist as a means to an end. This is evidenced in the empirical study of this 
research discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. The authors also agree that collaborations share out 
responsibilities among their diverse members in order to achieve set goals. In another 
definitional stance, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) showed how vertical and horizontal 
relationships with bodies operating at different tiers and in associated policy ﬁelds constitute 
collaboration. Notwithstanding these definitional positions, it is clear that actors engaged in a 
partnership work towards the attainment of set collective goals while sharing effort. 
The multi-sector characteristic of collaboration as argued by Sterling (2005) was 
shared by Harrison et al. (2003: 4) while stating that collaborations facilitate local 
mobilisation and the pooling of resources, institutional synergy, and leverage in tackling 
socio-economic development problems. One criticism of collaboration is that due to the 
competitive nature of the parties, underlying suspicion may limit the degree of commitment to 
any collaborative venture, while a few privileged members of any given collaboration could 
take advantage of the process for their personal agenda. Besides, it can also be argued that 
collaboration could lead to an overstepping of boundaries, thereby risking corruption, 
commercial bias and policy distortion between the political system, private sector and 
markets. This then leads to a dislocation of political accountability, as market-based actors 
penetrate the political domain for their own interest (Harrison et al., 2003: 99-112).  
To conclude the discussion of collaboration, this section has shown its significance for 
the making and implementation of policies aimed at sustaining public goods and services. It 
was also shown that while collaboration exists across different spheres (horizontal and 
vertical), the absence of set rules and governance modes, discussed in the next section, could 
lead to negative actions and the incidence of overstepping the boundaries between actors. 
Also, it is important to note that there are certain challenges, such as how to, and who can, 
establish the criteria for determining the membership and leadership of collaborations. The 
failure to rise to these challenges may lead to collaboration failure. From the discussion of 
collaboration, it is clear that governance plays a key role in sustaining collaborations as 
argued by Healey (2006). The concept of governance is thus discussed in the next section. 
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3.4 The concept of governance  
 
While there is no single definition of governance, it has existed for a long time and its 
formal use can be traced back to the work of Plato, who referred to governance as a way of 
designing a system of rule (Kjær, 2004: 3). Governance as a concept witnessed a renaissance 
in the 1980s and 1990s as several authors (March and Olsen, 1995; Kooiman, 2003; Kjær, 
2004; Leftwich, 1993 and 1994; Rhodes, 1996 and 1997; Stoker, 1999, Rosenau, 1992 and 
1995) redefined the concept based on emerging trends. However, despite the definitional 
problem suffered by the term, in the context of this thesis it is interpreted as those rules and 
forms that guide collective decision-making (Stoker, 2004: 3). 
During the discussion of collaboration in the previous section, it was emphasised that 
governance is key for sustaining collaboration, especially through the use of rules. From the 
suggestions of Rosenau (1995), Stoker (2004) and Healey (2006), it is clear that governance 
includes governmental activities, especially the use of rules to regulate groups of actors who 
relate to each other within a socio-political system. For instance, Healey (2006: 206) 
comments that the system of governance of a society refers to the methods by which the 
collective affairs of that society are managed. Hence, “governance involves the articulation of 
rules of behaviour with respect to the collective affairs of a political community; and of 
principles for allocating resources among community members” (Ibid). Although government 
is not the only actor that influences a societal system, as observed in the study of the cases in 
London and Lagos discussed in Chapters 4 to 7, it is clear that it plays a key role in the 
governance process by which policies are made and implemented. To better understand 
governance, it can be discussed using two categories: governance as the rules and forms that 
guide collective decision making (Stoker, 2004), and governance as the networks that exist 
between actors (Rhodes, 1996). 
The discussion of the first category of governance focuses on the arguments of Stoker 
(2004) and Lynn et al. (2001) who noted that governance is constituted by the judicial 
verdicts, rules and forms which restrain and guide collective actions linked to the delivery of 
public goods and services. Thus, emphasis is placed on the relevance of rules and modes of 
governance in shaping the behaviour of actors in the society. While it is clear that there exist 
two forms of rules, including formal and informal rules, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 316-
318) argued for the existence of three modes of governance which shape the behaviours of 
actors in society: market governance mode, hierarchical governance mode and network 
36 
 
governance mode. Similarly, Kooiman (2003: 5) emphasised that governance operates in 
different modes including self-governing, co-governing and hierarchical governing.  
While formal rules include statutes, laws (written and unwritten) and constitutional 
provisions, informal rules consist of norms, beliefs, values and customs shared by a group of 
people. Through this means, governments and constituted authorities are able to govern socio-
political systems and mobilise resources to plan and implement policies which address the 
needs of citizens. During the governing process, rules are employed by governments who 
develop relevant institutions and bodies to act on its behalf in certain circumstances. To 
understand governance as structures that guide collective decision making and the behaviour 
of actors in a system, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) proposed three modes of governance. 
They suggested that while the market-governance mode revolves around the establishment of 
contractual relationships over property rights, especially through the use of pricing 
mechanisms, hierarchical-governance focuses on the imposition of an authoritative integrating 
structure which employs bureaucratic routines. Lastly, the network-governance mode 
suggests that actors are able to identify complimentary interests while developing 
interdependent relationships based on trust and reciprocity. Similarly, Kooiman (2003) noted 
three modes of governance (self-governance, co-governance and hierarchical governance) of 
which two are similar to the modes identified by Lowndes and Skelcher (1998).  
The discussion of the second category of governance draws upon the argument of 
Rhodes (1996: 658) which sees governance as self-organising networks where inter-
organisational linkages define service delivery. While employing networks, Rhodes (1996) 
pointed to the several interdependent actors which need to exchange resources, such as 
information and expertise, to achieve their objectives and to avoid becoming dependent on 
other actors. Rhodes (1996: 660) supported the idea that regulatory mechanisms such as PPPs 
may function well independently, as they are self-organising and not directly accountable to 
the state. While the suggestion of Rhodes (1996) is different from the earlier definitions 
considered in terms of his proposition of governance as self-organising and inter-
organisational networks with considerable independence from the state, the study as discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 6 did not find evidence of such self-organising networks. Nevertheless, his 
proposition of governance as a process incorporating exchange of resources, while there is 
also adherence to the rules of the game, is consistent with the arguments of Kooiman (2003), 
Stoker (2004) and Newman et al. (2004), and evidenced in the study. 
37 
 
Notwithstanding the challenges inherent in governance, it could be argued that the 
nature of governing in some states like the UK and USA has changed to the greater use of 
networks and collaborations, and from the state use of direct control to approaches devised to 
engage a number of stakeholders, thereby enabling the prospect of collaborative governance. 
However, despite such changes, the state still plays a key role (in terms of being both 
regulator and producer {Evans, 1995: 77-79}), using the tools of government; for example, 
law and regulation, public spending and taxation, bureaucracy, institutions, information and 
networks, especially to protect citizens, while also delivering relevant public goods and 
services (John, 2011: 10). In the UK for instance, the state has developed more means (for 
example, the use of commissions such as the National Audit Office and Ofsted) to regulate 
actors. 
Governance has also been conceptualised as ‘good governance’ by Leftwich (1993: 
610) who based his argument on three strands of good governance which include: the 
systemic (efficient public service), the political (respect for the rule of law) and the 
administrative (accountable administration). Thus, it is clear that the concept of governance is 
fluid and flexible as it takes different forms while ensuring public services are delivered by 
any permutation of government and the private and voluntary sectors in collaboration with 
other stakeholders such as citizens. The implication of this for the study is reflected in the 
empirical chapters where issues such as competition among actors and blurred boundaries 
were observed in the governance systems of both cases. 
 
 3.5 Summary of the key characteristics of governance 
This section has examined some common and particular features which traverse the 
previous discussion. First, it can be established that governance is about ‘rules and forms’. 
Stoker (2004) and Healey (2006) suggested this in their definitions. Furthermore, in 
discussing the concept, two categories including: governance as rules and forms that guide 
collective decision making (Stoker, 2004) and governance as networks existing between 
actors (Rhodes, 1996) was explored. While the study demonstrates the occurrence of the first 
category (governance as rules and forms) of governance in both cases as discussed in 
Chapters 4 to 7, the second category (governance as self-organising networks) of governance 
was not observed in London and Lagos as the partnerships and networks existing are not self-
organising as propounded by Rhodes (1996). 
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The discussion of governance according to Stoker (2004), Lowndes and Skelcher 
(1998), Rhodes (1996), Healey (2006), Kooiman (2003) and Lynn et al. (2001) also shows 
that the concept is flexible and fluid, and could be a means to an end as it uses different 
frameworks to mitigate problems while the government steers (or creates the enabling 
environment and methods for achieving set goals) the process by which rules and policies are 
made for relevant purposes. Notwithstanding the alleged capability of governance as argued 
by Healey (2006), some of the literature on the concept shows that the processes of 
governance have been construed by different authors to be marred by various factors such as 
conflicts and the challenge of how to determine who participates in the governance process.  
In summarising the discussion of governance, it is clear that government plays a key 
role in the governance process, especially through the use of government tools, for example 
law and regulation, bureaucracy and taxation, for the purpose of creating an enabling 
environment for the planning and implementation of policies that sustain public services 
delivery. The literature reviewed shows that at the core of governance are political processes 
(inclusive or exclusive), participating institutions, networks, and collaborations including a 
mix of actors from the public, private, voluntary sectors and civil society. Furthermore, 
Lowndes and Skelcher’s (1998) three modes of governance (‘market-governance mode’, 
‘hierarchical-governance mode’ and ‘network-governance mode’) illustrate the complexity 
and fluid nature of the concept. Hence, a deep understanding about the process and elements 
constituting the governance system will arguably provide further insights into the usefulness 
of the concept towards enabling and sustaining policies and public services.  
 
3.6 Collaborative governance 
 
 This section discusses the arguments of scholars who have focused on collaborative 
governance. The discussion begins by exploring the emergence of the concept. Thereafter, the 
definitions of collaborative governance by Ansell and Gash (2008) alongside the arguments of 
other authors are considered. The section then goes on to highlight the characteristics 
common to the definitions of collaborative governance.  
During the discussion of collaboration, it was emphasised that governance through 
rules and forms is key for sustaining the activities of partnerships. Furthermore, in the course 
of examining the concept of governance, it was stressed that the governance process is 
characterised by networks, groups and partnerships (Rhodes, 1996). Thus, it is clear that 
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relations exist between the concepts of collaboration and governance. The discussion here 
first draws on the definition of Ansell and Gash (2008: 544) which argue that collaborative 
governance is a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage 
non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process, in order to make or implement 
public policy or manage public programmes or assets. In addition, the discussion draws on the 
definition of an American institution, the National Policy Consensus Centre (NPCC) (2010) 
which defined the concept as the process wherein a leader engages with all sectors (public, 
private, non-profit, citizens, and others) in order to develop effective, lasting solutions to 
public problems that go beyond what any sector could achieve on its own. It is thus clear that 
collaborative governance encapsulate a significant proportion of the ideas of collaboration and 
governance.  
Collaborative governance emerged as a political science concept in the 1990s with 
significant focus on ‘governance’ as a result of the governance agenda (Ansell and Gash, 
2008). Although there is no established theory of collaborative governance, there are several 
definitions and propositions on the subject. Ansell and Gash suggested that the concept 
emerged as a response to the high cost of regulation and the politicisation of regulation by the 
state (Ibid: 544). Scholars including Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), NPCC (2010), Chapman et 
al. (2010) and Newman et al. (2004) have suggested that collaborative governance emerged 
during the period when the concept of governance witnessed a renaissance, that is, in the 
1980s and 1990s. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 14), for instance, suggested that the public 
sector in liberal economies, for example, the UK, witnessed remarkable changes (inclusion of 
more actors in the policy process) in their institutional structure due to domestic conditions 
such as an increasing demand for public goods. Thus, factors within states, such as 
partnerships and governance modes, enabled the participation of more non-state actors in the 
process of delivering public goods and services.  
Drawing on the comment of Ansell and Gash (2008: 544) above, and the prevailing 
ideology in most Anglo-Saxon political systems, including the UK, USA and Australia during 
the 1990s, which largely favoured the inclusion of more actors in the governance process as 
opposed to the government delivering most public services, it is clear that the emergence of 
collaborative governance was ideologically motivated. Notwithstanding the degree to which 
the shift from ‘government to governance’ was contested, the 1980s and 1990s in the UK 
witnessed the central government using contracting-out and other reforms to address the 
challenges of public service delivery. Consequently, the government reduced its role in the 
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direct delivery of public services. It is also worth noting that the so-called movement from 
‘government to governance’ partly reflected the increasingly multiscalar nature (acting across 
more than one geographical scale) of decision making, which was an indication of the 
opening up of those new issues that needed to be addressed by the state, especially through 
the re-examination of state strategies in order to deal with the challenges of public service 
delivery (Somerville, 2011: 81-82). 
While making reference to the occurrence of political and socio-economic changes in 
the USA, Ansell and Gash (2008: 543) argued that collaborative governance has emerged as a 
new approach to governing in order to replace adversarial and managerial modes of policy 
making and implementation, especially through the use of collaboration in coordinating 
governance and the delivery of public services. They further suggest that collaborative 
governance is different from earlier forms of governing as it is not a “winner-takes all” form 
of interest intermediation.  
Ansell and Gash (2008) identified factors including face-to-face dialogue, the building 
of trust, the development of shared understanding, knowledge of prior history of cooperation 
or conflict among collaborating institutions and institutional design, as important for 
collaborative governance. Put simply, Ansell and Gash (2008) suggest that collaborative 
governance is when public agencies and non-state stakeholders primarily employ 
collaboration for decision making in a formal and consensus-oriented process. While this 
emphasises the use of collaboration for decision making in a formal way, it is argued that 
decisions are not often made in this manner, neither in London nor Lagos, where the Mayor or 
the Governor make most governmental decisions, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. 
 The definition of NPCC (2010) reflects some of the arguments of Ansell and Gash 
(2008) especially on the use of collaboration between public agencies and non-state actors. 
The NPCC perspective identifies the need for a leader who engages with all sectors in order to 
address the challenges of public service delivery. Furthermore, NPCC (2010) argued that the 
best solutions to the challenges of public service delivery are realised when people from 
different spheres of life collaborate in addressing the issues. Thus, the body claims that 
solutions to challenges developed in collaborative governance last longer as they are the joint 
effort of all stakeholders. The researcher observes that collaborative governance may be 
appropriate in a policy area such as mass transportation because of the diversity of actors 
involved. However, in a sector such as military defence which employs particular actors and 
operates in a command and control way, it might not be relevant. It could also be argued that 
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collaboration has not been relevant in the armed forces, which are predominantly controlled 
by the government. 
 For collaborative governance to work effectively and efficiently, NPCC (2010) 
established that it must have three elements: a sponsor, a leader and a neutral forum. The 
‘sponsor’ was suggested to be an agency, foundation, civic organisation or public-private 
coalition to initiate and provide support. The ‘leader’ was required to be a governor, 
legislator, or local official with the power to attract and bring various people together to work 
on common problems that would be solved collectively and which cannot be unravelled 
individually. Thirdly, it was argued that collaborative governance needed a ‘neutral forum’ to 
act as an unbiased organisation in terms of providing and ensuring a skilled process of 
management.  
Following from these three elements, NPCC (2010) established that the collaborative 
governance system revolves around sponsors identifying and raising an issue, for instance the 
challenges of transportation, land use coordination and the need for improved coordination 
and collaboration between local governments and state/federal transportation agencies in the 
US (NPCC, 2006: 1); the convening of all needed participants by a leader; the adoption of a 
framework by participants for addressing the issue; conveners and participants’ framing and 
reframing issues for deliberation; a neutral forum/facilitator designing and conducting a 
process for negotiating interests and integrating resources; the writing of an agreement to 
establish accountability; and sponsors identifying and raising an issue or opportunity calling 
for a collaborative response. It was further argued by NPCC that the aforementioned system 
can work anywhere as long as several key principles such as: transparency; equity and 
inclusiveness; effectiveness and efficiency; responsiveness; accountability; and consensus-
based decision making are adhered to. While the NPCC is an American based institution 
which has implemented collaborative governance schemes with stakeholders in the US, they 
present a scenario of actors in the US, in particular in the transport sector, as willing to work 
with each other in partnership. However, this view does not necessarily hold in places where 
actors only engage in partnerships when they cannot attain their goals alone. Nonetheless, 
some of the preconditions they identify, for instance equity and accountability, constitute 
some of the key factors which shape the degree to which a partnership would be successful.  
In considering another definition of collaborative governance, Evans (2007: 15) 
suggested that the concept signifies a change for the method of governing society since it is 
the increasing way in which public services and public goods are delivered through 
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collaborative and networking structures of governance involving state and non-state actors 
based on clear operating rules and trust. Additionally, Evans (2007: 15-16, 47-48) defined 
collaborative governance as an administrative model involving: public-private partnerships, 
participatory appraisal supported by NGOs, and an increase in the use of non-departmental 
public bodies, for example, regional development agencies to enhance development. The 
strength of Evans’ (2007) arguments about the use of collaborative governance dwells on how 
various institutions can use each other’s strengths to negate weaknesses through 
‘networking’5 in order to facilitate partnerships for the delivery of public goods. He is also of 
the view that the partnerships developed would further enhance information flow and 
knowledge sharing as various institutions collaborates in achieving their goals. 
 While Evans (2007: 15-16) argued that collaborative governance is dependent on the 
networking of various structures of governance involving state and non-state actors, the study 
of the cases in London and Lagos show that collaborative governance cannot be based on 
networks alone. Networks should be seen as embedded in socio-political environments, and 
shaped by formal institutions (stable structures) which form partnerships as independent units 
with goals focused on development and service delivery. Seeing institutions as independent 
units will reduce the duplication of functions and responsibilities as they work towards the 
same overall goal while being subjected to public scrutiny.  
 The arguments of Newman et al. (2004: 204-205) that focus on the two concepts of 
‘project politics’ and ‘politics of presence’ provide a further explanation as to the process of 
collaborative governance. They argued that the policy context developed by New Labour and 
which was implemented across the UK saw policy papers full of concepts such as 
collaboration and partnership. Newman et al. (2004) suggested that it is precisely in the 
domain of ‘project politics’ (how to engage citizens in helping solve particular or local policy 
problems), and the ‘politics of presence’ (how to enable citizens to voice their interests, 
experiences and identities in the deliberative process), that deliberative forums were situated.  
Newman et al. (2004) stated that New Labour introduced policies that involved a new 
form of collaborative agreement between the state and citizens based on a concept of active 
                                                          
 
5
  Evans (2007) argued for networking as a vital component of collaborations due to it unifying collaborators in 
the delivery of governmental services. This same view of the use of networks for effective collaboration is 
shared by Rhodes (1996, 1997). 
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citizenship, involving service users and other stakeholders in the decision making process. 
Newman et al. (2004: 206) also argued that many of these policies required organisations to 
involve stakeholders in their organisational and community structural arrangements. In the 
NHS, for example, citizen representatives were included on the boards of the new Primary 
Care Trusts, while national and neighbourhood forums were established to involve patients 
and citizens in consideration of health care decisions. Thus, a collaborative form of 
governance was observed during the New Labour government of the 1990s.  
Having explored some definitions of collaborative governance, a working definition is 
generated for the study in order to aid analysis. Regardless of its ambiguity, collaborative 
governance in this study is defined as ‘the process of providing public services and goods, for 
example, mass transportation, through a network of collaboration involving government and 
non-governmental actors based on clear operating rules’. 
 
3.6.1 Factors that shape the success or failure of collaborative governance 
 
 Researchers in the field of collaborative governance have identified that power and 
resource unevenness will affect the incentives of stakeholders in participating in the 
collaborative process (Gunton and Day, 2003). Gray (1989) further argued that the degree of 
power possessed by stakeholders also influences their motivation to engage in collaborative 
governance. It was noted by Brown (2002) that the incentives that motivate stakeholders 
increase as they see a direct relationship between their participation and substantial powerful 
policy outcomes. Thus, it is clear that when the incentives of stakeholders are low, and when 
they can achieve their own goal without collaborating with others, they tend not to engage in 
any collaborative governance process.  
In addition to the aforementioned factors that can shape the success and failure of 
collaborative governance, Ansell and Gash (2008: 554-555) suggested the presence of a 
facilitative leader to guide the collaborative process in order to ensure stakeholders focus on 
achieving set goals. Chrislip and Larson (1994: 125) further elucidated that the leadership 
style of any person coordinating collaborative governance should be like that of the custodian 
(for more information on the ‘custodian’ role of the state or facilitator or leader of any 
collaborative framework see Evans (1995: 78-79). In addition, Ryan (2001: 241) identified 
three key skills of an effective leader of a collaborative governance framework: the ability to 
adequately manage the process of collaboration, to maintain the credibility of the process, and 
to acknowledge that the collaborating stakeholders are empowered to make realistic decisions 
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which are acceptable to all. Lasker and Weiss (2001: 31) further supported Ryan’s (2001) 
argument by arguing that leaders of collaborative governance set-ups should have the 
requisite skills to enable them to advance broad and dynamic participation, guarantee broad-
based influence and control, assist in the development of fruitful group dynamics, and 
broaden the capacity of the process. 
Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) used a series of studies to answer questions traversing 
accountability, collaboration, governance and citizenship to establish themes relevant to the 
concept of collaborative governance. They focused in particular on New Labour’s 
collaborative schemes such as Health Action Zones, City Challenge, Sure Start, Community 
Safety, Public Involvement and Neighbourhood Management Programmes. They identified 
five key imperatives dictating whether or not actors and organisations collaborate, including 
the need for achieving a shared vision, maximising the use of available resources, addressing 
complexity in policy or service environments, maximising power and influence in relation to 
a policy or service area, and resolving conflict.  
Chapman et al. (2010: 613) argued that the move towards establishing collaborative 
governance in the UK witnessed the establishment of initiatives emphasising the use of 
partnerships, for example Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Local Area Agreements 
(LAAs). They also maintained the argument of Ansell and Gash (2008) regarding the use of a 
facilitator (individual or institution) in a collaborative governance framework. 
 
3.6.2 An exploration of arguments which critique the idea of collaborative governance 
 
From the discussion of collaborative governance, it is clear that the concept, along 
with others such as collaboration and governance, employ some similar elements, for 
example, the use of rules, thus creating a definitional problem for collaborative governance. 
For instance, the discussion of collaborative governance illustrates the relationship between 
concepts (collaboration, governance and collaborative governance) and some incidence of 
blurring in their definitions. Thus in evaluating collaborative governance, the discussion will 
focus on issues relating to the emergence of the concept, its definitional problems, its features, 
its practice, and the relevance of the concept for sustaining mass transportation. 
 
The literature (Ansell and Gash, 2008; NPCC, 2010; and Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002) 
states that collaborative governance emerged in the 1990s as desirable for addressing 
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problems linked to the delivery of public services in the US and UK. In the course of 
exploring literatures focused on collaborative governance, it has become clear that the 
emergence of the concept was ideologically driven, as the governments in the US and UK 
implemented some reforms which considered it advantageous to employ more actors, 
including private sector bodies, to help the state in the provision and delivery of public goods. 
Thus, it could be argued that collaborative governance was an instrument used by the UK and 
US governments to reduce the state role in delivering services at particular times. 
Consequently, it is clear that the idea of collaborative governance as argued by Ansell and 
Gash (2008) and NPCC (2010) might only be useful in socio-political systems similar to the 
UK and US, which desire to delegate the delivery of some state services to non-governmental 
bodies. 
Arising from the definitional problems suffered by collaborative governance are 
various claims by scholars on factors alleged to enable its success. While some of these 
claims are contentious, others were observed in the study. For instance, Ansell and Gash 
(2008) claimed that the history of cooperation and conflict between actors in a collaborative 
governance framework determines the degree to which the collaboration will be successful. 
While this may arguably be true, nevertheless, some bodies are likely to enter into 
collaborative frameworks due to what they perceive as the future benefits. Furthermore, 
Chrislip and Larson (1994), Evans (1995), Ryan (2001) and Ansell and Gash (2008) all 
argued that a leader (facilitator) is necessary to coordinate actors and enable the attainment of 
the overall aim of the collaboration. This assertion may be true, as it was demonstrated in the 
study in Chapters 5 and 7 that a leader is essential for coordinating the systems in London and 
Lagos. However, the literature failed to establish how a leader should be chosen for a 
collaborative governance framework and the factors that must be considered in choosing such 
a leader. Gunton and Day (2003) and Gray (1989) further argued that the level of power and 
resource unevenness in any collaborative governance framework will affect the success of 
such a structure. Resource inequality was seen in both Lagos and London as it was clear from 
the study that both the Mayor of London and the Governor of Lagos state wield enormous 
power. Nevertheless, the study makes it clear, as discussed in Chapters 4, 6 and 8, that the 
leaders in each city employ partnerships and compulsory means in coordinating actors in the 
system to enable service delivery. 
While the UK Labour government in the 1990s claimed that its government reform 
programme aimed to involve more actors in the policy making and governance processes 
(Cabinet Office, 1999: 6), the arguments of Cope and Goodship (1999: 5) show that the 
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government instead regulated public and private sector agencies through the use of regulatory 
agencies located in the public sector and operating inside government and outside government 
in order to shape the activities of the agencies and institutions delivering public services. 
Cope and Goodship (1999: 6) also note that the act of regulating public services corresponds 
with the emergence of NPM which was used by central government in the restructuring of 
policy networks which were traditionally resistant to reform. Thus, the emergence of NPM 
witnessed the process of centralising government policy strategy and goals in the core 
executive (government), while also decentralising the delivery of policy to various agencies 
such as local authorities, private contractors and voluntary bodies. 
It is therefore clear that while central government implemented its reform programme 
in the 1990s, it was perhaps just interested in transferring the delivery of some of its functions 
to the private sector and not necessarily interested in working in partnership with the 
collaborators due to the regulatory agencies it employed for regulating the sectors. It is then 
important to note the argument of Cope and Goodship (1999: 7) which affirmed that NPM 
advanced the capacity of steering agencies, such as government and core executive agencies, 
to manage rowing agencies, for example local authorities and quangos within their 
jurisdiction, thereby establishing interdependence and mutual dependence between sponsors 
(government and core executives), regulators (agencies such as the Audit Commission), and 
regulated (local authorities and other established bodies). This further confirms that public-
service regulation especially that which relied upon the implementation of NPM was a means 
of control used by the central government to govern the activities of the agencies and 
institutions offering public services (Cope and Goodship, 1999: 10). Furthermore, since the 
government began steering the process of public service delivery, it also employed regulation 
as an instrument to coerce agencies and other bodies responsible for delivering public goods 
and services, into implementing its policy goals. Consequently, rather than working with 
partners from various sectors, central government was regulating the so-called partners. 
In this instance, it makes sense to ask whether central government was truly interested 
in implementing collaborative governance or not. Rather, the researcher is of the view that the 
notion of implementing collaborative governance was a ploy to attain government policy 
priorities as shown in the study of the case of London discussed in Chapter 5. It is also 
important to note that the collaborative governance framework promoted by the New Labour 
central government (1997-2010) was the vertical, top-down approach which witnessed the use 
of centrally driven targets and performance indicators, which were set by the central 
government for local authorities. This framework affected the participation and process of 
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meeting the needs of locals as such needs were more often than not supported by central 
government targets due to policy goal differences between the two levels of government. 
Newman et al. (2004: 216) cited an example where a group of local people had identified 
learning disabilities as a core area which they wanted to tackle but their wishes were not 
granted as they were not reflected in central government policy targets. In summing up the 
practice of collaborative governance in the UK during the New Labour government, Newman 
et al. (2004) stated that the implementation of central government policies was full of rules 
and participatory models forced on institutions and stakeholders. 
Another assessment of collaborative governance by Ansell and Torfing (2015) suggest 
that critical issues including the tensions inherent in collaboration across scales or at multiple 
scales play key roles in influencing the process whereby the collaborative framework adapt to 
changing problems and demands. The authors thus made the argument for the need to 
understand cross- and multi-scale collaboration and the dynamics of collaborative scaling as 
they were argued to be critical for realising the limits of collaborative governance. 
From the discussion of collaborative governance, characteristics, including the 
presence of a leader, partnership and networks were identified as common in the literature. 
Arguably, the discussion of collaborative governance does not just present a variety of 
interpretations which can be used as an analytical framework, but also demonstrates the 
relations between concepts including collaboration and governance. While the discussion of 
collaborative governance points to the relevance of collaboration from the 1990s, the study 
also illustrates the existence and relevance of partnerships today, in both London and Lagos. 
Collaborative governance has arguably the capacity to sustain mass transportation if practised 
as demonstrated by the ‘Clark County habitat conservation plan for desert tortoise’6. In this 
case, the Clark County Desert Conservative Program (DCP) was established through a 
collaborative medium that included local government representatives, interest groups and land 
owners, and which aimed at implementing actions to ensure the survivability of desert 
tortoises. Hence, the possibility of the concept existing in both cases shall be investigated and 
discussed in the empirical chapters and concluding chapter. 
                                                          
 
6
 See details of the collaborative governance process leading to the protection of the endangered desert 
tortoise at http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/Depts/dcp/Pages/About.aspx   
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3.7 Urban transport governance 
 
This section moves from the exploration of the concepts underpinning this study to 
examine literature particularly focused on transport governance, in order to better understand 
how mass transportation governance systems can be sustained. Kennedy et al. (2005: 393) 
suggested that the achievement of sustainable transportation requires the establishment of four 
pillars: effective governance of land use and transportation; a fair, efficient, stable funding 
regime; strategic infrastructure investments; and attention to neighbourhood design.  
Bourne (1982) argued that a city is a complex system wherein changes in one part will 
affect other parts. Similarly, and due to several issues including capacity and funding issues, 
the cities investigated in this study are arguably complex systems. In choosing an ideal body 
to effectively plan the governance of a city, Kennedy et al. (2005: 398) argued for the balance 
of qualities including spatial representation, structure, democracy and market philosophy. 
These factors are considered in both London and Lagos and discussed in Chapters 4 to 7. 
Kennedy et al. (2005: 401) state that the development of efficient and long-term 
financing for transportation systems is important for the wellbeing of cities, either for 
investing in old or new infrastructures or for the long term functioning of the system. 
However, the funding of transport infrastructures in the systems investigated in this study has 
faced enormous pressure in recent times due to a reduction in government grants. Hence, the 
relevance of funding shall be investigated in the empirical chapters of the study. Having re-
evaluated the governance of transportation, Kennedy et al. (2005) argued that cities may 
benefit from alternative funding mechanisms for sustainable financing of transportation 
including: a general tax base as practised in places including Canada and the UK; fuel taxes as 
practised in countries like Germany and the USA; fees related to both vehicles and tolls as 
practised in places like France and Japan; Public-Private Partnerships of which some are 
judged to be more successful than others; the creative use of transit assets and fare revenue 
enhancements such as cashless fare payments. 
Infrastructural investments in both transit and private vehicle infrastructures were also 
argued to be essential for the vitality of cities. Kennedy et al. (2005: 406) suggested that if the 
essence of sustainable transportation is to reduce auto dependence without compromising 
urban mobility and accessibility, it is important for sustainable transportation to include an 
extensive and well-integrated public transit system that is able to provide adequate capacity to 
meet the travel needs of urban commuters. 
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Through land use and supportive micro neighbourhood designs, neighbourhoods were 
argued as relevant, while supporting investments in capacity schemes to sustain 
transportation. For instance Kitamura et al. (1997) suggested that residents’ attitudes can play 
a more important role than land-use characteristics in explaining the choices of people as 
regards transport modes. Thus, it is argued that the role of local neighbourhood design in 
sustaining urban transportation requires more than just developing pedestrian-friendly 
neighbourhoods where people live, but also where they work and visit (Kennedy et al. 2005: 
409). Having discussed the four pillars of sustainable urban transportation according to 
Kennedy et al. (2005), the relevance and occurrence of these themes shall be explored along 
with other concepts in both cases investigated in the study. 
The complexity of transport governance has been confirmed by Docherty and Shaw 
(2009). They argued that planning and making transport policies for different transport modes 
requires collaboration between government levels and relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, 
they emphasised that government plays a key role in transport-related activities, as transport 
planning and implementation requires coordination and regulations. Also, government was 
argued as playing a key role in mass transport management and planning as it can employ the 
use of partnerships or coordination to ensure its policies are implemented. This view will be 
investigated further in the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
3.8 The model of collaborative governance used for examining the case studies 
 
After reviewing the literature on collaborative governance, the Ansell and Gash (2008) 
model was adopted to provide a comparative framework for analysing the case studies. The 
model was employed primarily due to its identification of key variables, presented in Figure 1 
below, and argued by its proponents to play a crucial role in ensuring the success of 
collaborative modes of governance. It is important to note that the proposed variables were 
identified by the authors after reviewing 137 cases of collaborative governance across a range 
of policy sectors. By employing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model as a comparative 
framework, the study is able to test the relevance or irrelevance of the critical variables 
identified by the authors as influencing the success, or otherwise, of collaborations. 
Furthermore, reflecting on the roles of the variables and crucial factors proposed by Ansell 
and Gash (2008) within the collaborative process using evidence from the cases explored here 
will advance the study on collaborative governance. Although some of the literature (Evans, 
1995; Chrislip and Larson, 1994; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; and NPCC, 2010) supports 
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elements of the variables proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008), others (Emerson et. al, 2012) 
have argued that the definition of the concept remains amorphous, and that there is 
inconsistency in its use. 
For clarity, Figure 1 below presents the essential variables and ingredients of the 
Ansell and Gash (2008) collaborative governance model employed in analysing the cases 
investigated in this study. 
 
Figure 1: Ansell and Gash (2008) model of collaborative governance 
 
Source: Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2008), ‘Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice’, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, Vol.18, No.4, pp.550. 
 Ansell and Gash (2008) presented a number of variables, including starting conditions, 
institutional design and facilitative leadership, as influencing the collaborative governance 
framework they proposed. Their model suggests that within the collaborative framework is a 
variety of influential factors, including face-to-face dialogue, trust building, commitment to 
process, shared understanding and intermediate outcomes. While the propositions presented 
above by Ansell and Gash (2008) as helping to sustain the collaborative governance 
framework are tested by drawing on evidence and findings from the cases investigated in the 
study, as discussed in Chapters 5, 7 and 8, the model is further critiqued in the empirical 
chapters based on its overly normative stance, problem of generalisation and definitional 
problems as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
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3.9 Chapter summary 
 
 To conclude the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that governance, collaboration 
and collaborative governance are not clear concepts. However, these concepts do relate to one 
another. It was shown in previous paragraphs that there exist some similarities and differences 
among the propositions of scholars as to the concepts, thereby making it possible to identity 
cross-cutting characteristics such as the relevance of a leader and joint-working, the relevance 
or irrelevance of which is validated in the cases explored in this study. 
This chapter has achieved three tasks central to this study. First, it has discussed and 
reviewed literature not just relating to the concept of collaborative governance, but also on the 
related concepts of collaboration and governance. Second, the chapter has attempted to 
address the first research question of the study (What is meant by collaborative governance?) 
while also providing the conceptual framework for the factors that must be considered while 
addressing both the second (How useful is the concept of collaborative governance for 
understanding mass transportation in London and Lagos?) and third (How far can 
collaborative governance improve mass transportation?). Third, the discussion of concepts 
and the review of the literature in the chapter have shown that some of the empirical issues 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 such as the incidence of conflicts and partnership in both 
systems are consistent with conceptual arguments, while the finding relating to the 
disagreement among interviewees in both systems, as to which actor is best suited to lead the 
system, constitute a significant finding which enhances the understanding of the concept of 
leadership.  
 The chapter demonstrates that although the concept of ‘collaborative governance’ can 
be used as an analytical framework which can be employed to explain how the challenges of 
public service delivery might be addressed, nevertheless, the concept can also be problematic 
due to its fluid nature as argued by Emerson et al. (2012). Chapman et al. (2010) and Healey 
(2006) have commented that the cultures existing within organisations and across sectors play 
key roles in either enabling or hindering the use of collaborative governance to deliver public 
goods and services. It is worth noting that the various challenges pervading the collaborative 
governance process are due partly to the flexibility of the constantly changing governance 
process and the nature of the institutions constituting the governance process. To better 
understand the concepts discussed in this chapter, their relevance are explored in the study 
and discussed in Chapters 4 to 8. 
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Chapter Four: 
The governance structure of London and mass transport capacity 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the historical background to the current government structure 
of London and the capacities existing to address mass transport problems in order to sustain 
mass transportation. It traces when, why and how relevant government institutions and mass 
transport bodies were established. The chapter commences with a discussion of the role of 
local authorities in London. Sub-sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3 then explore the development of local 
government from 1835 to 2010. Thereafter, section 4.3 discusses the emergence of mass 
transportation in London. Section 4.4 then goes on to analyse central government – Greater 
London Authority (GLA) relations, including the factors shaping the relationship between 
both organisations. Sub-sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.3 discusses three forms of partnership observed 
from the system in London. This is followed by an overview of key projects, both delivered 
and ongoing, which contribute to the study of research questions 7 (What capacity (within and 
outside each city) exists to solve these problems?) and 8 (How can this capacity be 
strengthened?). Section 4.8 then goes on to present a summary of the chapter, while linking 
the evolution of government structures in London with the emergence of the present Greater 
London Authority (GLA), which incorporates the Mayor and London Assembly. 
 
4.2 The place of local authorities in London governance 
 
Local authorities in England and Wales historically have played two main roles: a 
service provider and a political instrument used for promoting local democracy (Keating, 
1991 in Pierre, 1997: 2). London’s governance structure has evolved over time due to the 
changing socio-economic, political and cultural characteristics of the city. London’s economic 
dynamism, among several factors, has arguably enhanced its status in becoming a global city 
where mass transportation play key roles in sustaining socio-economic development, mobility 
and the status of the city. In understanding the workings of London governance, particular 
attention must be paid to different actors and local authorities (London boroughs) who are the 
closest government to people in communities.  
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London boroughs, including the City of London Corporation, aim to implement the 
London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy to enable the provision of services to meet the 
needs of people while also improving welfare through the provision of services like housing 
and bus passes for people in certain age groups. The twenty-five members of the London 
Assembly (which scrutinises the Mayor and other bodies responsible for delivering services) 
represent different London boroughs. Furthermore, it was discussed in Chapter 5 that some of 
the elected members of the London Assembly serve as Deputy Mayors to the Mayor. This 
then shows that local authorities in London do not only aid the delivery of goods and services 
but also enable the rise of politicians from local constituencies to borough level and then to 
the GLA level where they constitute London’s governance system. It is thus clear that local 
authorities (boroughs) in London play some roles (implementation of some GLA policies, 
collection of taxes for instance council tax and other charges like the Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL) and enablers of actors constituting the GLA) which enable and 
sustain the governance of London thereby indicating some relationship between both levels of 
government (GLA and London boroughs). 
 
4.2.1 London’s local authorities (1835-1889) 
 
This section is the first of three which discusses the emergence of institutions in 
London, which sustains the governance process and the delivery of public services. The 
emergence of institutions in London commenced with the creation of the Metropolitan Police 
by the Metropolitan Police Act on 19
th
 of June 1829. The Metropolitan Police force was 
created to address the societal challenges linked with urbanisation and the industrial 
revolution which led to an increase in London’s population and additional economic 
expansion. Thus, existing social systems such as the transport system and health structures 
were unable to meet the demands of users. Furthermore, the existing volunteer constables and 
‘watchmen’ could not cope effectively with managing crime in London; consequently, Sir 
Robert Peel was nominated to head the Metropolitan Police so as to address the emerging and 
ongoing problems in London most of which were linked with urbanisation (National Digital 
Archive of Dataset-Metropolitan Police).  
The Metropolitan Police was the first city-wide institution in London, and it was 
accountable to the Home Secretary (Travers, 2004: 22). After the establishment of the 
Metropolitan Police, emergent problems linked with urbanisation and sanitation, in addition 
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to increasing poverty, provoked the creation of other government institutions. Parliament 
passed the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 to give relief to the poor while establishing 
Poor Law Boards of Guardians to govern at the local level (Wilson and Game, 1994: 42-44). 
Thereafter, in 1835, the Municipal Corporations Act was passed by Parliament in order to 
establish the process of direct election of corporate boroughs in England and Wales so as to 
change the self-electing and corrupt medieval corporations (ibid).  
Urbanisation due to the industrial revolution created some challenges including the 
need to provide sufficient transportation infrastructures as a result of the influx of people in 
and out of London, and to address sanitation problems such as those relating to housing and 
other welfare needs. Consequently, existing local authorities were not able to meet public 
demands and needs relating to transport provision and health care as they lacked the capacity 
needed to address the diverse problems in existence. These factors and others provoked 
central government to embark on reforms targeted at the activities of local authorities. The 
Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW) was established by Parliament through the Metropolis 
Management Act of 1855, and mandated to primarily address the sanitation challenges 
London faced, especially the terrible state of the Thames, which had a foul smell (Travers, 
2004: 21-23). Other immediate responsibilities of the MBW were to create necessary 
infrastructures such as major streets, the embankment, and to set up the fire brigade to match 
the demands generated by London’s fast growth (ibid, 24).  
In other places outside London around the end of the nineteenth century, various 
authorities oriented towards delivering public services to solve emergent problems were 
established and given certain economic and political powers, for example, as regards the 
financing and provision of services like housing, road infrastructures, and health care. Some 
of the authorities that provided the aforementioned services included counties, boroughs, 
county boroughs, urban districts, and rural districts. An important feature of these institutions 
was that they were urban authorities directly elected by ratepayers, although suffrage was 
restricted to adult male ratepayers with more than three years’ continuous residence in 
London (Wilson and Game, 1994: 44). 
 Although central government initiated reforms in the late 19
th
 century in London, 
local authorities experienced chaos in some of their activities, for example, in the process of 
rate collection, which was marred by rate irregularities and collection disorderliness. Thus, 
central government played an enabling role facilitating the provision of public goods 
especially through the MBW, and its successor the London County Council (LCC), by 
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financing projects and developing infrastructures. The enabling role played by central 
government thus influenced local authorities to play similar roles. It is also worth noting the 
creation of other bodies for example, the Metropolitan Fire Brigade established 5
th
 July 1865.  
Some of the significant highlights in the activities of the MBW include the 
construction of a sewerage system, creation of embankments, and the establishment of a fire 
brigade. Regardless of the achievements the MBW made in terms of building some 
infrastructures, it did not allow for representative democracy, and its officials engaged in 
corrupt practices such as not declaring all the taxes they collected. As early as 1885, Lord 
Salisbury had claimed that the Cabinet was in support of full reforms of local authorities 
particularly in London. Such reforms, according to Salisbury, included having elected local 
authorities, ensuring that they are fully (financially and politically) independent, accountable 
and have sufficient powers (Young and Garside, 1982: 54). Consequently, central government 
initiated a reform which materialised through the Local Government Act of 1888, establishing 
the two-tier structure of elected local authorities throughout England (62 County Councils and 
61 County Boroughs), and London’s first directly elected city-wide local authority - the 
London County Council (LCC) in 1889 (Wilson and Game, 1994: 45). In understanding the 
circumstances that led to the making of the Local Government Act of 1888, it is necessary to 
note the role of the Progressives (Liberals) who supported the Conservative government that 
was elected in 1886, which did not have the necessary political support (seats in Parliament). 
Consequently, the Progressives supported the Conservative government on the condition that 
the latter would introduce a bill (Local Government Reform) which would place county 
government under the control of elected councils (Young and Garside, 1982: 52-54). 
 Another factor worth mentioning was the desire of central government and London’s 
Conservatives from 1887-1889, to limit the powers of the MBW which had become a big 
institution and taken up enormous responsibilities (Young and Garside, 1982: 58). Central 
government thus deemed it fit to break up the MBW in order to reduce the powers of the 
Progressive party while simultaneously reviving the powers of the Conservative party (ibid, 
64). 
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4.2.2 London’s Local Authorities (1889-1965) 
 
The LCC emerged in 1889 as an authority piloting developmental projects in London, 
especially those related to the construction of roads and housing. The powerful status of the 
LCC was further enhanced by the political stance of central government as the party in power 
sought to make its presence felt in London. After the establishment of the LCC, it supported 
the functions it inherited from the MBW for example, the London School Board, and also 
delivered some new public services. During the early period of its existence, the LCC 
conducted an election for councillors from a population base of about 4.5 million people. 
However, there were huge doubts about the competence of prospective councillors (Gibbon 
and Bell, 1939: 83). Further reforms and Acts were then introduced by central government, 
for example, the London Government Act of 1899 which reformed the administration of 
London through the creation of 28 elected metropolitan boroughs while also transferring 
various responsibilities for example, street maintenance, local roads, and rate collection to the 
second tier of government. In addition, the LCC embarked on a programme of public service 
development by constructing tramways to improve transportation, and building hospitals and 
housing so as to advance welfare facilities (Travers, 2004: 26).   
One of the incidences observed during the LCC period was the way in which political 
power shifted from one party to the other as a result of political party’s ideology. The 
dominant party in the LCC was initially the Progressives (Liberals), from 1889-1907. The 
policy thrust of the Progressives focused on consolidating all local authorities in London 
under one central control, that is, combining London government as an organic unit under the 
LCC through what it termed as ‘unification’. However, the policy goal of the Progressives 
was dealt a blow by the death of Firth (the Progressive’s leader), which created a leadership 
vacuum (Young and Garside, 1982: 59-62). In addition, the speech by Lord Salisbury in 
November 1897 where he advocated the reduction of the powers of the LCC through 
‘tenification’ which was a breakup of the organic unit earlier established by the Progressives 
into 10 administrative units under the leadership of ten different mayors also furthered the 
shift of political dominance in the LCC from Progressives to Municipal Reformers 
(Conservatives) (Ibid: 87). Subsequently, the Municipal Reformers became the dominant 
party from 1907-1934, while the Labour Party became the last political party to dominate the 
affairs of the LCC, from 1934 until 1965, when the LCC was disbanded. The significance of 
the aforementioned shift explains how political decisions affected the relations between 
central government and London government.   
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Before the end of the first decade in the twentieth century, the LCC claimed to be the 
largest employer of labour in London, while they embarked on various projects such as 
building fire stations, schools, and public housing in communities (Travers, 2004: 26). In 
addition, the LCC and London boroughs provided additional services such as providing 
policing and social services. Furthermore, the LCC established elementary and secondary 
schools from 1904 and protected ancient monuments through conservation work. They also 
advanced transport infrastructures, especially through the building of bridges, subways, 
railways and tunnels from 1889-1899. 
The period after the First World War witnessed a new era, in the sense that there was 
an increase in the services demanded from local authorities by citizens. As Pierre (1997) 
commented, local authorities became increasingly interested in strategy planning relating to 
the provision of infrastructures such as housing and roads. This shift in the service delivery 
orientation of local authorities was influenced by the realities of the time, that is, the need for 
infrastructures such as affordable housing and roads. This manifested in the duties of the LCC 
which included but not limited to providing public assistance, for example establishing 
training centres; health services, for example establishing District Medical Council while also 
making provision for hospitals and ambulances; and regulating and licensing which took the 
form of building regulations and town planning. However, the established local rating system 
for collecting taxes which had provided revenues for financing the aforementioned public 
services became regressive and ineffective in the post-war years due to the many diverse roles 
and services local authorities were performing and partly due to the limitations inherent in the 
local rating system (Wilson and Game, 2006: 217). 
During the period that the Labour Party was in power (1934-1965), the key political 
leaders (Herbert Morrison, Charles Latham, and Isaac Hayward) understood the challenges 
occasioned by the fragmented nature of London government. Morrison, in particular, used his 
leadership position of the London Labour Party (LLP) to develop policies which focused on 
long-term education and large-scale housing developments in London in order to reduce the 
presence of slums (Young and Garside, 1982: 174 and 180). Furthermore, the Labour Party 
used its position as leader of central government (1929-1934) and LCC to unify issues 
traversing development planning, housing and governmental structures (ibid: 173). Herbert 
Morrison, who sat on the LCC, also led the LLP, and he used his tight control of the LLP and 
LCC to centralise power in order to enhance the development of infrastructures, especially in 
areas where the boroughs were weak. As the Minister of Transport in 1931 he introduced a 
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bill which later became the Act that created the London Passenger Transport Board (London 
Transport), which unified bus, tram and other modes of mass transportation with the 
Underground (Thurston, 1934). However, Herbert Morrison’s attempt to control the 
administration of London’s transport was frustrated by Lord Ashfield who wanted to 
administer London Transport in a different way (Donoughue and Jones, 1973: 140-149). 
Furthermore, various events in the middle of the 20
th
 century motivated the Labour 
Government to increase its pace of reforms in the 1960s in order to unify fragmented units 
and institutional divisions operating at the local authority level. This was partly in response to 
the poor relations that had existed between the Labour Party controlled LCC and districts in 
Middlesex which believed they should be county boroughs. Other events that provoked the 
Labour Party to increase their reforms included the problems of traffic planning in London 
and the declaration of the Macmillan government’s intent, in 1961, to dissolve the LCC and 
Middlesex County Council in order to redraw the administrative map of Greater London 
(Young and Garside, 1982: 305-308). By 1963, some of the recommendations of the Sir 
Edwin Herbert Royal Commission of 1960 were upheld especially as regards the coverage of 
most of the districts outside London (Outer London). Consequently, the London Government 
Act of 1963 established the Greater London Council (GLC) and thirty-two (32) moderately 
large London boroughs. The GLC is discussed further in the next session. 
 
4.2.3 London’s Local Authorities (1965-2010) 
 
London Labour Party’s (LLP) exposure to the national Conservative Party’s policy on 
London, especially as pertaining to the latter’s quest to capture political power in London led 
the LLP to modify the outer boundary of London by pursuing an initial aggressive policy of 
acquiring suburban land for developing public housing pre 1965 in order to have more 
political support especially from Conservative Party members. Thus, Labour’s victory during 
the first GLC election in 1964 was influenced by their land and housing policy. However, the 
London Conservative Party regrouped, based on their prediction that potential Labour 
administration in the GLC, especially through their wide-spread housing policy, might 
negatively influence suburban way of life especially through the submerging of outer London 
with public housing and Labour residential voters (Young and Garside, 1982: 325). 
Furthermore, the Conservative Party feared they would lose their relevance and political role 
in the governance of London because more suburban housing construction by the Labour 
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Government could lead to them losing their party members resident in the places where the 
Labour suburban housing construction were implemented. Hence at the election conducted in 
1967, the Conservative Party, led by Desmond Plummer mobilised supports from residents 
residing in outer London. 
During the early years of the existence of the GLC, the institution was involved in 
issues relating to metropolitan housing and writing of proposals to build major new roads 
(ringways) in London. Consequently, the GLC drew up a plan for land use in London 
(Greater London Development Plan, GLDP) in 1965, thus giving the institution a strategic 
role (Travers, 2004: 29). In another development, the power of the GLC to build housing even 
when it conflicted with borough plans (building against local authority wishes) was 
challenged by the outer London authorities, while the representatives of the Association of 
Municipal Corporations (AMC) also argued that the GLC’s powers regarding housing were 
enormous and might influence the GLC to dominate the housing field (Ibid: 319). 
By 1973, the Conservative Party had lost control of the GLC to Labour Party. From 
this period till the next election held in 1977, Sir Horace Cutler took charge of the 
Conservative Party. During the next GLC election, he won and set out different policies 
including the inquiry he established under Sir Frank Marshall which aimed to justify the 
merits of the GLC. During Cutler’s time as leader of the GLC, he attempted to extend the 
Jubilee line into the Docklands however, he was refused grants by the Labour government. It 
was also noted that he was not able to make tangible investments in London Underground 
thereby leading to depleted rail transport infrastructures. After the 1981 GLC election, Ken 
Livingstone emerged as the leader of the GLC, and he implemented a variety of policies 
related to transportation for example cuts in London Underground fares by 32% reduction 
(Fares Fair Policy), the introduction of the congestion charge which increased the use of 
public mass transport modes in order to manage increasing traffic in London, and the Spatial 
Development and Economic Development Strategies.  
Analysis of some of the policies of the Livingstone era show some negatives and 
positives. For instance, while some commuters did benefit from the 32% cuts in fares, it was a 
cost to the government as it was funded through a subsidy. In another gesture, the government 
of Ken Livingstone gave monetary support to minority groups. Furthermore, the oyster card 
was introduced thereby furthering efficiency in ticketing (Wilson and Game, 2006: 75-77).  
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The circumstances in which central government transferred the London Transport 
Board (LTB) to the GLC is arguably controversial because central government 
simultaneously withdrew its funding from the LTB while also transferring Country buses and 
Green circle line coaches to a new company called London Country Bus Services which was 
further incorporated into the National Bus Service in 1970. This action by central government 
led to less income for LTB as the profits of buses had hitherto been used to reimburse the 
losses made by other lines of business, for example trains. The GLC used the LTB executive 
in running the affairs of the LTB up till 1984 when the Conservative government took over 
the control of London Transport (Travers et al, 1991: 9-10). The reasons for the takeover of 
the LTB by the Conservative government were based on the need to improve the GLC which 
at a time introduced the ‘Fares Fair Policy’, and due to other political reasons which have to 
do with differing ideologies with the London Labour government. Regardless of the various 
challenges highlighted above, the GLC through the LTB delivered and controlled transport 
services within the boundaries of Greater London thereby setting the scene for the 
development of a transport strategy for London.  
The GLC was abolished on the 1
st
 of April 1986, bringing to an end city-wide 
government in London for the first time since 1855. Travers (2004:8-42) commented that the 
huge vacuum left by the abolition of the GLC presented the opportunity for kick-starting an 
innovative public sector driven by partnerships, which has become an important feature of 
London. The GLC will be remembered for the institutional structures it established especially 
units, such as planning, housing, local roads, just to mention a few, as they were instrumental 
in developing various sectors in London. For instance, the planning unit developed the Spatial 
Development and Economic Development Strategies which influenced the writing of the 
London Plan discussed later in the thesis. Also, the transport unit was instrumental in enabling 
the implementation of the Oyster card which furthered efficiency in the process of fares 
payments.  
Before the abolition of the GLC, various challenges emerged within the political 
system, ranging from vagueness in terms of who to hold accountable and responsible for 
public service provision, challenges emanating from the political composition of the various 
local authorities, and problems of resource generation. Furthermore, the co-ordination of 
policies and public administration was difficult due to the cost of maintaining the two-tiered 
structure of administering local authorities (Wilson and Game, 1994: 53).  
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After the GLC was abolished, the Conservative government of Mrs Thatcher in 1986 
targeted the governance structure of London by abolishing metropolitan county councils 
while making metropolitan boroughs have unitary status. The Thatcher era change began with 
the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC), six metropolitan county councils, and the 
Inner London Education Authority. The reasons for the abolition of the GLC and the six 
metropolitan county councils were allegedly linked to the wastefulness of local authorities 
with their resources, them not being accountable to people, and them being out of control. To 
address these alleged excesses on the part of local authorities, the Thatcher government made 
several legislations (Streamlining the Cities) to modify the method of operations of local 
authorities including the ways they generate and spend funds. 
After the abolition of the GLC, the period 1986-2000 witnessed a general shift among 
the political parties especially on the need to have an elected authority which would steer 
government activities in London. Having criticised some of the activities of local authorities, 
central government embarked on a reform programme involving the use of several laws to 
check the activities of local authorities while re-modelling their pattern of expenditure and 
revenues (Wilson and Game, 1994:55).  
In order to assert its reform programme, the Tory Government introduced into its 
election manifesto a pledge to eliminate the six English Metropolitan County Councils and 
the GLC while arguing that the institutions scheduled for elimination were performing minute 
functions thus outmoded. Consequently, a Thatcher (Conservative) versus Livingstone 
(Labour) resentment emerged. Another viewpoint to understand the dilemma in the 
relationship between the Thatcher-led central government and Livingstone-led GLC can be 
understood from the fact that the change proposed by the Thatcher-led government regarding 
the elimination of the GLC and the Metropolitan County Councils was aimed at asserting 
central government control over local authorities in England in general, and in London in 
particular, as there had been increasing tension between local authorities and central 
government, especially as relating to the funding and expenditures of local authorities for 
instance through rate capping (Travers, 2004: 30).  
Following the victory of the Conservative party in the May 1983 general election, the 
White Paper proposed to abolish the six metropolitan counties and the GLC recommended 
that the functions carried out by the abolished seven bodies be allocated to lower tier 
metropolitan district councils, London boroughs, ad hoc agencies, joint boards, and central 
government divisions. Examples of public services reallocated were the police, fire and public 
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transport outside London. Nonetheless, it is important to note that most of the GLC powers 
including that of managing London Transport had been removed from the GLC even before 
its abolition in 1986 and transferred to various bodies such as the London Residuary Body. 
The running of London Transport was thus transferred back to central government in 1984 
(Travers et. al, 1991: 9-10). Other powers were devolved to joint boards consisting of 
councillors.  
The study shows that the recommendation of the White Paper was pervaded by central 
government control of local authority activities through the use of joint committees and 
boards enforced on the district tiers. For instance, Wilson and Game (1994:56-57) notes that 
the conflict between the Labour party which controlled most of all the recreated councils and 
London boroughs, and the Tory led central government took another dimension, policy 
conflict. Moreover, in order to encourage the private sector to participate in public service 
delivery for certain services like transportation, local authorities were required by central 
government and London government to enter into collaboration with private sector 
organisations to establish companies which would deliver the needed services.  
After the 1992 election, there was the creation of London government institutions such 
as the Cabinet Sub-committee for London (Ibid, 32-33), and the Government Office for 
London (GOL) which was a central government creation mandated to represent the interests 
of various central government departments while working with relevant stakeholders in 
delivering central government goals for London (Government Office for London, 2010). The 
influences of the aforementioned institutions and others on London have contributed to the 
inability of local authorities to set up and pursue their own development agendas in order to 
rise to emergent challenges particularly in their environment, and generally in London 
because they constitute another level of bureaucracy regulating the activities of local 
authorities. In commenting on the complexity of the governance process in London, the 
Commission on London Governance (2005: 2-4) argues that the complex nature of the 
governance structure in London is so vague that sometimes people do not know who to hold 
accountable for public services. This has been occasioned by the existence of various bodies 
and agencies created by central government in order to check the political and economic 
powers of London local authorities.  
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4.3 The emergence of mass transportation in London 
 
 This section discusses the context of the emergence of mass transportation in London. 
It explores the evolution of mass transport modes and discusses the key challenges 
confronting mass transportation in London. It is then followed by a discussion of the 
relationship between central government and London government. 
 The emergence of mass transportation in London can be traced to the middle of the 
nineteenth century when existing mass transport infrastructures could no longer meet the 
needs of the Victorians especially those relating to the provision of transport infrastructures. 
Consequently, some parliamentary enquiries were made in order to raise the funds needed to 
provide mass transport infrastructures. Furthermore, other features of London at the period 
included its increasing population, which grew six-fold from about 1,110,000 to 6,580,000 by 
the end of the nineteenth century, and urban sprawl. These made the establishment of mass 
transportation essential.  
Mass transportation in London has gone through several phases of development and 
models (Horse-Drawn Carriage-Short Stage Coach-Omnibus-Trains-Buses-Cabs-Boats). One 
of the most important factors arguably to have influenced the development and spread of mass 
transportation in London was the increase in the distances commuters had to embark from 
home to work. In addressing this issue, London’s mass transport system gradually developed 
with the use of horse-drawn carriages along major roads and the use of steam boats on the 
river Thames. Subsequently, as it became obvious that existing mass transport capacities 
could no longer meet user demands due to the increasing population of London, railway 
construction began. London’s first railway emerged from Deptford to Spa Road, Bermondsey, 
on the 8
th
 of February 1836 and further extension was made to London Bridge by the 14
th
 of 
December 1836. In its first fifteen months of operation, the railway transported an average of 
about 1,422 passengers daily (Barker and Robbins, 1975: 45). 
In building infrastructures to address mass transport needs in London, central 
government played an important role by engaging private businesses to set up rail companies 
to ply commercially viable routes that would meet the transport needs of Londoners. 
Furthermore, central government established the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Termini 
in the 1840s to consider the possibilities of building new rail lines into the heart of London. 
Thus, central government used Acts of Parliament to instigate partnerships such as London & 
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Greenwich, London & Blackwall, South Eastern & Croydon Companies, and London & 
North Western Railway companies in order to develop rail infrastructures (Barker and 
Robbins, 1975: 50-51). Hence, central government through its powers (statutes and funding) 
has been involved in the creation and operation of most forms of public transportation (train, 
ferries and buses) in London until July 2003 when it transferred the responsibilities of the 
operation of some train lines to TfL, thus making some operators accountable to TfL 
(Bayman, 2008: 4-5).  
The London Underground was the first underground railway in the world, and it 
commenced operations in 1863 at Baker Street Station (Bayman, 2008: 4). Yet, despite the 
emergence of the railway and Underground in London in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the omnibus remained the main transporter of most workers in London as it regularly 
provided mass transportation for the public, especially to work, while the emerging trains 
provided more of occasional trips and excursions. This was mainly due to the inability of 
railways to gain access into central London where the omnibuses dominated (Barker and 
Robbins, 1975: 56-57). 
Since the establishment of London Underground, there have been increasing demands 
on central government for infrastructure funding including funding demands from other 
public sector institutions such as health bodies, police, and education. Hence, in funding mass 
transportation capacity in London, central government has regularly employed ‘Public-Private 
Partnerships’ (PPPs) and ‘Private Finance Initiatives’ since 1992 (Wilson and Game, 2006: 
153-156).  
 
4.4 Central government – London government relations and partnerships 
 
This section discusses the relations between central government and the GLA due to 
the roles they play in sustaining mass transportation in London. Partnerships, with particular 
focus on Crossrail 1, Barclay’s cycle scheme and Metronet are also examined.  
 
4.4.1 Central government – GLA relations 
 
The relations between central government and London governments have been shaped 
by several factors including socio-economic, political and strategic influences. For instance, 
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section 4.2.3 point to some political issues between the Thatcher-led central government and 
Livingstone-led GLC which focused on the elimination of the GLC and Metropolitan County 
Councils. On the other hand, section 4.4.2 discusses the incidence of partnership in London 
including the Crossrail 1 partnership which involved both central government and the GLA, 
and other actors from different sectors. Thus, the study shows the incidence of both conflict 
and collaboration between central government and the GLA.  
The study of the relations between central government and London government 
focuses on the period from 1966 when the Royal Commission led by Lord Redcliffe-Maud 
was established, and which argued that the division of England into 79 county boroughs and 
45 counties which had independent jurisdictions that divided town from country facilitated 
improper planning of socio-economic development and transportation as it created an 
atmosphere of hostility between county boroughs, counties, and the central government thus 
causing a weakness in the relationship among the tiers of government (Wilson and Game, 
1994: 50-51).  
By 1999, there was consensus between central government and bodies representing 
the interests of Londoners and businesses on the need to have an elected authority to represent 
the interests of Londoners and govern the city. After some consultations between central 
government, interest groups and bodies in London, and a referendum, the Greater London 
Authority Act of 1999 was passed by Parliament and it made provision for the Greater 
London Authority (GLA) to constitute the Mayor of London and the London Assembly. 
Provision was also made in the Act with respect to how the GLA would relate with other local 
authorities and institutions in London. In Part 1 of the GLA Act, the section titled ‘The 
Authority’ stipulate the power of the GLA in section 3 – “The Authority shall have the 
functions which are transferred to, or conferred or imposed on, the Authority by or under this 
Act or any other Act” to be dependent on the UK Parliament.  
 Another way of evaluating the relations between central government and London 
government is by considering the political stance of the party at the central government level 
to that in the GLA. In a situation whereby the party in power at the central government level 
is different from that in charge of the GLA (Mayor), the likelihood of conflict between both 
actors will be high due to their support for different policies or opposing implementation 
process. An instance was the period when Prime Minister Thatcher and Ken Livingstone were 
in power at the central and London government levels. Table 1 below shows the 
characteristics that sometimes pervade the relationship between central government and GLA 
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when the party in power at central government is different from the party in power at the 
GLA, and when the party in power at central government is the same as that at the GLA. 
Table 1: Characteristic of the relationship that existed between central government and 
London government across different period 
Year Party in 
power at 
central 
government 
Party in 
power at 
London 
government 
Characteristic of relationship that existed 
1931 Labour Party Labour Party Central government showed commitment towards the 
housing policy of the LCC regarding ‘slum clearance’. 
The goal of the LCC which was to build more houses 
and reduce slums was later made the national policy 
goal of the Labour Party. 
1960 Conservative 
Party 
Labour Party Central government under the leadership of 
Macmillan ensured that Conservative suburbs were 
incorporated into a wider Greater London thereby 
weakening the political leadership of Labour in 
London Government. 
1983 Conservative 
Party 
Labour Party Central government under the leadership of Thatcher 
was enraged by the activities of the GLC which was 
led by Livingstone (Labour). The conflict between 
central government and the GLC ended with the 
abolishing of the GLC and the 6 metropolitan 
authorities through the use of the White Paper 
‘Streamlining the Cities’. 
2010 Conservative 
Party 
Conservative 
Party 
While Central Government has introduced cuts across 
governmental Departments through the 
Comprehensive Spending Review, the funding of key 
projects such as Cross rail 1 has been made secure 
(ring fenced) due to the support of central government. 
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  Due to the powers of central government, including its ability to enact statutes and 
fund bodies including their capital projects, it has been able to control London government in 
addition to other actors in the system. For instance, both the Conservative government (1979-
1990) and the New Labour government (1997-2010) employed policies to address challenges 
linked to the delivery of public services at the local authority level in London. It is also clear 
that central government has been able to control local authorities through the use of means 
such as ‘rate-capping’ to control their expenditures and how they spend money allocated to 
them. The researcher observed in the 1999 GLA Act that the Mayor is not empowered to use 
the funds allocated for a particular functional body of the GLA for another or employ the 
funds allocated to the GLA by central government for other purposes contrary to that 
established by central government. In addition, it was noted that New Public Management 
(NPM) tools such as performance measurement and public private partnership (PPP) have 
also been used by central government to control the activities of local councils including 
London boroughs (Travers, 2004: 18). 
The adoption of New Public Management (NPM) principles in the UK in the 1980s 
and 1990s redefined the roles and responsibilities of government agencies including bodies in 
the system in London. The new roles proposed that local authorities should serve as enablers 
in the delivery of public services. Furthermore, these roles were seen to include the setting of 
the general administrative, financial and regulatory structures to facilitate the delivery of 
public goods. Hence, it was not a surprise when New Labour in 1998 after being elected to 
office argued that public services should be provided by any sector or institution capable of 
providing the best services in an effective and efficient manner (HM Treasury, 1998).  
To conclude, this section has examined the relationship between central government 
and London government while highlighting the factors that influence the relations between 
both bodies. Furthermore, the discussion in the section shows that the relations between both 
actors have been influenced by socio-economic, financial and political factors. More 
importantly, it was clear that central government was more dominant in the relations between 
both actors as it employs its powers such as Acts of Parliament to implement its policies. This 
then suggests that while private sector bodies now play a key role in the governance of 
London especially in sustaining mass transportation and other services, nonetheless, central 
government and the GLA play more influential roles relating to goals, funding, rules setting 
and the coordination of the system.  
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4.5 Partnerships 
 
From 1986 to 2001, there was the creation of partnerships by actors from both the 
public and private sectors. For instance, while Kensington and Chelsea boroughs led the 
Central London Partnership which is constituted by actors from both the private and public 
sectors; the Thames Gateway Partnership is also constituted by bodies across sectors, and 
both partnerships aims to enable the provision of public goods since there was no city-wide 
government (Travers, 2004: 145). During this period, the political class embarked on various 
conferences, seminars, and report-launches to collaborate on how to further develop the 
infrastructures and institutions of London. This section thus aims to discuss the incidence of 
partnerships relevant to mass transportation in London as this is the focus of the study. To aid 
analysis, the partnerships delivering Crossrail 1, Barclays cycle scheme and an incidence of a 
failed partnership – Metronet are discussed. While the first two partnerships are discussed as a 
result of the frequency of their recurrence in the data gathered from London and due to their 
different capacities and goals relating to sustaining mass transportation in London, the third 
partnership is discussed as it is arguably the main incidence of partnership related to mass 
transport sustenance known to have failed. 
 The study of the case in London shows that partnership between the DfT, GLA, TfL, 
private sector organisations and London boroughs is encouraged by the Mayor especially for 
the purpose of pulling resources together to execute projects like Crossrail 1 and the Barclay’s 
Cycle scheme. To further the understanding of the relevance of partnership to mass 
transportation, and on how it exist in London, Crossrail 1 and Barclays cycle scheme 
partnerships are discussed below in addition with Metronet partnership. 
 
4.5.1 Crossrail 1 partnership 
Crossrail 1 is a major engineering programme cutting through the complex geography 
of London and integrating with several existing rail systems. It was ratified by the UK 
Parliament with the Crossrail Act 2008 after its introduction to the Commons in 2005
7
. The 
Crossrail Act 2008 gave Crossrail 1 a confirmed route - Maidenhead and Heathrow in the 
west to Shenfield and Abbey Wood in the east, with new rail tunnels (and stations) under 
                                                          
 
7 Available at http://www.crossrail.co.uk/route/crossrail-from-its-early-beginnings#, Accessed on 21st March 2014 
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central London as required, and it is due to be completed in 2017. To deliver and fund the 
scheme, the DfT and TfL entered into a joint venture which created Cross-London Rail Links 
Ltd (CLRL) (also referred to as Crossrail Limited) as a subsidiary of TfL and responsible for 
delivering Crossrail 1. In delivering the scheme, Crossrail Limited works with Network Rail 
which is responsible for undertaking work to improve existing surface infrastructure to meet 
the needs of the new Crossrail 1 service. The actors thus identified as constituting the strategic 
partnership implementing Crossrail 1 include the DfT, TfL, Network Rail and businesses 
which stand to benefit from the railway. 
Why Crossrail 1? 
The strategic need for Crossrail 1 has become clearer over time as forecasts of 
population and employment growth in London have increased. Thus, both the DfT and TfL’s 
decision to invest in Crossrail 1 is based on forecast growth to the population in London and 
the South East, and continued increase in the demand for public transport. On the benefit of 
the scheme, the DfT forecasts that Crossrail 1 will bring £1.97 of transport benefits for every 
£1 of cost (National Audit Office, 2014). A Strategic Rail Authority review in 2000 found 
that new rail links were needed to relieve congestion on east–west routes across London. 
Furthermore, the government’s initial business case for Crossrail, in 2003, found that the line 
would reduce crowding by more than 25 per cent on a number of London Underground lines. 
The benefit–cost ratio in the latest update of the business case, in 2011, is 1.97. This is within 
the DfT’s definition of ‘medium’ value for money, a range of 1.5 to 2. 
Furthermore, it became imperative to implement Crossrail 1 in order to address 
capacity issues linked to the inability of the Underground to cope with demands on the 
network, congestion problems on the network and the need to enable regeneration in areas 
such as the south Thames Gateway area, Woolwich and the Royal Docks.  
In funding Crossrail 1, the sponsors (DfT and TfL) came up with a £14.8 billion 
funding package which is to be met as shown in Table 2 below. In developing a funding plan 
for the scheme, it was established by the expert team of officials from different central 
government departments and rail organisations who reviewed the Crossrail 1 Business Case 
that “It simply wasn’t practical for the Crossrail 1 project to be wholly financed by either the 
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public sector or the private sector”8. The team argued that the funding plan for Crossrail 1 
must be met by key stakeholders including central government and GLA, and businesses who 
would mainly benefit from the scheme. 
Table 2: Allocated funding for Crossrail 1 by DfT and TfL  
Adapted from ‘Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General’, Department for Transport: Crossrail; National Audit Office (2014) 
Body Amount to be contributed 
Department for Transport (DfT) £4.8 billion (Setting aside an additional 
£5.2 billion in case it failed to secure 
private sector fund) 
Transport for London (Tfl) £4.7 billion 
Contributions from businesses and other 
bodies (Donations) 
£5.3 billion 
In funding Crossrail 1 as shown in Table 2, it is clear that the scheme would be funded by 
government, TfL and businesses. Before this funding deal was accepted for the scheme, 
Crossrail Ltd submitted its Business Case to the DfT on 11
th
 of July 2003. On the 14
th
 of July 
2003, Alistair Darling, secretary of state for transport, made a statement to Parliament 
commenting on the Crossrail 1 Business Case. In his statement, he confirmed that the 
government sees merit in the arguments for Cossrail 1 in addressing the increase in East-West 
capacity to support London's continued growth and success. While the funding looks simple 
in principle, it is complex in practice. For instance, while the DfT contribution is met by 
central government, TfL’s contribution is coordinated by the Mayor of London who devises 
means of raising the required contribution. For instance, the Mayor empowered London 
Boroughs to raise part of TfL’s contribution through the Community Infrastructure Levy 
(CIL). Furthermore, the Mayor has deployed saving strategies in order to raise additional 
revenues to fund Crossrail 1 and other projects. 
 The analysis of the Crossrail 1 partnership shows that there was collaboration between 
the DfT, TfL and central government especially during the initial phase of planning the 
scheme as these actors jointly worked together in developing the proposal (business case) to 
                                                          
 
8 Available at http://www.crossrail.co.uk/route/crossrail-from-its-early-beginnings# 
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address capacity issues linked to the sustenance of mass transportation in London. 
Furthermore, additional collaboration was evidenced between the partners delivering 
Crossrail 1 and another partnership (Thames Gateway Area Partnership) which is constituted 
by some of the boroughs affected by the scheme, whose areas would undergo regeneration as 
a result of implementing Crossrail 1. However, going by the working definition of 
collaboration in this study as shared task between two or more people in order to achieve 
collective goals and interests which none of the parties can achieve alone, it is argued that the 
process of implementing Crossrail 1 is also driven by contractual terms and the directives 
from central government who is the major funder of the scheme. Nevertheless, ongoing 
construction works shows that the scheme is working in terms of the infrastructures built to 
address congestion on the Underground and the different actors engaged in order to attain the 
policy goal of the scheme. 
To conclude the discussion of Crossrail 1 partnership, the researcher observed from 
the study that the partnership employed in delivering the scheme has been able not just to 
raise the capital needed to fund the project but also to work with stakeholders affected by the 
scheme through regeneration projects. Aside from the benefit linked to cost saving and 
funding, the partnership delivering Crossrail 1 has also been able to reach out to different 
actors including those that do not constitute the Crossrail 1 partnership such as local 
businesses and ordinary Londoners in the proximity of the perimeter of the Crossrail 1 
project. By engaging with these different groups, the partnership delivering Crossrail 1 has 
been able to accommodate the diverse needs of other stakeholders into the project cycle of the 
scheme so that they can also benefit from the operation of the project. For instance, Crossrail 
(2002: 2) established that they sought the views of key stakeholders including local residents 
and local authorities on the short-list of route corridors they identified and the kind of services 
that should run through Crossrail 1. 
 
4.5.2 Barclays cycle scheme partnership  
 
In the case of the partnership employed for the delivery of the Barclays Cycle scheme 
which is small in scope as compared with Crossrail 1 partnership, the partnership is 
constituted by Barclays bank, TfL and London boroughs. While it is clear cycling is not a 
mass transport mode, the scheme was implemented in order to encourage Londoners to use 
cycles as another means of moving around in London in order to reduce the demand on the 
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Underground. Arguably, while this partnership has been able to attain its purpose as some 
Londoners now use the Barclays cycles to move around London thereby making cycling 
account for the 3
rd
 largest road based mode in London (TfL, 2013), nonetheless, there are 
several questions relating to the success and effectiveness of the scheme due to the 
unfortunate deaths of a number of cyclists in London, doubt over the bidding process (if there 
was any) which awarded Barclays bank the deal, and the unwillingness of Barclays bank to 
renew its contract as funder.  
Why Barclay’s cycle scheme? 
 Johnson (2010: 187) states that encouraging more people to cycle is a key Mayoral 
priority, especially for the purpose of achieving a 5% modal share for cycling (currently 2%) 
by 2026. Furthermore, the Mayor argues that the high demand for limited road space makes it 
imperative to employ cycling as another alternative transport mode.  
What is Barclay’s cycle scheme? 
 The Barclay’s cycle scheme is one of the forms of London’s public transport covering 
65km and stretching from Shepherd’s Bush in the west of the capital, through central London 
and east to the fringes of the Olympic Park. There are about 8,000 bikes accessible from 570 
docking stations, thereby making cycling the first choice for tens of thousands of short 
journeys made in central London every day (available at 
https://www.london.gov.uk/priorities/transport/cycling-revolution/a-cycle-hire-scheme-for-
london). The scheme was launched on 30
th
 of July 2010 to registered users and payment for 
its use is through a Visa or MasterCard credit/debit card or Visa Electron. In implementing 
the Barclay’s cycle scheme, actors including the Mayor, TfL, Barclays bank and London 
boroughs who play key roles through the process whereby they embed the Mayor’s Transport 
Strategy (MTS) in their Local Implementation Plans (LIP) are responsible for delivering the 
scheme. The fees charged for the usage of the cycles are £2 for 24 hours, £10 for 7 days and 
£90 a year. 
 In funding the scheme, TfL claims to have advertised for a sponsor in March 2009 and 
suggested that energy company EDF and phone giants Nokia submitted bids which were not 
accepted. However, evidence from BBC
9
 suggests that the Mayor (Boris Johnson) approached 
                                                          
 
9
 Additional information available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-14326295 
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Barclay’s bank chairman – Marcus Agius, offering him “an exciting opportunity – Barclay’s 
bikes”. Furthermore, BBC comments that during the process the Mayor was negotiating with 
Barclay’s bank, he assured the bank that no rival bank would be able to sponsor any future 
Mayoral cycling initiatives, and that Barclays could have access to the personal data of those 
registering to use the bikes. While the details of the sponsorship package for Barclay’s cycle 
scheme is not made available by TfL, who claim that to do so would adversely affect TfL’s 
bargaining power when negotiating other sponsorship deals, the evidence provided by Hoscik 
(2012) on the sponsorship package is indicated in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Facts on Barclay’s cycle scheme funding 
Adapted from Hoscik (2012)10 and Donovan (2011)11 
Description Amount (£) 
Cost of setting up and running the bike 
scheme till 2016 
230 to 240 million 
The cost Barclays bank is to pay under the 
5 year sponsorship deal 
50 million 
The cost London borough’s pay to get an 
expansion of the Barclay’s cycle scheme 
to their borough 
2 million 
Possible cost of the scheme to be met by 
tax payers by 2015/16 
225 million  
 
The table shows that the Barclays cycle scheme is mainly funded by tax payers and does not 
arguably reflect the perception that the majority of the public hold of the scheme in terms of it 
been fully funded by Barclays bank. Furthermore, unlike the detailed process and Terms of 
Reference (TOR) employed for the partnership which delivered Crossrail 1, evidence from the 
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 Additional information is available at http://www.mayorwatch.co.uk/exclusive-tfl-reveals-how-much-
barclays-has-paid-for-cycle-hire-scheme/ 
11
Additional information is available at http://www.mayorwatch.co.uk/exclusive-tfl-reveals-how-much-
barclays-has-paid-for-cycle-hire-scheme/ 
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study shows that the policy process which led to the creation of the partnership delivering the 
Barclays cycle scheme is not as transparent and detailed as that which is delivering Crossrail 
1. The questioning of the degree to which the process is transparent is related to the lack of 
relevant information relating to the funding and contributions of the actors delivering the 
scheme. In commenting on the transparency of the bidding process for the Barclays cycle 
scheme, John Biggs (Labour London Assembly member) suggests that “We need to 
understand how the bidding took place, how transparent it was, whether there were deals on 
the side to encourage them and whether we as taxpayers got proper value out of that”12.  
 The analysis of the Barclays Cycle scheme presents two types of findings relating to 
the occurrence of partnership among the actors constituting the partnership. First, the 
evidence discussed relating to how Barclays bank emerged as the funder of the Barclays 
Cycle scheme point to the possibility of some act of collusion between the Mayor and the 
chairman (Marcus Agius) of Barclays bank. The meagre contribution of Barclays bank to the 
scheme further raises question on the extent to which the acceptance of Barclays bank as the 
sponsor of the scheme represent value for money considering the amount of publicity the 
bank gets on the cycles. On the other hand, since the cycle scheme constitutes an element of 
the Mayor’s transport strategy and also embedded in the London Plan, it is compulsory for 
London boroughs to implement the Cycling scheme in their Local Implementation Plans 
which is authorised by TfL. This therefore demonstrate the use of imperative coordination 
alongside some degree of collaboration observed between the Mayor and Barclays bank (in 
establishing a funding and contractual plan) and between the Mayor and TfL (in establishing 
an implementation plan) who both work towards ensuring boroughs implement the cycle 
scheme. The study thus shows that the Barclays cycle scheme is complex both in principle 
and in its implementation. Nevertheless, the scheme has arguably reduced the numbers of 
people who would have used the Underground for short journeys although this has come with 
a problem manifesting in the increasing death of cyclists. 
4.5.3 Metronet partnership 
 
The discussion of the Metronet partnership described by the House of Commons 
Transport Committee (2008) as ‘pathetic under-delivery’ due to its inability to achieve its aim 
(to modernise the London Underground) and the amount of tax payers money lost is 
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significant as it highlight how and why a partnership which could  have been employed to 
sustain mass transportation might fail. In establishing the Metronet partnership, the DfT, 
Treasury and London Regional Transport (which owned London Underground until July 2003 
when it was transferred to Transport for London (TfL)) had responsibility for the strategy and 
design of the Metronet PPP arrangements. London Underground negotiated and managed the 
contracts. DfT retained a crucial role after the PPP contracts were put in place as it gave 
assurances to Metronet’s lenders that it would not stand by and do nothing should London 
Underground be unable to meet its financial obligations and provided an annual grant of 
around £1 billion for the modernisation (National Audit Office, 2009: 5).  
  In modernising the London Underground network, central government announced in 
1998 that PPP agreements would be employed. London Underground Limited (acting on 
behalf of central government) entered into three separate PPP agreements between December 
2002 and April 2003: first with Tube Lines for the maintenance and renewal of the Jubilee, 
Piccadilly and Northern Lines; second with Metronet Rail BCV for the maintenance and 
renewal of the Bakerloo, Central, Victoria and Waterloo & City Lines; and third with 
Metronet Rail SSL, which was responsible for the maintenance and renewal of the ‘sub-
surface lines’: the Circle, District, Hammersmith & City, Metropolitan and East London Lines 
(House of Commons Transport Committee, 2008: 3). 
 Under the PPP Agreements, which were for 30 years, these private sector 
infrastructure companies would maintain, renew and upgrade discrete parts of London 
Underground’s infrastructure. The PPP Agreements set out a performance-related incentive 
and penalty scheme to remunerate the bodies for the improvements they make to the network. 
The bodies were given a large degree of flexibility in how they choose to deliver 
improvements but London Underground also specified a number of achievements that must 
be met by given target dates, such as for station refurbishments, replacement of train fleets 
and track replacement. Furthermore, the agreements allowed for an extraordinary review by 
the PPP arbiter where an implementing partner considers that it is incurring additional costs 
above the level allowed for in its bid (Ibid). This effectively allows Metronet (partnership 
consortium) to claim additional remuneration from London Underground where their costs 
exceed the level that was originally anticipated. The bodies (shareholders) constituting the 
Metronet partnership include Bombardier, WS Atkins, EDF Energy, Thames Water and 
Balfour Beatty.  
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Issues: 
 In his evidence to the members of the House of Commons Transport Committee, Mr 
Graham Pimlott, former Chairman, Metronet, gave evidence on the problem faced by 
Metronet by saying “It ran out of cash and the reason it ran out of cash was that it had spent 
too much money and the banks were no longer prepared to advance it any more money, and if 
one were to pick one area which had caused the most difficulty it was the stations project”. 
Furthermore, Mr Pimlott presented the view that the specification of the Metronet contract 
was not clear enough and that also enabled the problems Metronet confronted.  
The House of Commons Transport Committee (2008: 34) however suggests that 
Metronet’s inability to operate efficiently or economically proves that the private sector can 
fail to deliver on a spectacular scale. 
 By the second year of implementing the goals of Metronet PPP, National Audit Office 
(2009: 43-44) states that departmental notes suggest that all the bodies that constitute the 
partnership were ‘slightly behind on stations’ and it is not clear that Metronet can catch up. 
Furthermore, it was established that by the end of the second year of its operation, Metronet 
did not complete any of the eight stations it was due to revamp. Hence, the National Audit 
Office (2009) reports that the Financial Times (FT) suggest that the Mayor will declare PPPs 
unworkable if Metronet is not back on schedule by year end (2005). Once in its third year, it 
was clear that Metronet overspending was running into tens of millions of pounds thereby 
prompting London Underground to commission PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to undertake 
an audit of Metronet. In addition, London Underground made it known to the public that 
Metronet cannot catch up the delay on its stations programme as it was only able to deliver 
eleven out of thirty-five stations. By its fifth year of implementing the Underground upgrade, 
the National Audit Office (2009: 46-47) note that Metronet was seeking guidance on good 
industry practice while its credit rating was downgraded by S&P from BB+ to CCC. Later in 
the year (2007), DfT established a steering committee to decide on a permanent solution for 
the Tube modernisation while also obtaining EU state aid clearance to rescue loans. Metronet 
later went into administration after lenders refused further loan drawdown thereby prompting 
TfL to announce its formal bid to take control of the partnership body.  
It was observed that the Metronet partnership was a creation by central government 
bodies, of a group of actors (constituent partners) not representative of the system whose 
problems they were meant to address. The analysis of the Metronet partnership identifies 
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various issues which arguably led to its failure. First, from the inception of the partnership, 
there was no acknowledged leadership structure unlike the other two partnerships discussed. 
The absence of leadership was identified by the National Audit Office (2009: 6) as one of the 
causes of the failure of the Metronet partnership. Furthermore, the researcher observed an 
imbalance in the make-up of the Metronet partnership as it failed to include the 
representatives of key stakeholders such as users, operators, train drivers and TfL, who will 
be affected by the upgrade programme. More importantly, as regards the actors constituting 
the Metronet partnership, the researcher observed that the same bodies (Bombardier, WS 
Atkins, EDF, Thameswater and Balfour Beatty) constituting the partnership were the main 
suppliers to the Underground upgrade scheme. This situation could further conflict of interest 
as constituent bodies might likely seek to maximise the gains and profits of their individual 
organisations with their influence in the partnership. Also, by allowing bodies constituting the 
partnership to supply rolling stocks and other materials, the possibility of getting competition 
for the pricing of goods and supply is reduced as partners would use their access to 
information within Metronet in winning bids.  
The National Audit Office (2009: 6-7) identified other reasons which led to the failure 
of Metronet to include poor quality information available to management, particularly on the 
unit costs of the station and track programmes; DfT reliance on public sector monitoring by 
London Underground, TfL and the arbiter, and private sector monitoring of the contracts by 
Metronet’s shareholders, who all proved to be unreliable; London Underground lack of 
information to take a ‘partnering approach’ with confidence and its inability to drive 
improved performance when necessary. The National Audit Office (2009) report concludes 
that at the heart of Metronet’s fate lie problems of internal governance. Hence, its 
recommendations focus on improvements in governance, co-ordination, and assurance on 
costs as DfT and its partners seek a lasting solution to the problems of the Metronet PPP 
contracts. 
 
4.6 Conclusion on partnerships in London 
 
From the discussion of partnerships in London, it is clear that it does exist within 
actors in London and across actors at the central government and GLA levels. Nevertheless, it 
was noted that while some of these partnerships employ mandatory arrangements, others rely 
on both contracts and joint-working among actors for the purpose of services delivery. For 
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instance, it was noted that TfL works with boroughs by giving them local transport grant and 
maintenance grants which are then used in strengthening and supporting transport capacities 
in London (Johnson: 45). In another instance, imperative coordination was observed in 
London as the Mayor through the use of his statutory powers makes it essential for London 
boroughs to implement transport schemes such as cycle highways, embedded in their Local 
Implementation Plans which is approved by TfL. 
It is thus clear from the study that funding, especially from government (central 
government and GLA), plays a key role in the partnerships identified for instance, Crossrail 1 
and Metronet partnerships. More importantly, the study of partnerships in London 
demonstrate the significant powers of both central government and the GLA in instigating and 
sustaining partnerships as evidenced with the three forms of partnerships discussed. 
Furthermore, the study shows two forms of ‘partnership’ in the case of London. The first is 
that in which government (GLA and central government) selected the actors constituting the 
partnership in order to achieve certain government aims, such as improving transport 
infrastructures in London, for example Crossrail 1. The second form of partnership is centred 
around voluntary participation, with the only example clearly identified in the study being that 
of the Barclays cycle scheme. Nonetheless, the study also show that the Mayor, perhaps 
played a role in choosing partners in the Barclays cycle scheme thereby questioning the 
degree to which participation in the partnership is voluntary. In addition, it can be argued that 
the actors involved benefited from the collaboration. For instance, government gained from 
the Crossrail 1 partnership because it led to the development of infrastructures which sustain 
mass transportation in London; and Barclays bank got recognition for its partial funding of the 
Barclays cycle scheme, while the GLA also gained as the partnership relieved aspects of 
overcrowding on the transport network.  
In discussing the incidence of partnership in London, the study also reveals that in 
some cases as illustrated with the Metronet partnership, the reasons for creating a partnership 
might not be fully attained while the partnership may become a liability to its creator, in this 
instance, central government. Similarly, the House of Commons Transport Committee (2008: 
34) suggests that it is difficult to lend any credibility to the claim that the Metronet PPP 
contracts were effective in transferring risk from the public to the private sector as the reverse 
was the case: Metronet’s shareholders (partners) stood to make some returns. However, when 
they failed, it is the taxpayer and the tube passengers who must meet the cost. Thus, 
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partnerships as existing in London are influenced by various factors including political 
ideology, leadership stance, attitude of partners and ultimately government policies. 
 
4.7 The key projects delivered and ongoing 
 
 In addressing the mass transport problems in London which arguably has to do mainly 
with inadequate capacities, the Mayor through TfL has identified some projects as key 
deliverables. These projects are set in the TfL Business Plan for the period 2010-11 and 2012-
13, and they include London Underground upgrade, London overground upgrade, Docklands 
Light Railway (DLR), Crossrail 1, Surface Transport Highways and Roads, London Buses, 
and Fare Ticketing. These schemes are discussed below while also stating the mass transport 
problems they address. 
 
4.7.1 London Underground 
 
 The Mayor of London suggest that the funding of upgrade works across the modes of 
mass transportation in London is germane to modernising and enhancing the operation of the 
tube in order to ensure present and emergent service levels and demands are met (Johnson, 
2010b: 22). London Underground carries as many passengers as the entire National Rail 
network, with up to 4 million journeys made each day, on 11 lines serving 270 stations 
(Mayor of London, 2010d: 131). After decades of under-investment, the tube is now 
undergoing major transformation programme comprising asset renewal, rebuilding and 
refurbishment. Also, there are upgrades on some lines, including the Jubilee line whose 
capacity was boosted by 17% in 2006 through the addition of a seventh carriage to all its 
trains and completed in 2010. In addition, the Victoria line upgrade was completed by 2012 
and some of the features of its improvement include the introduction of a new fleet of faster 
trains, and with modern technological gadgets such as CCTV in every carriage. In 2012, there 
was also the purchase of a new control centre and digital signalling system installed on the 
Northern line, which is the most complex line in the London Underground network, to further 
help trains to operate at higher speeds thereby reducing journey times by 18% while also 
increasing capacity by 20%. 
Since 2003, more than 124 stations have been refurbished. TfL will also build on the 
foundation of the 58 step-free stations already in place while further improving street to 
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platform accessibility in order to reduce congestions. Further projects relating to the 
strengthening of station capacities include the step-free access projects at Blackfriars and 
Farringdon – and important interfaces with Crossrail 1 which will be completed by 2018  
(Johnson, 2010b: 22-23).  
4.7.2 London overground 
 
 The majority of the upgrades carried out across the London overground network were 
aimed at increasing the capacity, quality and reliability of the overground rail network in 
London, in time for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. A new connection 
from Surrey Quays to Clapham junction with the use of the South London lines was 
implemented to complete the overground’s orbital route by 2012. 
There was also the introduction of additional carriages on North London railway to lengthen 
the train thereby increasing the North London railway’s capacity by 50%. The East London 
line extension was also connected to the North London railway via new track in the Dalston 
area. The East London line services are now operating as far as Highbury and Islington 
thereby providing users with more services. London overground has also benefitted from 65 
new trains introduced on the overground network since June 2010 when the East London line 
opened thereby providing additional trains to reduce the incidence of overcrowding during 
peak period. 
 
4.7.3 Docklands Light Railway (DLR) 
 
 In enhancing mobility in London and regeneration in the Thames Gateway, the 
operations of the DLR (which was established in 1987) have been of immense help. The key 
improvements to the DLR include a network extension to Stratford International and the 
upgrading of its carriages by 55 new ones to allow for three-car operation, thereby leading to 
a 50% increase in the capacity of the trains since June 2010. Furthermore, in order to enable 
regeneration in areas including south of Lewisham, west of Bank and north of Stratford 
International, the Mayor is working with TfL and other stakeholders to provide additional 
capacity for the new areas under consideration (Mayor of London, 2010d: 130).  
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4.7.4 Crossrail 1 
 
 Having discussed the partnership which is delivering Crossrail 1 earlier in this chapter, 
the aim of the scheme is emphasised here. Crossrail 1 was implemented to contribute to the 
upgrading of London mass transport system while also providing the Eastern and Western 
outer suburbs of London with fast and high-capacity links to central London, Heathrow 
airport and the Docklands. Thus, upon completion, Crossrail 1 will increase the capacity of 
London rail by 10% while easing congestion by 45% on the rail and tube lines. This can be 
translated to the movement of about 1.5 million more people to the heart of London. 
Construction began at key locations such as Canary Wharf and Tottenham Court Road in 
2010 and the scheme is delivered by a partnership.  
 
4.7.5 Surface transport highways 
 
In order to improve the highway and road traffic in London, TfL invested in a 
programme which increased traffic signals using the ‘intelligent’ SCOOT (Split Cycle Offset 
Optimisation Technique) system. Furthermore, TfL has improved existing road tunnels by 
embarking on a programme of safety improvements which included the installation of 
mechanisms that detects fire incidence, vehicle overweight, new lighting, and advanced 
communication and ventilation systems. Furthermore, TfL is planning to complete various 
safety and environmental improvements on the A406 at Bounds Green and a junction 
improvement scheme at Henley’s Corner in order to ensure highway infrastructures support 
the needs of not only transport users but all road users. 
 
4.7.6 London buses 
 
The Mayor has planned progressive upgrading to the bus fleet of TfL in order to 
improve passengers comfort and safety especially through an improvement in the design of 
seats, air-cooling systems, CCTV and the creation of more space in the bus through an 
outward-opening door mechanism. Furthermore, a new iconic bus called the New Bus for 
London has been developed and now in operation in order to replace the bendy-buses which 
are being withdrawn from operations (Johnson, 2010b: 22-26). The new London buses are 
82 
 
equipped with high standards of accessibility, safety and emissions abatement. It is also 
claimed by the Mayor that the buses are more fuel efficient and better ventilated.  
 
4.7.7 Barclays cycle scheme 
 
 Although each of the bicycles used on the Barclays scheme is not capable of 
transporting two or more people thereby not making it a mass transport mode, however, due 
to the numbers of journeys made by the scheme, it can be argued that Barclays cycles have 
helped in reducing the demand on the Underground network and other modes. For instance, 
the Barclays cycle hire quarterly performance statistics (November 2013 to January 2014: 3) 
shows that there was an average of 995 hires and docks per week day. This shows that the 
scheme helps in reducing the capacity problems on other modes in particular the Underground 
and buses. Nevertheless, as discussed in section 4.5.2, it is clear that the scheme does not 
offer tax payers good value for money due to its cost. The Barclays cycle report also shows 
that the scheme is not financially sustainable as shown in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Barclays cycle hire cost/revenue statistics 
Adapted from Barclays cycle hire quarterly performance statistics (November 2013 to January 2014: 5)  
£m 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Cycle Income 2.4 6.5 7.5 
Sponsorship Income 3.8 5.2 5.4 
Operating Costs (13.3) (21.0) (24.0) 
Net Operating Costs (7.1) (9.3) (11.1) 
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4.8 Chapter conclusion 
 
 This chapter has attempted to trace the emergence of government institutions in 
London especially those whose roles have an effect on mass transport capacities. The 
transformation of government institutions for instance, the MBW to LCC, later to GLC, and 
thereafter to GLA shows the changes that have occurred in the governance structure of 
London. In engineering these changes, it was noted that central government played key roles 
relating to funding and coordination through the enacting of rules which shaped the working 
of the system and the limit of the powers of London government including that of the Mayor. 
Arguably, fragmentation occasioned by central government policies and legislations was 
identified as the primary cause of the series of reforms and changes London government has 
witnessed, and which impinge on the delivery of public services, thereby making it to depend 
on central government for the funding of development projects especially mass transport.  
 Throughout its existence, London governments have been influenced by central 
government in different capacities. While the formation of the Mayoral system and Assembly 
in 2000 reintroduced a city-wide authority after fourteen years of abolishing the GLC which 
was a city wide authority, evidence from the study shows that the GLA like its predecessors is 
still influenced and controlled by central government who funds majority of its schemes. 
Although the GLA was established as an independent institution, however, it is restricted in 
its operational capacity by the central government for example, through the 1999 GLA Act 
which stipulates the powers of the GLA. Nevertheless, the GLA has been able to enable and 
sustain the delivery of goods and services to Londoners using a combination of partnerships 
and strategies as observed in the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy in addressing 
current and emergent challenges confronting the system in London. 
 The discussion of partnerships in the chapter also illustrates its relevance in delivering 
public goods and services through schemes like Crossrail 1. While the incidence of 
partnerships in London recurred more from the late 1990s due to the ideology of central 
government as discussed in Chapter 3, the GLA has subsequently employed partnerships in 
delivering its policy priorities embedded in the London Plan and Mayors Transport Strategy. 
The study of the case in London has thus shown that partnerships including its modification 
and other mandatory ways of working have been employed by the Mayor in ensuring 
capacities are deployed to sustain mass transport modes in London.   
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Chapter Five:  
Discussion of themes and findings in the case of London 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss findings concerning the governance of mass 
transportation in London. The discussion begins with an explanation of the government and 
governance structure in London and how they relate to actors, in particular to the 
organisations concerned with mass transportation governance. Thereafter, the goals of a 
number of organisations are considered (the selection criteria are discussed in the 
methodology chapter). In addition, the key themes that emerge are examined in order to 
establish their significance to the study. Drawing on the findings from London, some of the 
weaknesses of the collaborative governance model presented by Ansell and Gash (2008) are 
then presented. 
As noted in Chapter 2, information was gathered from a number of actors: Rob Fox 
(London First); Jonathan Hollis (London Assembly); Rhodri Ball (Transport for London - 
TfL); Richard Tracey (London Assembly); an individual from London Underground, who 
wished to remain anonymous; Andrew Phipps (City of London Corporation); and Tim 
Bellenger (London Travel Watch). All of these individuals provided primary evidence on how 
their organisations contribute to advancing the system
13
 in London. This evidence was further 
corroborated using secondary data, such as reports of the Transport Committee of the London 
Assembly and publications by London First and the GLA. As noted in the discussion of 
methodology in Chapter 2, it was not possible to collect primary data from other actors, such 
as the Mayor of London (Boris Johnson), bus operators, the National Union of Rail and 
Maritime Transport (RMT) Workers and London boroughs. Nevertheless, some of the data 
that might have been provided directly by such actors was collected from secondary sources, 
such as the London Plan, TfL’s 2011/12 Annual report, the 2012/13 Mayor’s final 
consolidated budget and the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (2010). 
 
                                                          
 
13
 A discussion of the system (Unit of Analysis) including the actors that constitute it is available in Chapter 2 
(Research methodology). 
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5.2 Overview of the governance structure of mass transportation in London 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, London government is directed by the Greater London 
Authority (GLA), which is made up of the office of the Mayor, Boris Johnson (Conservative), 
his deputy, Roger Evans (Conservative member of the London Assembly) who represents the 
Mayor at local and London-wide events. In addition, there are seven Deputy Mayors
14
 
appointed by the Mayor including Isabel Dedring – Deputy Mayor for Transport, who 
oversees the relationship between the GLA and TfL to ensure the delivery of the Mayor’s 
priorities. Furthermore, the Deputy Mayor for Transport acting on behalf of the Mayor or with 
the Mayor undertakes negotiations with central government departments concerning transport 
issues, and to influence this to ensure no detriment to London or the Mayoral priorities. The 
Deputy Mayor for Transport while relying on TfL’s reports and studies commissioned by the 
Transport Committee of the GLA also monitors the provision of transport services, implement 
and make recommendations for appropriate changes required in the interests of effective 
management as ordered by the Mayor (http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-
assembly/mayor/mayoral-team/isabel-dedring).  
Aside from the Deputy Mayors, the London Assembly of the GLA, chaired by 
Jennette Arnold OBE (Labour Party), which has several committees, including the Transport 
Committee, plays a scrutiny role. The Assembly looks after London’s interests in two key 
ways: first, by questioning the Mayor and his team at Assembly meetings on their major 
activities, which include making strategic plans and decisions affecting key policy areas 
including policing, transport, planning and the economy; second, working through its 
committees, such as the Transport Committee, it conducts investigations linked to the 
Mayor’s decisions and policies (London.gov.uk). In identifying and implementing various 
policies linked with the four key policy areas identified above, the Mayor of London 
collaborates both with governmental actors, including central government and London 
boroughs, and non-governmental actors, such as London First, through a variety of 
mechanisms including co-funding, policy planning and implementation, and resource sharing. 
The advent of an elected Mayor and Assembly in 2000, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
incorporated a number of checks and balances so that the Assembly members can hold the 
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 For a list of the Deputy Mayors, see http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/mayor/mayoral-team 
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Mayor to account on relevant policy issues. While the Mayor and his deputies take decisions 
regarding policies and plans relating to Transport for London (TfL), the Metropolitan Police 
Authority, London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA), and London 
Development Agency, the Assembly can overturn his decisions with a two-thirds majority 
vote (Wilson and Game, 2006: 76), although this has not happened so far.  
 In Chapter 4, the relationship between the GLA and central government was 
discussed. It was emphasised that the latter plays a vital role in the governance system of 
London. For example, Travers shows that central government provides about 70 to 80 per 
cent of the money spent by the GLA and London boroughs (2004: 142). In addition, the 
relationship between central government and London government has been shaped by several 
factors including political, economical, cultural, demographic and infrastructural influences. 
After an analysis of the relations between the two actors, it was clear that both collaboration 
and contracts were employed by both actors in delivering infrastructural projects, such as the 
construction of Crossrail 1
15
 discussed in Chapter 4. It was clear that the GLA and central 
government, fund most of the cost associated with the delivery of major public infrastructures 
such as the London Underground upgrade and Crossrail 1, with the rest being funded by some 
private and third sector organisations. 
 Within the governance system in London is embedded the mass transport governance 
system, referred to earlier in the thesis as the system. Given the diversity of organisations and 
interests involved, this system essentially functions through a wide variety of different 
mechanisms, including the use of partnership working, contracts, and networks of relations 
among bodies such as the London Assembly (including its elements for example, the 
Transport Committee), TfL, London boroughs, and London Travel Watch. This shows the 
existence of governance as defined by Kooiman (2003) in London. It was clear to the 
researcher that, in general, these organisations collaborate with one another where they find it 
advantageous to do so but not otherwise. For instance, London First and the London Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry collaborate on how to advance London’s competitiveness and 
transport infrastructures by using business briefings with key figures in City Hall, 
Westminster, Whitehall, the ‘Square mile’ and London boroughs to influence mass 
transportation policy making and implementation. Also, actors are sometimes required to 
                                                          
 
15 See section 4.5.1 titled Crossrail 1 partnership for the discussion of the Crossrail 1 scheme. 
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collaborate as a result of particular government policies which favour partnership, such as the 
emphasis placed on partnership in the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS) 
where the Mayor comments that partnership shall be employed in delivering the mayoral 
priorities. 
 From the discussion above, it is clear that to understand the governance process in 
London, it is essential to identify and study actors operating at the local (London) and national 
(central government) levels of governance, and how such actors engage with one another in 
the governance process. Furthermore, it is apparent that in delivering public goods and 
services, the position and office of the Mayor of London bestow certain powers and 
leadership roles, such as strategic capacity, which enable the Mayor to consult and delegate 
necessary functions to individuals and organisations in or outside of the system. For 
emphasis, some of the Mayor’s powers include: the power to levy three transport-related 
charges (a congestion charge, emissions charge, and workplace parking levy); the power to 
raise funds through the Business Rate Supplement and Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) 
which is being employed for funding Crossrail 1; and the power to direct boroughs to change 
their local plans to ensure conformity with the London Plan (Sandford, 2013). The Mayor also 
has the power to appoint members to the boards of the functional bodies in London and to set 
their budgets and strategy. In practice, he has full authority over them in terms of appointing 
and dismissing board members; however, in some respects his powers are also restricted 
because the majority of funding for the boards comes directly from the Treasury, and cannot 
be moved to another budget area (Ibid).  
Bache and Flinders (2004: 97-98) interpret ‘governance’ as an increase in the roles of 
non-governmental actors in public policy making and delivery through an increasingly 
complex state-society relationship in which networks are prominent, while the state’s primary 
roles include funding and policy coordination. This is evidenced in the way in which the mass 
transport system works in London, as the GLA and other elements of the state coordinate 
actors and fund initiatives in the system. Also, in situating the new role of government as the 
coordinator of the system, evidence from the London Plan, developed by the Mayor of 
London, the 32 London boroughs and the City of London Corporation and non-governmental 
actors such as London First and London Travel Watch, shows that the Mayor engages 
different actors for the purpose of delivering public services. For instance, quoting the Mayor: 
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“Delivery is not just for us in City Hall – boroughs and neighbourhoods (community 
based organisations and private sector bodies) have an increasingly important role, and 
I want to see this Plan used by them as a resource for localism, helping them develop 
and then implement local approaches to meet their needs” (London Plan, 2011: 6).  
Thus, through the implementation of the London Plan, as discussed later in the chapter, the 
various roles
16
 played by the Mayor were made clear.   
 
5.3 The goals of relevant actors and conflicts in the system 
 
 This section begins with a discussion and illustration of the actors that constitute the 
system in London. Thereafter, the goals of the actors and others (non systemic actors) who 
work with them are discussed. Next, the relationships between actors are considered in 
addition to the incidence of conflict as it occurs among organisations. Finally, Table 5 
summarises the primary goals of the key actors in the system in London. 
 Figure 2 shows the different categories of actors in and out of the system in London 
and linkages between actors across the system. The importance of these was clear from the 
study; for instance, the analysis of the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS), 
showed that both placed significant emphasis on the use of partnership working among actors 
and stakeholders in delivering public services in London thereby confirming relations among 
actors in and out of the system. Furthermore, Figure 2 highlights that it is possible to identify 
different levels among the actors in the system. For instance, key actors including the Mayor 
and TfL occupy the main component of the system where they coordinate and communicate 
to actors in other level about the policy priorities of the Mayor. Thus, due to the leadership, 
funding and coordinating roles they play in the system, the Mayor and TfL constitute a level. 
It was also noted that secondary actors include bodies from different sectors such as London 
First, London boroughs, operators and London Travel Watch (mix of public, private and third 
sector bodies), thereby constituting another level in the system. These actors however relate 
with other secondary actors and actors in the main component and with bodies in (GLA) and 
outside (DfT) of the system. The secondary actors identified constitute another level due to 
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 The identified roles played by the Mayor include as producer, funder, planner and as the champion of 
Londoners. 
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the implementation, funding and delivery roles they play. Another level of actors includes the 
Treasury and DfT who are outside of the system. These bodies play funding and coordinating 
roles for actors in the system for instance, it was shown in the discussion of the funding 
regime later in this chapter that central government through the Treasury and DfT is a major 
funder of the system including transport initiatives in London. For clarity, Figure 2 below 
shows systemic and non systemic actors in addition with the level of actors. 
 
 
Figure 2: Network diagram of actors inside and outside the system in London. 
  
The actors identified by the researcher as constituting the main component of the 
system in London are TfL and the Mayor of London, as without them the system cannot 
function effectively as they play strategic roles and leadership roles. TfL’s expertise relating 
to mass transportation strategy, planning and implementation, including their role in 
enhancing capacity, and the four key roles (funder, regulator, champion of the masses and 
producer) of the Mayor, make these two actors central, for both the short term and long term 
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survival of the system. Other bodies, including the Transport Committee of the London 
Assembly, London First and London Travel Watch, play roles such as providing evidence, 
through studies they commission, that is relevant to the long term sustainability of the system. 
For instance, it was noted from the study that findings from the studies commissioned by 
London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee influence policy decisions and actions 
which address different challenges linked to mass transportation in London. Examples of such 
studies are cited later in the chapter. 
Other actors who constitute secondary actors include the City of London Corporation, 
London boroughs and the RMT union. In addition, it was clear that the Treasury and DfT who 
constitute actors outside the system also play key roles through their funding of the projects 
implemented by systemic actors to sustain mass transport capacity as illustrated in the funding 
regime section later in the chapter. The Treasury and DfT are perceived by the researcher as 
non-systemic actors because they are not directly involved in the daily operation and planning 
of mass transportation in London.   
 
5.4 The goals of the actors inside and outside the system 
 
The goal of the Mayor of London (primary actor) is to make London the best place to 
work, live, study, invest and do business (https://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-
assembly/mayor/vision-2020). In developing and implementing policies aimed at sustaining 
Londoners, the Mayor works with other actors, some of whom are discussed below 
(http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl/4510.aspx). The researcher observed from the 
study that while it is clear the Mayor works with other actors in delivering mayoral policy 
priorities, nonetheless, the Mayor is able to influence the actors he works with through his 
powers. Hence, it was not always clear whether the Mayor is the champion of Londoners as 
he claims, as some of his policies for instance the introduction of driverless trains which was 
opposed by most actors, contradict his champion role.   
The goal of the Transport Committee (secondary actor) of the London Assembly is to 
scrutinise actors in the system, especially on how they use resources to sustain the delivery of 
mass transportation. The researcher observed from the activities of the Transport Committee 
that the body employs questions and invitation to call for evidence in examining actors. 
Furthermore, the researcher also observed that the committee make recommendations to 
operators and other actors playing roles related to the delivery of mass transportation in 
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London on how they can address the challenges facing mass transportation. London First is 
another secondary actor in the system and its goal is to make London the best city in the 
world in which to do business (http://londonfirst.co.uk/about/mission/). In considering this 
goal, the study shows that London First contributed to the development of the Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy (MTS) and to the implementation of schemes such as Crossrail 1 through 
donations in order to meet the expectations of its members who sustain the organisation 
through membership fees. The goal of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry was 
seen to be similar to that of London First in some respects, as the organisation aims at 
promoting and defending the interests of its members while representing London business to 
the Mayor, GLA, national government, the opposition, international audiences and the media 
(http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/lcc_public/article.asp?aid=4073).  
London Travel Watch is another secondary actor inside the system, and its goal is to 
press for better public transport London-wide with higher standards of quality, performance 
and accessibility through its scrutiny of the services provided by operators 
(http://www.londontravelwatch.org.uk/about/). It was observed from the study that, due to the 
broad roles of London Travel Watch and its work, which investigates a wider category of 
users and organisations, bodies including TfL and DfT invite the institution to present 
relevant evidence related to users, accessibility and the delivery of modes of mass 
transportation in London. It was also observed that London Travel Watch sometimes works 
with the Transport Committee by presenting evidence from the studies it commissions, for 
example, bus passengers’ priorities for improvements in London (2010), which relate to how 
mass transportation can be sustained in London. 
Another organisation which constitutes a secondary actor and relates to the key 
components of the system is the Rail Maritime and Transport (RMT) Union, whose objective 
is to protect and better the pay and conditions of its members who are from almost every 
sector of the transport industry such as mainline and underground railways, shipping and 
buses (http://www.rmt.org.uk/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeId=89764). It was also clear from 
the study that the RMT Union protects the interest of its members as the body influences 
policy decisions which might have effects on the working conditions of its members. London 
boroughs and the City of London Corporation are also secondary actors, and they play 
implementation roles for some policies, for example the Barclays cycle scheme. While the 
City of London Corporation aims to sustain the competitiveness of the City by acting as the 
local authority for the ‘Square Mile’ business district around St Paul’s, and to provide 
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relevant services for London and the wider UK (http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-the-
city/what-we-do/Pages/default.aspx), London boroughs aim to develop and deliver a 
comprehensive and sustainable approach for public services delivery at the local level, while 
implementing the Mayor’s policies as set in the London Plan and Mayors Transport Strategy 
(http://www.london.gov.uk/priorities/business-economy/working-partnership/london-
boroughs). In coordinating the activities of London boroughs with regards to mass 
transportation, TfL and the Mayor of London play key strategic and funding roles, as 
discussed later in this chapter.  
In addition to the organisations discussed above, the DfT and Treasury (central 
government agencies) constitute important actors outside the system, whose goals include 
coordinating the overall transport system in England, and setting the policy framework which 
regulates the system in London. The primary aim of the DfT is to work with transport 
agencies in supporting the transport network that helps the UK’s businesses and gets people 
and goods travelling around the country.
17
 It was also clear from the study that the DfT and 
Treasury implement their goals by funding the system and setting the rules guiding the 
operation of the strategic transport authority (TfL). 
In considering the strategic role of organisations as they relate to the system, Boris 
Johnson (2009: 7), in the London Plan
18
, emphasised that strategic planning in London is the 
shared responsibility of the Mayor and actors including London boroughs, TfL and 
organisations from the private and third sectors. However, while the researcher observed that 
the significant power held by the Mayor enables him to make, influence and implement any 
plan, it was also clear from the study, especially in relation to the process by which the 
Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS) was developed, that joint working was employed between 
certain organisations including London First, Transport Committee and London Travel Watch 
for the purpose of policy development and implementation. The study therefore shows that 
the Mayor of London employs partnerships as instruments to attain set objectives, including 
sustaining mass transport infrastructural developments and the delivery of public services 
                                                          
 
17
 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-transport/about 
18
 The London Plan is the overall strategic plan for London, setting out an integrated economic, environmental, transport and social 
framework for the development of London over the next 20-25 years. As regards transport, the plan links improvements to infrastructures 
while setting out proposals for implementation, coordination and resourcing; and helping to ensure joined-up policy delivery by the GLA 
Group of organisations including Transport for London (The London Plan, 2011: 10). 
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while dictating who gets what, when and how as seen in the Barclays Cycle scheme 
partnership. 
TfL is a statutory body created by the Greater London Authority Act 1999, and is the 
key organisation tasked with the implementation of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy. The body 
works with actors such as London boroughs, the DfT and private sector funders such as 
Barclays bank in order to implement schemes, for example the Barclays cycle scheme and 
Crossrail 1, discussed in Chapter 4, all of which are directed at supporting the Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy. TfL and other organisations such as London Travel Watch and RMT 
union were observed to influence the DfT through the evidence they present which relate to 
the capacity of the network and the functioning of the licensing regime which award 
franchises to operators and organisations. Written evidence from TfL (RF 06 January 2013), 
and the Brown Review of the Rail Franchising Programme (January 2013), shows that while 
the licensing regime in the UK is coordinated mainly by the DfT, in 2007 the DfT devolved 
the power to award franchises for some limited national rail services to TfL, which is now 
known as London Overground and constitutes one of the transport modes in TfL. 
Furthermore, it was noted from the franchises awarded by TfL that the organisation is 
responsible for licensing bus operators, ferry operators and some train operators (London 
Overground, but not other mainline trains licensed by the DfT). By awarding the franchises, 
TfL is able to encourage some operators to facilitate the delivery of mass transportation to 
routes that are supposedly less profitable, through incentives such as its Quality Incentive 
Contract
19
 which aims to keep standards high by measuring the quality of service that 
passengers receive from operators, while rewarding some operators by developing training 
materials and qualifications for their operating staff.  
During the consultation process which leads to the awarding of franchise(s), the key 
features of franchising, such as operating obligations, performance benchmarks, financial 
obligations and payments, are deliberated and approved by TfL. As is discussed later in the 
funding regime section, it was noted that TfL allocates grants to actors such as London 
boroughs and City of London Corporation to work together to implement schemes supporting 
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 Additional information on the Quality Incentive Contract of TfL is available at 
http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/modesoftransport/1548.aspx 
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the Mayor’s Transport Strategy and the London Plan. This power to allocate grants is another 
example of TfL’s strategic powers. 
 The London Assembly, and in particular its Transport Committee, is empowered by 
the GLA Act 1999 to scrutinise the activities of actors, such as the Mayor and TfL, including 
its contractors and operators of mass transportation, especially on how the activities of those 
organisations advance mass transportation in London. It works with other organisations to 
gather evidence which is then used in making recommendations to appropriate organisations 
or in holding actors to account for their use of resources. For instance, after identifying 
challenges such as overcrowding on the network and a lack of information on alternative 
routes, the Transport Committee (2009a: 15-19) recommended that London Underground and 
Tube Lines should ensure improved train design to relieve overcrowding. It was observed 
from the study that London Underground implemented the recommendations of the Transport 
Committee through its Underground upgrade programme.  
The Transport Committee also recommended that London Underground should pilot 
the provision of specific information at stations about crowding levels in order to address 
challenges linked to inadequate information on the network (Ibid: 21). During the study, the 
researcher observed that some of the recommendations of the Transport Committee, such as 
improved train design, were implemented on some lines on the Underground, while London 
Underground (2010: 12-13), in its report titled ‘Transport for London Investment 
Programme’, indicated that its milestones include the network installation Electronic Service 
Update Boards (ESUBs) which inform users on current services, and the ongoing work on the 
increasing of train capacities. Nevertheless, this does not mean that organisations implement 
all of the recommendations of committees in the London Assembly, as such recommendations 
are not legally binding and their non-enforcement is not penalized. Thus, the relationship 
between committees of the London Assembly and actors in the system is shaped by the 
scrutiny roles and recommendations of the Assembly in committees in relation to transport 
operators and other organisations whose operations have an effect on mass transportation in 
London. In addition, at present the Transport Committee cannot directly hold to account 
organisations such as the mainline train operators, for example Virgin Trains East Coast and 
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Cross Country, most of whom are instead accountable to the DfT and Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR)
20
. 
During the study it was observed that London First, more than other non-
governmental organisations, engages with central, regional and local government policies. For 
instance, it contributed to the making of the 2010 Mayor’s Transport Strategy for London in 
terms of the case it made for the funding of transport infrastructures such as Heathrow 
expansion and the Underground upgrade to avert the breakdown of the aged rail transport 
system in London. It also provides the DfT with data and reports from the studies it 
commissions, such as ‘Getting London to Work’ (2006), which explored the state of rail 
transport carriages in London. The evidence given by Rob Fox suggested that London First 
does not collaborate with organisations such as London Travel Watch because their goals 
compete due to the different policy programmes they support. The former focuses on 
addressing the needs of its business membership organisations while the latter focuses on a 
broader remit
21
 of mass transportation. Since London First aims at supporting its members by 
ensuring their employees have access to operational modes of mass transportation to convey 
them to and from their place of work, it mainly funds mass transport projects that positively 
affect the business of its members and the competitiveness of London. For instance, in 
contributing to the funding of Crossrail 1 and the DLR, London First mobilised the Canary 
Wharf group and other organisations into making donations (however, such contributions may 
be viewed as largely tokenistic when compared to the significant grants from central 
government). Thus, it is clear that in attaining its core goal, which is to provide competitive 
advantage for its members while also making London a destination for business, London First 
partners with government bodies and organisations it identifies to further its interests. On the 
contrary, the relationship of London Travel Watch with users and bodies in London is shaped 
by the degree to which users needs and demand for modes of mass transportation are met. 
 The City of London Corporation, as with all boroughs in London, supports the 
implementation of the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS) by integrating 
                                                          
 
20
The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) regulates the UK rail industry's health and safety performance. The body also hold Network Rail and 
High Speed 1 (HS1) to account while making sure that the rail industry is competitive and fair (Available at http://orr.gov.uk/about-orr/what-
we-do). 
21 London Travel Watch aims to meet the transport needs of a wide variety of actors including the membership organisations of London First 
and ordinary Londoners as well as visitors to the City.  
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relevant policies from the MTS and London Plan in their Local Implementation Plan. During 
this process, the Corporation engages with organisations such as the GLA, London boroughs, 
TfL and actors from the private sector, partly by contributing some funding to initiatives 
(such as £200 million in the case of Crossrail
22
) to enhance the delivery of mass transportation 
to organisations located and operating in the ‘Square Mile’. While it is clear that the City of 
London Corporation relates mainly with actors which provide services that enhance the global 
status of the City, evidence from the study shows that the Mayor is able to influence the 
Corporation, as well as other London boroughs through the Mayor’s powers, as identified 
earlier in the chapter. For instance, the study shows that for boroughs and the Corporation to 
get GLA and TfL funding, they must implement programmes that support and further the 
attainment of Mayoral policy priorities as established in the London Plan and Mayor’s 
Transport Policy. 
 Other organisations, such as the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) 
and the Rail and Maritime Transport (RMT) union, play roles in the system that are not as 
strategic as those played by the actors constituting the main component. For instance, the 
RMT union and other unions in the transport sector are fundamentally concerned with 
protecting and improving their members’ working conditions by seeking shorter working 
hours and higher remuneration from employers. This is likely to reduce the profits accruing to 
operators and other investors in the transport system in London. Hence, a lack of agreement 
between operators and workers on remuneration and conditions of work through relevant 
unions can sometimes lead to industrial action, which can have a negative effect on business 
activities in London. For instance, The Independent
23
 (January 11th 2013) reported that when 
train drivers went on strike on Boxing Day (26
th
 of December 2012) in a long-running dispute 
over bank holiday pay, Tube services were considerably disrupted. Nonetheless, officials of 
the ASLEF union played a key role in ensuring the suspension of the strike action in order to 
allow for talks of resolution. This incident suggests that union officials sometimes work with 
operators in addressing employee demands (in this instance, train drivers) in order to prevent 
strike actions in the system, especially when such actions affect union members. 
                                                          
 
22 The funding framework for crossrail is available at http://www.crossrail.co.uk/about-us/funding 
23 Further details on the pay row between Tube workers and ASLEF the train drivers’ union are available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/pay-row-tube-strikes-called-off-8447514.html 
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 The London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) is closely involved with the 
development of enterprise and industries in London. The LCCI partners with both 
government and private sector organisations through projects, such as ‘Enterprise Zones’,24 
one of which is situated at the Royal Docks, and aims to promote enterprise and innovation 
and the acquisition of skills for sustained employment in London in order to protect and 
enhance London’s competitiveness. It was noted by the researcher that mass transport modes 
such as the DLR and Underground form a key component of the enterprise zone at the Royal 
Docks. This therefore point to the relevance of mass transportation in the economy of 
London. Another initiative of the LCCI is ‘Changing the way we work’, which is a 
partnership between LCCI, central and GLA governments, focused on developing flexible 
working patterns to reduce the numbers of users of modes of mass transportation. This 
scheme is another example of how businesses, through the LCCI, work with government and 
TfL in sustaining mass transport delivery in London. 
Drawing on the discussion in previous paragraphs relating to goals of actors, the primary 
goals of systemic and non systemic actors are stated in Table 5 below. 
Drawing on the analysis of the goals of actors in the system, their distinctive goals are 
highlighted in Table 5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
24 The enterprise zone is in the Royal Docks in London which was historically the throbbing artery of UK trade and commerce. Currently, the 
Mayor argues that it presents a huge opportunity to develop a world class international business district where jobs are created while also 
experiencing growth and the strengthening trade between east and west London by means of integrated transportation. The key assets located 
in the Royal Docks to facilitate economic growth and developments include DLR, Crossrail and London City Airport. 
98 
 
Table 5: The distinctive goals of the actors constituting the system in London and other 
external actors. 
Actor Stated primary goal 
Transport for 
London (TfL) 
To do strategy and planning relating to the implementation of the Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy and manage transport services across the capital for 
which the Mayor has responsibility. These services include London’s buses, 
London Underground, DLR, London Overground, Tramlink, London River 
Services and Victoria Coach Station (http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-
tfl/4510.aspx). 
Mayor of 
London 
To make London the best place to work, live, study, invest and do business 
(https://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/mayor/vision-2020). 
London Travel 
Watch 
To be recognised as an impartial body, whose views are taken seriously and 
either acted upon or, if not, reasons should be given as to why not in order to 
sustain better public transport, with higher standards of quality, performance 
and accessibility (http://www.londontravelwatch.org.uk/about/). 
London 
Assembly of 
the Greater 
London 
Authority 
(GLA) 
To scrutinise the Mayor as well as other relevant actors playing roles related 
to key areas such as transport and economic development, and provide 
recommendations to support them (London Assembly, 2012). The Assembly 
including its committees holds regular discussions with the chairs and chief 
executives of organisations such as TfL and operators in order to press for 
improvements to services. 
City of London 
Corporation 
To support and promote 'The City' as the world leader in international 
finance and business services. The Corporation does this by providing local 
government and policing services for the financial and commercial heart of 
Britain, the 'Square Mile'. (http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-the-
city/what-we-do/Pages/default.aspx). 
London First To influence national and local government policies and investment 
decisions to support London’s global competitiveness and the business 
interests of its members (http://www.londonfirst.co.uk/about-us/). 
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Rail Maritime 
and Transport 
(RMT) Union 
To protect and improve the pay and conditions of its members. It negotiates 
with over 150 transport-sector companies to drive home its agenda for better 
pay, shorter hours and safer working conditions 
(http://www.rmt.org.uk/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeId=89764). 
London 
Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Industry 
To be an independent, not-for-profit business support and networking 
organisation that puts the needs and interests of its members and 
stakeholders at the heart of everything it does 
(http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/lcc_public/article.asp?aid=3929). 
London 
boroughs 
To develop and implement policies within the overall policy framework of 
the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy 
(http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/aboutus/default.htm).  
Department for 
Transport 
(DfT) 
To set up a transport system that is an engine for economic growth, but one 
that is also greener and safer and improves the quality of life in our 
communities (http://www.dft.gov.uk/about). 
   
5.5 The incidence of conflict in the system 
 
The mass transportation system in London as with most political systems experiences 
conflict and consensus. Dahl (1976: 59) comments that the members of a political system 
pursue conflicting aims, which are dealt with, among other means, by the government of the 
political system. In the system in London, the GLA especially the Mayor plays a role in 
dealing with potential issues by initiating policies. Three types of conflicts were identified in 
the system: conflict between organisations who have the same goal and compete to achieve 
that goal, conflict within organisations and conflict between the roles of the Mayor. The study 
however shows that the forms of conflicts were addressed by a combination of means 
including through government (GLA) policies as established in the London Plan, through set 
organisational rules and TORs, and lastly through the individual actions of some actors in the 
system. Of all the means identified for addressing the incidence of conflicts in the system in 
London, arguably, the use of government policies was seen as the most effective for reducing 
conflicts due to the broad remit and effects of such policies and government action. For 
instance, the Mayor made it clear in the Mayor’s Transport Strategy and London Plan that 
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schemes related to mass transport infrastructure shall be delivered with the use of 
partnerships. 
It is clear that during the processes through which organisations implement their goals, 
conflicts are bound to occur. Furthermore, it was noted that additional conflicts originate from 
the make-up of the system in London. For instance, Haugaard (2002: 309) suggests that 
structures do not confer power equally across a system because large amounts of power are 
conferred on some actors and none upon others. This was argued to cause conflict by 
Haugaard. Considering the system in London, the view of Haugaard (2002) is sustained 
because it is clear that central government, through the DfT and Treasury, and the Mayor have 
majority of the powers in the system and allocate elements of such powers as they deem fit. 
By acting this way, there is conflict sometimes between some central government policies and 
the policy needs of communities. This was shown in Chapter 3 while discussing Newman et 
al. (2004: 216) whose comments show how a central government policy conflicted with the 
needs of a community as their demands were not reflected in central government policy 
targets. 
The three forms of conflict observed within the system in London are, discussed 
below, considering how each conflict emerges and the consequences of this for the overall 
functioning of the system. In discussing conflict, Mao’s (1968) distinction between 
antagonistic (irreconcilable) and non-antagonistic (reconcilable) conflicts is employed. He 
(1968: 45-46) argued that while antagonistic conflicts are those between ourselves and the 
enemy,
25
 non-antagonistic conflicts are those among the people themselves.  
Overall, non-antagonistic conflict appears more common than antagonistic conflict in 
the system. For instance, non-antagonistic conflict can be seen to exist between some 
organisations, such as London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee of the London 
Assembly. Conflict between these organisations came about due to competition over who 
should be mainly responsible for scrutinising operators and organisations against their service 
delivery benchmarks. For instance, while London Travel Watch claim they carry out better 
scrutiny of actors in the system because they are non-political and they employ quantitative 
methods through surveys and qualitative means through consultations for the purpose of 
                                                          
 
25 Enemy in the case of the system in London is construed as the actor who takes undue advantage over others while also serving as a threat 
to the existence of any actor.  
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gathering data from the users of the modes of mass transport in London, the Transport 
Committee argue that they play a better scrutiny role than London Travel Watch because they 
are set up to scrutinise actors in the system. However, the researcher observed from the study 
that London Travel Watch play a better scrutiny role than the Transport Committee because 
the body employs both primary and secondary data as evidence from the study it 
commissions. On the contrary, the Transport Committee mainly rely on the evidence they get 
through discussions with relevant actors in particular organisations whose activities influence 
mass transport modes. 
Moreover, the conflict between the two bodies increased due to the purported plan of 
the Transport Committee to integrate London Travel Watch within its own structure in 2011, 
as it argued that such a move would reduce the incidence of role duplication (scrutiny roles) 
in the system. London Travel Watch, however, argued that such integration would put at risk 
its political impartiality (London Travel Watch, 2011: 4). It was noted that the powers 
conferred on the GLA including the London Assembly and its Transport Committee played a 
role (funding and regulatory roles) in its relations with London Travel Watch and in its 
attempt to integrate the latter in its structure. While there is the occurrence of non-antagonistic 
conflict between London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee, both bodies engage in 
the scrutiny of bodies responsible for providing elements of mass transportation in the system. 
Furthermore, the study shows that both bodies (London Travel Watch and Transport 
Committee) support some of the workings of the other; for instance, while the former body 
provides the latter with data from the studies its commissions to enable the recommendations 
it makes, the latter body funds the budget of the former so as to ensure users of all mass 
transport modes get good experiences.  
Despite the conflict between the Transport Committee of the London Assembly and 
London Travel Watch, there was a positive relationship between the organisations. For 
instance, London Travel Watch is accountable to the London Assembly, including the 
Transport Committee, since it was established and funded by the London Assembly. 
Furthermore, London Travel Watch submits evidence and reports to the Transport Committee 
to enhance its work relating to the scrutiny of actors (contractors and operators) responsible 
for elements of mass transportation in London, and such reports are employed by the 
Transport Committee and Assembly while questioning the Mayor and other actors on their 
use of resources. From the analysis of some of the reports of the Transport Committee, for 
example, ‘Too close for comfort: Passengers’ experience of the London Underground’ 
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(2009b) and ‘The big squeeze: Rail overcrowding in London’ (2009a), the researcher 
observed that the Committee rely on some of the evidence and findings from the studies the 
London Travel Watch and other bodies commission. This therefore indicates that, although 
conflict exists between the two bodies, they also work with each other on issues of interest to 
both actors.  
Another form of conflict (non-antagonistic) occurred within organisations between 
staff (union and non-union members) and employers within an organisational context. While 
employers such as TfL employ and implement cost saving strategies, such as Project Horizon 
(discussed in the funding regime section), some staff are disadvantaged by the 
implementation of such strategies which lead to redundancy, and there is a possibility of 
antagonistic conflict, especially when the redundant staff are not given a compensation 
package which meets their expectations. Consequently, employees of service oriented 
organisations such as TfL sometimes disagree with employers about their working conditions, 
while also seeking a better remuneration and contract. One instance when employees’ 
demands contradicted the cost-saving and profit-making strategies of their employers was the 
‘fare-free’ scheme introduced on Arriva trains in January 2002. During this scheme, unions 
decided to stop strike action in favour of the ‘fare free’ days in order to reduce Arriva’s profits 
but not disrupt services for passengers, according to the RMT
26
. Nonetheless, it can also be 
argued that sometimes the demands by employees for better working conditions are addressed 
covertly as illustrated by the negotiation between the train drivers union (ASLEF), the RMT 
and London Underground, which agreed a £350 bonus for train drivers who voluntarily 
worked on Boxing day (26
th
 December 2013) in order to avert the proposed train drivers’ 
strike which had occurred on the past two Boxing days in 2012 and 2011. The deal, termed a 
‘cost-neutral deal’27 by Phil Hufton, London Underground’s Chief Operating Officer, was 
said to be funded from productivity savings from various parts of the trains operations. This 
deal could be said to be an example of a negotiated truce in an ongoing conflict between 
employers and employees, thereby indicating how a form of conflict is addressed in the 
system.  
                                                          
 
26 Additional information, on the ‘fare free’ days is available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1834296.stm 
27 Additional information on the cost neutral deal is available at http://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/no-tube-strike-this-boxing-day-as-
bosses-agree-350-bonus-for-drivers-8994958.html  
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The conflicts discussed above have dysfunctional consequences not only in the 
immediate organisational context but also in the wider system. For instance, if the ‘cost-
neutral deal’ described above had not been struck between London Underground, train drivers 
union (ASLEF) and the RMT, the strike action proposed by train drivers on the 26
th
 of 
December 2013 would have gone ahead, impacting on socio-economic activities in London 
while also increasing distrust among systemic actors.    
The third form of conflict identified in the study and which was also non-antagonistic 
was between two of the Mayor’s four multiple roles, namely: producer (chair of the TfL board 
which plans the enhancement of capacities, for instance on the Underground), political leader 
(champion of Londoners), planner (of the London governance system), and funder (of 
initiatives in London). While each of these various roles is legitimate, there is potential for 
conflict between the political and producing roles. For instance, using the example of the 
scrapping of the policy on the introduction of driverless trains to the network, the Mayor’s 
role as producer, through TfL, by which he declared his support for the implementation of the 
driverless train scheme, might be perceived as contradicting his role as the champion of 
Londoners because most Londoners, including the RMT union and their affiliates, were 
against the scheme. Indeed, the Mayor eventually dropped the idea of implementing the 
scheme due to the opposing stance and threats of some Londoners, unions and train drivers. 
This shows how the interests of some groups representing a cross-section of London can 
challenge either of the Mayor’s roles. Notwithstanding this, the degree to which the bodies 
that challenged the Mayor’s driverless trains represent the views of Londoners is another 
issue for debate. 
It is clear that while the Mayor used his position as the chair of the TfL board to 
introduce the driverless train scheme (perhaps not considering the effects of such policy on 
other actors such as train drivers and health and safety officials), it was obvious the policy 
would meet stiff opposition, especially from bodies representing train users and drivers. For 
instance, the RMT union feared its members would lose their jobs if the driverless train 
scheme were implemented. It was therefore not surprising to see how the Mayor failed in his 
acclaimed role as champion of Londoners because his view regarding the implementation of 
the driverless train scheme contradicted that of bodies and groups (RMT, Passenger Focus 
and London Travel Watch) representing some Londoners. While the degree to which the 
views of most Londoners are reflected by the bodies that opposed the driverless train scheme 
could be queried, nevertheless, evidence from the study in particular Richard Hollis (London 
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Assembly) and Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch) suggests that the implementation of the 
driverless train scheme failed mainly because most of the concerned stakeholders (for 
instance the RMT Union and Association of Train Drivers) affected by the policy were not 
consulted. 
Although the study shows the presence of contradictions in the Mayor’s role, it is clear 
that simply due to the position of the Mayor, he has to perform different roles. In performing 
some of his roles, the study also shows that the Mayor employs Deputy Mayors to take some 
decisions on his behalf while also coordinating the implementation of some of the policies 
developed to attain set Mayoral objectives.  
Notwithstanding the degree to which conflicts exist in the system, the Mayor and TfL 
(main actors) are usually able to coordinate other actors playing roles related to sustaining 
mass transportation through policies such as the London Plan and CIL, while also getting 
them involved in the process of making and implementing policies such as the Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy. From the discussion of conflict in this section, it is clear that, although 
there is some divergence between actors over who should be responsible for the function of 
scrutiny such as London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee of the London 
Assembly, these bodies work together on some schemes. Furthermore, the discussion of 
conflict has shown that while it is possible for an organisation, for instance TfL, to mobilise 
its workforce to implement cost saving strategies such as ‘Project Horizon’, nevertheless, 
such strategies can lead to conflicts within the organisation thereby hindering the workings of 
the organisation internally and externally. This therefore suggests that there is the occurrence 
of both conflicts and collaboration in the system in London thereby sustaining the argument 
of Haugaard which suggest that conflict and consensus exist as phenomena (2002: 308).  
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5.6 Key themes that emerged from the study 
 
Key themes including ‘leadership’, ‘funding regime’ and ‘accountability’ emerged 
from the investigation of London. These are discussed in subsequent paragraphs, together 
with an examination of the position taken by organisations and actors on each of the themes.  
 
5.6.1 Leadership 
 
All interviewees in London were of the opinion that leadership is key for the 
coordination of the system and for sustaining public services such as mass transportation. In 
this section the concept of leadership is discussed. Also, the process of how leadership 
advances or obstructs the occurrence of conflicts among actors is considered. Finally, the 
relevance of different leadership roles played by actors in the system, in particular the Mayor, 
is examined, while conclusions are drawn for the practice and sustainability of the system. 
In defining leadership, here the view of Northouse (2013: 5), who defines leadership 
as a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common 
goal, is employed (see also Western, 2008: 23). This definition was adopted because in this 
study it was found that the Mayor of London, as leader, influences actors through his powers 
and capacity within a group context in order to achieve goals such as making London the best 
place to work, live, study, invest and do business. The Mayor, as the political leader, employs 
some elements of strategic leadership, which can be defined as the creation of an overall sense 
of purpose and direction which guide integrated strategy formulation and implementation in 
organisations (Hosmer, 1982). For instance, evidence from the study reveals that in sustaining 
the delivery of the key priorities of the GLA, the Mayor works with non-governmental actors, 
committees and some politicians in the London Assembly, including those serving as Deputy 
Mayors.
28
 Furthermore, the Mayor uses his leadership position to engage with business and 
London boroughs by working jointly with them on relevant aspects of their Local 
Implementation Plans in order to ensure the implementation of London-wide initiatives, such 
                                                          
 
28 The Mayor employs several politicians and non politicians to work in the Mayoral team which is responsible for running London (This is 
available at http://www.london.gov.uk/who-runs-london/mayor/mayoral-team). 
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as the Barclays Cycle Hire and Barclays Cycle Superhighway schemes.
29
 Thus, due to the 
powers of the Mayor it was not surprising to observe that he played different leadership roles 
(political and strategic) in order to coordinate the system and sustain mass transportation 
delivery.  
While it is clear the Mayor provides leadership for the making and implementation of 
relevant policies and for governing the system in London, the London Plan and Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy shows that mass transportation schemes would be implemented  through 
partnership working among some actors for projects such as the Upgrade of the Underground, 
Crossrail 1, and the Barclays cycle scheme. It can also be argued that these partnerships are 
not immune to problems, such as the exclusion of certain actors or interests, thereby serving 
as additional potential sources of conflicts. For instance, the Borough Partnership, which 
consists of 33 London boroughs, works closely with TfL to provide a range of local transport 
initiatives while excluding actors from the private sector. While the operation of this 
partnership could result in some degree of conflict as the excluded actors may withhold their 
supports (small amount of funding and policy know-how), there was no evidence of such an 
occurrence to support this argument. The discussion of the leadership functions of the Mayor 
thus enables an understanding of the Mayor’s role in the system in order to gain further 
insight into how such roles enable or restrict collaboration and conflicts in the system.   
Notwithstanding the powers possessed by the Mayor as conferred under the GLA Act 
1999, which enable him to employ and deploy resources for the planning and implementation 
of relevant policies, some interviewees, including Andrew Phipps (City of London 
Corporation) and the interviewee who requested to be quoted as anonymous, were of the 
opinion that central government should lead the system in London due to its resource capacity 
(to provide funding), which they see as key for the sustainability of mass transportation in 
London. Other interviewees, including Richard Tracey (London Assembly) and Jonathan 
Hollis (London Assembly), believed that the Mayor and TfL were most suited to lead the 
system in London due to TfL’s strategic expertise on integrated mass transport, and the 
Mayor’s powers.  
                                                          
 
29 These schemes are sponsored by Barclays which is a major global financial services provider. TfL claims that both schemes make a 
positive contribution to London by offering sustainable environmentally friendly means of transport and helping Londoners and visitors to 
the Capital lead more active lives (Available at http://www.tfl.gov.uk/roadusers/cycling/15153.aspx).  
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Rob Fox (London First) was of the view that the leader of the system should have 
strategic and resource capacity, and also should be allowed by central government to retain a 
significant proportion of the tax revenue London generates, as he argued that central 
government control over revenues generated from London limits the funding power of the 
Mayor. Richard Tracey (London Assembly) and Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch) were 
also supportive of the Mayor’s leadership, as they presented the view that the existence of a 
powerful Mayor is in the interest of London as regards enabling socio-economic development 
and sustaining the delivery of public services such as mass transportation. Lastly, Rhodri Ball 
(TfL) supported the leadership of TfL and the Mayor as he was of the view that both actors 
play significant roles relating to strategy, planning and the coordination of the system in 
London.  
It is clear that the majority of interviewees wanted the Mayor and TfL to lead the 
system due to the funding capacity of the former and the strategic competence (the capacity to 
plan and implement transport projects) of the latter. Thus, interviewees made the argument for 
a leadership structure which employs official powers in influencing and coordinating actors in 
the system. Most interviewees favoured leadership by the Mayor due to the powers of the 
office in relation to the making and implementation of policies aimed at London-wide 
development. All of the interviewees indicated that they were in support of the various 
London-wide policies and projects implemented by the Mayor, irrespective of the 
inconvenience associated with some of the projects, as evidenced by the temporary closure of 
some Underground lines due to engineering/maintenance work, causing hardship to users. 
This therefore shows that regardless of the differences existing among organisations and in 
the Mayor’s role, key actors from relevant organisations as evidenced by interviewees 
supported the office of Mayor. 
In conclusion, the researcher observed that the Mayor was delivering on some of his 
vision and plans relating to mass transportation (for instance, the upgrade of the Underground 
and implementation of Crossrail 1) to aid capacity as set out in the Mayor’s Transport 
Strategy (2010) and The London Plan (2011). During the process by which the Mayor 
exercises his leadership roles and implements policies, both collaboration and imperative 
coordination
30
 were identified. Although the Barclays Cycle scheme discussed in Chapter 4 
                                                          
 
30 Imperative coordination is the process whereby the Mayor employs his powers in mandating actors to implement his policies or collaborate 
with him on certain schemes. 
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illustrates joint-working among actors including TfL, GLA, London boroughs, and Barclays 
bank, which funds the project, the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) is an incidence of 
imperative coordination (the use of Mayor’s powers in mandating systemic and non-systemic 
actors to carry out certain functions as directed by the Mayor). The London Plan statutorily 
requires all 33 London boroughs and the City of London Corporation to work jointly with TfL 
for the purpose of the collection of the CIL. Thus, through the Mayor’s leadership and 
policies in the MTS, in particular the CIL, which must be implemented by both London 
boroughs and the Corporation while also embedding it in their Local Implementation Plan, 
which is approved by TfL, a structure was observed to be in place to foster collaboration in 
the governance process. This practice illustrate the incidence of offensive collaboration in 
London as opined by Harding (1997),
31
 to emerge when a particular organisation cannot 
achieve its set targets independently without recourse to other organisations that have the 
necessary expertise and knowledge. In this instance, the Mayor including other elements of 
the GLA and TfL employed collaboration with actors such as London boroughs and the 
Corporation in raising additional revenue through CIL to fund schemes such as Crossrail 1 in 
London. The funding and implementation of Crossrail 1 and Underground upgrade, which are 
both delivered mainly by the GLA, TfL, DfT and other relevant organisations such as 
Network Rail, point to the Mayor’s use of partnership while implementing relevant projects. 
This therefore shows that the system in London employs and relies on means such as 
partnership working for the purpose of delivering and sustaining mass transportation. 
This section has shown evidence of the practice of collaboration and the use of 
leadership in coordinating the governance system in London. While contradictory views exist 
among actors in the system in London on the preferred actor to lead, the evidence gathered 
shows that all actors believe there is need for strategic leadership, as outlined in the 
propositions of Ansell and Gash (2008), Williams (2012), and Sullivan and Skelcher (2002). 
However, it was also clear that these actors have different opinions on the criteria (funding 
capacity and the possession of power) that should be used in selecting the leader. Nonetheless, 
most of the interviewees indicated their desire for a strategic leader who would play different 
(strategic and political roles) leadership roles in advancing mass transportation in London. 
Also, it was the view of all interviewees that the leadership of the governance system should 
be able to hold other actors to account for their functions, as is discussed in the section on 
                                                          
 
31 See Chapter 3 for further discussion of forms of collaboration 
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accountability. In instances where actors supported schemes that furthered their individual 
organisational goals, as witnessed with London First and operators of mass transportation, it 
is the opinion of the researcher that the leader of the system has a role to play in terms of 
coordinating the behaviours of actors.  
Clearly, the study of the case of London shows that the Mayor as the political leader 
of the GLA employs collaboration, contractual arrangements and imperative coordination for 
the purpose of coordinating systemic and non-systemic actors in implementing schemes 
which support the policy priorities of the Mayor relating to mass transportation. Thus, while 
the researcher observed from the study that the Mayor is effective in meeting the transport 
needs of a significant numbers of users, nevertheless, the means (use of collaboration, 
contractual arrangements and imperative coordination) employed by the Mayor to sustain 
mass transportation demonstrate the degree of its complexity, its capital intensive nature and 
the varieties of actors it engages. To better understand the mass transportation governance 
system in London and the relevance of capital to its sustenance, the funding regime of mass 
transportation in London is discussed next. 
 
5.6.2 Funding regime 
 
 As discussed above, it is clear that key actors, such as the GLA and central 
government, play significant roles such as coordinating and funding projects which can 
enable or restrict the functioning of the mass transport governance system in London. In 
particular, as indicated in Table 7 below, the grants from central government to the GLA and 
TfL constitute a key component of the funding regime in London. Thus, it was not surprising 
to see all the interviewees in the study advocating that the funding regime in place must be 
sustained while also seeking to diversify sources of income because of, first, the limited levels 
of funding available from central government, and second, the limits to the extent to which 
fares (the major income earner for TfL) can be increased. Hence, this section aims to identify 
the key actors and relationships that constitute the funding regime while also indicating the 
sources of funds (revenues) and how such funds are utilised. The significance of the funding 
regime for the existing accountability framework and the governance of mass transportation 
shall be explored. Lastly, the role of private and public sector funding in driving partnerships 
shall be explored. 
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 The actors constituting the funding regime include some of the actors shown in Figure 
2 which consist of main actors such as TfL and the Mayor, secondary actors such as London 
First and City of London Corporation, and key external actors to the system such as the DfT 
and Treasury. Section (159)1 of the GLA Act 1999 empowers the Mayor to give financial 
assistance to anybody or organisation in respect of expenditure incurred or to be incurred by 
that body or person in doing anything that in the opinion of TfL is conducive to the provision 
of safe, integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities or services to, from or within 
Greater London. London First was seen as one of the non-governmental organisations which 
make some limited contribution within the funding regime, as it is able to mobilise the private 
sector (businesses) to contribute to the funding of transport projects. Fare paying users were 
also identified as making a considerable contribution to the funding of mass transportation in 
London.  
These actors provide funds in various forms. For instance, users generate fares 
income. Funds from government, which constitute a significant proportion of the funds used 
for mass transportation, came in the form of grants, some of which went directly to TfL, while 
others went through the GLA to TfL. Also, some modest funding of TfL was seen to emerge 
from London Councils. However, while the amount of grants given by the organisations could 
not be verified, some interviewees (Rob Fox of London First and Andrew Phipps of City of 
London Corporation) presented the view that the funds given by their organisations were 
largely tokenistic, and clearly not as significant as those contributed by central government or 
raised from fares. Lastly, other forms of secondary income included revenues from 
advertising, rents, asset financing, TfL property disposal, TfL ‘prudential borrowing’ against 
future revenue, contributions from the private sector, for example, developer funding for 
associated transport investments, the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), direct London 
borough funding and other government funding sources including specific allocations to 
support regeneration, education, and the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games 
Transport Plan (Mayor of London, 2010: 315).  
In examining how the funding regime raises and spends funds for mass transportation, 
relevant financial reports and budgets were consulted. Tables 6 and 7 below are extracted 
from the TfL Budget (2012-13) and the Mayor’s final consolidated budget (2012-13). Table 6 
is about revenue and Table 7 is about capital, as illustrated in the GLA 2012-13 consolidated 
budget and TfL budget 2012-13.  
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Table 6: Operating budget (revenue) 
(£m) 2012/13 Business Plan Update 
(Dec.2011) 
Budget 
2012/13 
Fares 3,762 (3,800) 
Congestion Charge, Low emission zone 
and enforcement income 
284 (295) 
Other operating income 329 (330) 
Interest income 16 (11) 
Gross income (excluding revenue grants) 4, 391 (4,436) 
Operating costs (net of third-party 
contributions) 
5,784 5,778 
Debt Interest 312 326 
Group items 150 181 
Gross operating expenditure 6,246 6,286 
Net operating expenditure 1, 855 1,849 
General grant (1,948) (1,948) 
Overground grant (26) (26) 
GLA precept (6) (6) 
Other revenue grants (105) (103) 
Total revenue grants (2,086)
32
 (2,083) 
(Surplus)/ deficit (231)  (234) 
                                                          
 
32
 Note that totals in tables may appear to be incorrect due to rounding (Mayor of London and TfL, 2012: 1) 
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Table 7: Capital budget (capital) 
Expenditure (£m) 2012/13 Business Plan Update 
(Dec. 2011) 
Budget 2012/13 
Capital expenditure 1,890 1,988 
Third-party contributions – 
Capital 
(46) (53) 
Net capital expenditure 1,844 1,935 
Cross rail 1,366 1,467 
Net capital expenditure 
including Crossrail 
3,209  3,401 
Funded by: 
(Surplus)/ deficit from the 
operating budget 
(231) (234) 
Crossrail funding sources (2,058) (2,058) 
Investment grant (881) (881) 
Metronet grant (352) (352) 
Other capital grants (24) (55) 
Sales of property and other 
assets 
(113) (122) 
Working capital 101 71 
Net borrowing and reserve 
movements 
348 229 
Total (3,209) (3,401) 
Note: Figures in the tables above are from the GLA Consolidated Budget 2012-13, pg. 53-54 
and from TfL budget 2012-13, pg. 16-19.  
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From Table 6 above, it is clear that the fares paid by users of mass transportation 
generated the highest income (£3,800m) for TfL, constituting 58.3% of the total revenue 
funding for mass transportation projects in London. Next came government grants (£2,083m), 
constituting 32%, of which central government was the main donor, while other actors, such 
as London Councils, the City of London Corporation and organisations from the private 
sector made smaller contributions. However, the consolidated budgets of the GLA and TfL do 
not identify and indicate the contributions of the other actors listed earlier. It is clear from 
Table 7 that the cost of operating mass transport in London exceeded the income generated, 
and that the revenue grants from central government played a key role in addressing this 
deficit. 
With a total revenue grant of £2,083 million as indicated in Table 6 above, and an 
additional £3,428 million coming from different funding sources, TfL was able to meet its 
obligations while also funding capital expenditure, including Crossrail 1. From Table 7 
(capital budget), the funding of the net capital expenditure for mass transport projects 
including Crossrail 1 was £3,209 million. The Crossrail 1 sponsors’ funding account (£1,382 
million) is ring fenced, and not available for use on any other TfL expenditure. Furthermore, 
it was identified from the 2012-13 TfL Budget that TfL maintains a minimum of £250 million 
at all times to ensure liquidity and allow for fluctuations in income and expenditure. Thus, the 
funding regime in the system in London is capable of sustaining ongoing mass transportation 
projects, but only because of support from central government grants and other money saving 
schemes, as discussed later in the chapter. Also, in relation to examples such as Crossrail 1, 
the Mayor has used partnership between organisations across the public, private and third 
sectors to provide funding.  
It was observed that the Mayor employs various budgeting means, including fare 
increases, shedding of more jobs at TfL, and increases in prudential borrowing to raise funds 
for sustaining mass transportation. It was shown in the TfL Business Plan (2011/12 – 
2014/15: 5) that, in managing and sustaining the funding of TfL, the Mayor and his team have 
deployed savings strategies such as Project Horizon and the Continuous Savings Exercise 
(CSE). The latter was established in 2009 as part of TfL’s planning process, while the former 
was implemented following the 2010 Spending Review (in which the government reduced its 
deficit by making significant cuts in its spending) as a fundamental reorganisation of TfL’s 
back office and corporate functions, designed to protect investment and front line services, 
and deliver a 20% reduction in support staff costs (Ibid: 5). 
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 It was clear that the funding regime is a focus for conflicts between actors, for instance 
between employers (Spending Review and Project Horizon) and employees (union demands). 
On the other hand, partnership between the GLA, TfL, private sector organisations and 
London boroughs is encouraged by the Mayor especially for the purpose of pulling resources 
together to execute projects like Crossrail 1 and the Barclays Cycle scheme. For instance, the 
researcher observed from the study that the partnership employed in delivering Crossrail 1 has 
been able not just to raise the capital needed to fund the Crossrail 1 project, but more 
importantly to save cost through efficiency means developed by actors in the partnership.
33
  
The significance of government funding of GLA projects was observed in Tables 6 
and 7. Furthermore, it was clear that collaboration exists across governmental and non-
governmental levels in practice. It was noted that TfL works with boroughs by giving them 
local transport grant and maintenance grants which are then used in strengthening and 
supporting transport capacities in London (Ibid: 45). It was stated in the City of London Local 
Implementation Plan (2011: 22) that the Corporation would work with TfL to trial a method 
of dust suppression while also engaging with City businesses to gain their support for 
improving air quality in the Square Mile, thereby indicating another example of how 
government funding is used to drive partnership in the system.  
It is thus clear that funding, as evidenced in the Crossrail 1 funding package discussed 
in Chapter 4, especially from government (central government and GLA), plays a key role in 
the partnerships identified in the study. While uncertainty and the risk of cuts in central 
government funding have made it necessary to diversify mass transportation funding in 
London, the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (2010: 25) makes clear that it will be funded and 
delivered by partnership working among actors, including government (central, GLA and 
boroughs), Network Rail, the London Development Agency (LDA) and developers, through a 
process whereby each actor would make a significant contribution, either financially or 
through other means such as expertise given to the implementation of projects such as the 
Underground upgrade and Crossrail 1. This further illustrates the importance of collaboration 
to the funding regime and delivery of mass transportation and other transport projects in 
London. The Planning and Transportation Committee of the City of London Corporation 
                                                          
 
33 See discussion of Cross rail 1 in Chapter 4 for more details. 
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(2012) confirmed that TfL makes a number of grants
34
 to all boroughs in London to support 
schemes such as the development of more cycling routes, which complement Mayoral 
initiatives, thereby indicating an aspect of TfL’s contribution to the sustainability of mass 
transportation in London.  
To conclude, the discussion of the funding regime in the case of London has shown 
that, aside from fares income, central government and the GLA are the key funders of mass 
transportation in London. Also, it was indicated that other means of funding had to be 
explored and adopted due to the limited scope of central government grants and limits to the 
extent to which fares (the major income earner for TfL) can be increased. It was also shown 
that the Mayor, through his statutory power, employed imperative coordination in making 
actors such as London boroughs raise funds through the Community Infrastructure Levy 
(CIL) to finance the delivery of Crossrail 1. It is thus clear that the Mayor has the powers not 
only to initiate policies and plans, but can also play a major role in gathering together funds to 
finance projects relating to mass transportation. However, he is also to some extent restricted 
by central government through its central role in providing funding and in the development of 
policies and regulations by the DfT, including establishing the overall strategic framework 
regulating mass transport across the UK. It is thus clear that the Mayor is more powerful than 
other actors in the system in London such as London Travel Watch, TfL and London First, 
due to his statutory powers. However, the central government has more powers and is able to 
restrict the powers and policies of the Mayor. The discussion of the funding regime also 
demonstrate the relevance of collaboration for the purpose of raising funds to finance 
transport schemes such as Cross rail 1, and the significance of leadership for the purpose of 
identifying strategies such as ‘Project Horizon’, aimed at cutting cost.  
 
 
                                                          
 
34 An example of the grants given by TfL to Boroughs is the £100,000 in the 2012 fiscal year TfL’s budget, titled ‘Local Transport Funding 
Grant’.  
116 
 
5.6.3 Accountability 
 
In this section, accountability is interpreted as the process by which organisations or 
individuals are held to account for their roles and actions by others. First, how accountability 
is construed by different actors is considered. Thereafter, different forms of accountability 
(electoral and administrative) are explored, including how they relate to one another. 
Furthermore, the complex nature and multiple levels of holding to account are discussed. 
Finally, the implications of the forms of holding actors to account in the system are 
considered. 
Accountability was interpreted by all interviewees as a process in which an actor 
demands an account of resource use from another actor while the latter actor also gives an 
account of his or her use of resources. This is also the view of Schedler (1999: 14), who 
suggests that accountability embraces different ways of preventing and redressing the abuse 
of power and resources by subjecting those controlling resources to the threat of sanctions, 
while also requesting them to justify their acts. In the process of collecting data from 
interviewees on accountability, it was observed that most did not want to discuss the subject 
initially but opened up when the researcher prompted them further. This arguably 
demonstrates the attitude of some actors in the system relating to the process of holding to 
account and the complexity of the accountability process due to the diverse numbers of actors 
in the system. To aid the discussion, accountability is discussed on two levels: electoral 
accountability, which is from politicians to electorates, and administrative accountability, 
which is from all actors to those responsible for the scrutiny of their performance (e.g. in 
terms of efficiency, contractual obligations, fairness, legality, probity, professional codes, 
adherence to policy or accepted practice, campaign promises, manifestos, etc).  
A variety of lines of accountability were identified in London. Elected politicians are 
of course, accountable to their electorates, and so the Mayor is accountable to the citizens of 
London. But he is also held to account administratively - for instance, the London Assembly 
employs its Committees to question him on his policies while also scrutinising his budget and 
projects as established in the GLA Act 1999. In addition, another means, such as appearance 
before Select Committees (administrative accountability), both at the UK Parliament and in 
the London Assembly, are other significant means that could be used for holding the Mayor to 
account in London. However, there is no recent use of appearance before Select Committees 
at the UK Parliament as observed by the study. It was however noted that the Mayor appeared 
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before the London Assembly including its committees to present evidence relating to his use 
of resources. 
The GLA, as one of the key actors in the system in London, is accountable to central 
government, as established in the GLA Act 1999 (for instance, TfL send its annual financial 
reports to DfT while the GLA send its reports to the Treasury). Also, the 25 elected members 
of the London Assembly of the GLA are accountable to the electorates who voted them into 
office. The Greater London Authority Act 1999 stipulates the roles and responsibilities of the 
GLA, while also indicating in Part 1, Number 1 that “The Authority (GLA) shall have the 
functions which are transferred to, or conferred or imposed on, the Authority by or under this 
Act or any other Act”35.  
 The London Assembly hold to account London Travel Watch. The London 
Assembly, including its committees, assesses the extent to which London Travel Watch has 
delivered or failed in delivering its goals and objectives, which are mainly focused on 
addressing the needs of the travelling public through the process of scrutinising relevant 
actors. It was confirmed by Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch) that his organisation was 
established by the London Assembly to serve as the watchdog organisation representing the 
interests of transport users in and around London, while it was also being fully funded by the 
London Assembly to carry out studies that will improve the travel experiences of the users of 
the modes of mass transportation in London. Based on secondary data for example, ‘Bus 
passengers’ priorities for improvements in London’, produced by London Travel Watch 
(2010), it was clear that London Travel Watch implements its objectives thereby sustaining 
mass transportation in London. London Travel Watch is held to account by the London 
Assembly (Transport Committee) on how it uses the grants it gets from the GLA. In holding 
London Travel Watch to account, the London Assembly uses audits, reviews of projects and 
annual reports, and meeting sessions to investigate the failures and achievements of the 
organisation. Based on its findings, the Assembly which authorises London Travel Watch 
funds could reduce the funding allocated to the organisation if it is not satisfied with their 
report. While not giving any reason, Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch) established that 
the London Assembly reduced its grant in the 2011 budget of London Travel Watch. 
                                                          
 
35
 The legal framework constituting the GLA including its elements, and on how it is to operate is stipulated in the Greater London 
Authority Act 1999 available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/29/pdfs/ukpga_19990029_en.pdf 
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TfL is held to account by the Mayor, who chairs its board, and holds the board 
members to account through reviews and questioning based on the degree to which they have 
implemented the goals set in the budget of the organisation and the degree to which they have 
implemented the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (Ball, 2011). The board members submit a 
report to the Mayor annually, and on request, on their achievements and setbacks. 
Furthermore, the Budget committee and other relevant committees in the London Assembly 
hold TfL to account employing questioning and a review of their reports on other issues, such 
as the capacity of the Underground, and on the challenges faced by the travelling public.  
Turning to the accountability of non-key actors, Romzek and Dubnick (1987: 229) 
identified set rules and performance indicators as means by which employees and contractors 
are held to account. For instance, TfL holds its contractors to account for services outsourced 
to them in order to ensure value for money and compliance with set performance indicators, 
such as adherence to CO2 emission levels and level of customer satisfaction. Professionals 
such as members of staff of organisations like TfL and London Underground are also held to 
account, not only by their employers or clients but also by independent regulators, for 
example the Office of Rail Regulation. 
The study thus shows that actors in the system in London employ different means for 
holding each other to account. After evaluating the accountability modes, it was clear that 
while some means, such as target setting, enhanced systemic performance in some instances 
(such as during the upgrade of lines on the Underground), the use of targets to increase 
productivity was criticised by the interviewee at the City of London Corporation who   argued 
that targets could limit staff and organisational performance. However, targets could be 
helpful in ensuring, for example, that suppliers of rolling stock to London Underground 
deliver engineering parts on time.  
Furthermore, the study shows that London Travel Watch collaborates with the 
Transport Committee of the London Assembly in holding operators to account on their 
adherence to regulations linked with aspects of mass transportation, such as arrivals and 
departure timings, bus and train carriages capacity and design, and on the availability of 
information to the public on relevant aspects of mass transport. It is thus clear that while 
targets (administrative) and political means (election) are employed for holding actors to 
account, the particular means by which this modes operates has their disadvantages and 
advantages.  
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While suggesting that the Mayor does not fully hold TfL to account despite chairing 
its board, London First (2010: 16) recommends that actors, including TfL, should establish 
mechanisms that provide greater transparency over their efficiency programmes, such as 
Project Horizon, while also monitoring the actual progress achieved. The researcher is of the 
view that the suggestion by London First is linked to the inadequate information provided by 
TfL on how it spends the money it makes from its cost reduction programmes discussed 
earlier in the chapter. Nevertheless, the existing structures used for holding actors to account, 
such as statutes, targets, performance measurement and multiple accountability lines, have 
both advantages and disadvantages. For instance, using TfL as an example, while its multiple 
lines of accountability, including to the Transport Committee, Mayor and DfT, improve its 
transparency (as these bodies are able to scrutinise its accounts, operations and schemes), 
joint working and resource sharing with other organisations, thereby enabling the 
achievement of its Continuous Savings Exercise
36
, the same multiple lines of accountability 
serve as a constraint on its resource time as argued by Rhodri Ball (TfL) (although he did not 
specify the degree of such constraint). 
While interviewees such as Jonathan Hollis (London Assembly) and Tim Bellenger 
(London Travel Watch) criticised the means by which governmental actors (politicians) were 
held to account, they suggested that other means, such as enquiries and the media, can also be 
used to hold politicians to account because they can be employed as and when necessary, 
unlike elections, which are held every four years in London. It is however clear that these 
have implications for the use of resources and for costs. In relation to non-elected officials, 
such as the staff of the City of London Corporation and TfL, it was clear that there are 
established targets and performance indices used in assessing staff performance and 
rewarding performance. Nevertheless, it is clear that election gives democratic authority and 
legitimacy to those who are elected, while non-elected officials are unable to claim this 
authority. This therefore shows that although elected officials have more authority than non 
elected officials, these actors are held to account by either electoral accountability or 
administrative accountability.    
To summarise the accountability lines in the system in London, Table 8 and Figure 3 below 
indicates who is accountable to whom and how.  
                                                          
 
36 The Continuous Savings Exercise embarked upon by TfL is an organisational wide savings target of £7.6billion which is to be achieved by 
cost cutting and the process of ensuring the accountability of staff for resources in their custody. 
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Table 8: The accountability framework of the mass transport system in London 
Nos. Name of actor 
(organisation) 
Who actor is accountable 
to and what for 
How the organisation or body is 
held to account 
1. London Travel 
Watch 
Answerable to its funder 
which is the London 
Assembly. The body is 
mainly held to account for 
its use of grants from the 
Assembly. 
Scrutiny of its annual audit reports by 
the London Assembly. Calls for 
evidence on aspects relating to mass 
transportation, for example, user 
satisfaction and complaints handling. 
2. London First Answerable to its funders, 
such as British Airways 
and Siemens. London First 
is held to account for how 
much it has advanced the 
interests of its funders. 
Subscribing members assess the extent 
to which their interests are promoted 
and the relevance of projects 
commissioned. 
3. Transport for 
London 
Answerable to the Mayor, 
GLA and DfT for its use 
of resources.  
Held to account based on the extent to 
which it implements the Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy through an audit of 
its projects and activities by relevant 
audit bodies. Also, the organisation is 
held to account through calls for 
evidence in both the London 
Assembly and UK Parliament.   
4. City of London 
Corporation 
Answerable to the GLA, 
voters and business 
organisations in the 
‘square mile’ for its use of 
resources. 
Held to account through elections by 
residents and businesses. Also, like 
other London boroughs, is legally held 
to account by the GLA through an 
examination of its policies and the 
degree to which the policies conform 
with the London Plan and Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy. 
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5. London 
Underground 
Answerable to TfL for 
various aspects of mass 
transportation.  
Held to account based on set targets 
and performance indicators linked to 
reliability, emissions and capacity 
through the audit of its operations and 
budget. 
6. GLA including 
London Assembly 
Answerable to central 
government, UK 
Parliament and the public 
for the exercise of its 
powers. 
Held to account through question and 
answer session, and appearance before 
Committees in the London Assembly 
and UK Parliament to give evidence 
based on the extent it adheres to 
guidelines in the GLA Act 1999, and 
through investigations by 
organisations such as the National 
Audit Office and the Audit 
Commission. Elected members of the 
GLA and Assembly are also held to 
account through elections. 
7 Mayor Answerable to the London 
Assembly, Londoners and 
central government for its 
use of resources and 
power. 
The Mayor is held to account through 
election, question and answer session 
at the London Assembly and the 
Mayor’s Question Time at the London 
Assembly. 
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Figure 3: Accountability framework of the system in London. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 While Table 8 shows how bodies and actors are held to account and who they are 
accountable to, Figure 3 illustrates accountability relations in the system. Furthermore, Figure 
3 shows that some actors in the system are held to account by another actor. Also, Figure 3 
shows that at the heart of the process of holding to account are the GLA (in particular the 
Mayor) and TfL who also play leadership roles in the system. This shows the significance of 
both actors to the functioning and sustenance of the system and mass transportation in 
London, and existing relations between actors in the system. 
To conclude this section, the research has shown that while electoral and 
administrative lines of accountability exist in the system, both are relevant for holding 
particular type of actors to account. The two modes of accountability have features which 
cannot be realistically compared. The study also shows that during the process of employing 
administrative accountability, individuals and bodies tend to work together in order to gather 
evidence to be used for holding particular actors to account.  
Mayor          TfL 
Transport Committee 
London Assembly 
Members 
DfT 
Londoners & Users 
RMT   London Boroughs and City of London Corporation   LTW Operators 
Central government 
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The research thus shows that while the process of holding to account actors such as 
members of organisations like TfL and London Underground through means such as 
established performance benchmarks, for example the degree to which they support and 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by encouraging new developments (London Plan, 2011: 
260), this accountability mode through the use of benchmark could limit staff performance to 
the standard set thereby hindering innovation within organisations in the system. In 
commenting on the usefulness of performance benchmarks and targets as a means of holding 
actors to account, Andrew Phipps (City of London Corporation) suggests that actors in the 
system and within organisations should not be held to account against set benchmarks and 
targets, as these could influence people not to innovate and deliver outputs beyond the 
established benchmarks. Nonetheless, the researcher is of the view that rather than to be seen 
as a confining means, benchmarks and targets could be seen as guide and tasks to be done in 
order to attain and exceed some set goals. Furthermore, the discussion of accountability has 
also shed further light on the relevance of the GLA especially the Mayor (through its relation 
with systemic and non systemic actors) and TfL in enabling the process in which bodies and 
individuals are held to account.  
Furthermore, the study shows that the process of holding to account sometimes 
encourages collaboration among actors, for instance during the process by which the 
Transport Committee and the London Assembly hold the Mayor to account, the bodies gather 
evidence from different organisations and partner with others for the purpose of resource 
sharing to enable the holding of the Mayor to account
37
. In addition, the study shows that 
during the process by which key bodies such as London Underground are held to account by 
TfL, the latter body partners with bodies such as London Travel Watch and London First for 
the purpose of getting evidence to be employed in querying the activities of London 
Underground. On the other hand, the study also shows that conflicts sometimes emerge from 
the process of holding to account particular actors, as observed between the Transport 
Committee and London Travel Watch. 
 
 
                                                          
 
37 For an illustration of how the Mayor is held to account, see the Mayor’s Question Time held on the 23rd of July 2014 available at 
https://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/london-assembly/webcasts 
124 
 
5.7 Testing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model in the case of London 
  
 This section seeks to test the model of collaborative governance proposed by Ansell 
and Gash (2008). In testing the model, the evidence gathered from the case in London shows 
that the propositions of the authors as regards the essential ingredients they suggest as 
enabling collaborative governance are insufficient. From the collaborative governance model 
presented in Figure 1, key ingredients including starting conditions such as prehistory of 
cooperation or conflict, facilitative leadership and institutional design were identified to 
enable collaborative governance. Furthermore, the authors identified variables including trust 
building, the development of commitment and shared understanding to be crucial within the 
collaborative process. They also observed that a virtuous cycle of collaboration tends to 
develop when collaborative forums focus on ‘small wins’ that deepen trust, commitment, and 
shared understanding. In subsequent paragraphs, these variables are examined based on how 
they exist in the system in London. The themes identified by the study to be crucial for the 
system are also considered.  
 On the relevance of starting conditions, such as the prehistory of cooperation or 
conflict shaping the collaborative framework, the study of the system in London shows that 
rather than actors being influenced by prior history of collaboration or conflict, as argued by 
Ansell and Gash (2008), Andranovich (1995) and Gray (1989), actors such as London First 
were seen to be motivated by factors such as what they stood to gain from the collaborative 
framework and government policies. For instance, it was observed from the study that most of 
the actors that engaged with the GLA government of Boris Johnson did so because of what 
they stood to gain from such a partnership, and the policy stance of the government which 
placed significant emphasis on the use of partnerships to deliver schemes as a condition for 
government grants. The case of London suggests that rather than depending on the prehistory 
of cooperation or conflict, actors such as the government can influence the workings of 
collaborative frameworks through their policies and powers. 
 Although the idea of facilitative leadership playing a key role in the system in London, 
especially for initiating policies, was observed through the Mayor’s leadership, nevertheless, 
the system in London shows various complexities linked with leadership roles, which were 
not noted in the Ansell and Gash (2008) model. For instance, the model failed to indicate how 
the ‘facilitative leader’ would emerge. This was one of the issues identified by actors in the 
system in London. Furthermore, the inability of the model to show how leadership is 
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constructed within the collaborative framework is also a weakness. This was evidenced where 
systemic actors did not agree on the individual or institution that should constitute the 
leadership structure tasked with facilitating the system. The case of London showed that 
strategic leadership by TfL and political leadership by the Mayor constituted this leadership 
structure. These forms of leadership were lacking in the Ansell and Gash (2008) model. 
 In designing a collaborative governance framework, Ansell and Gash (2008: 555) 
argued that factors such as basic protocols and ground rules are critical for the procedural 
legitimacy of the collaborative process. Also, access to the collaborative process was alleged 
to be the most fundamental design issue, as they and other authors (Andranovich 1995; 
Chrislip and Larson 1994; Gray 1989; Gunton and Day 2003) opined that the process must be 
open and inclusive. Nonetheless, although it was observed in the system in London that 
protocols and rules guiding the mass transport governance system were in policy documents 
such as the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (2010), the discussion of partnerships in Chapter 4 
shows that key actors such as the Mayor and TfL influence and determine who participates in 
established collaborative frameworks. Thus, rather than an open collaborative process, the 
system in London shows the existence of partnerships with restricted membership, and which 
could be argued to be successful, as shown with the Barclays cycle scheme partnership and 
Crossrail 1 partnership. This further highlights the weakness of the Ansell and Gash (2008) 
collaborative governance model.   
Ansell and Gash (2008) also suggest that variables including trust building, face-to-
face dialogue, commitment to the process and shared understanding are important for 
sustaining the collaborative system. The case of London demonstrates the occurrence of some 
of these variables, for instance, shared understanding by actors, in terms of the need to 
develop more transport capacity to enable transport sustainability. The study also shows that 
rather than just face-to-face dialogue, other less formal means of communication, including 
the use of social media and information technology, were employed for communication 
purposes. Furthermore, while Ansell and Gash (2008: 558) suggest that direct dialogue allows 
for ‘‘thick communication’’, which is necessary for stakeholders to identify opportunities for 
mutual gain, the case of London shows that stakeholders also communicate directly and 
indirectly through representative bodies such as London First, representing business 
organisations, and London Travel Watch, representing users. These organisations 
communicate among themselves to identify and execute schemes that serve their common 
interests. 
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 Finally, as shown in Chapter 4, the study of partnerships in the system in London 
shows that collaboration develops among organisations not just because of the need to focus 
on ‘small wins’ that deepen trust, as suggested by Ansell and Gash (2008), but more 
importantly because of over-arching government policies and the quest of organisations to 
meet needs that they cannot achieve by themselves. Thus, drawing on the discussion of the 
system in London, it is argued here that rather than just the normative variables proposed by 
Ansell and Gash (2008) such as starting conditions and face-to-face dialogue, the key actors 
identified to influence collaborations in the system include the GLA, especially the Mayor, 
TfL and external actors such as central government. Furthermore, the study shows that the 
nature of the funding regime existing to fund capacity improvement also plays a crucial role 
in enabling or restricting collaborations. The means of ensuring accountability also emerged 
as a central factor that could determine the degree to which the collaborative framework in the 
system would be successful. Having examined the Ansell and Gash (2008) model, the case of 
London has, in some instances, shown the existence of some of the variables proposed. 
However, the case has also provided substantial evidence that contradicts some of the 
variables proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008), and adds new variables such as strategy and 
imperative coordination, in order to enhance our understanding of the factors that shape and 
influence collaborative frameworks. 
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5.8 Chapter conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed some of the findings from the case in London. It was clear 
from the study that both conflict and collaboration pervade the system. The discussion of the 
system in London tells of the roles of systemic actors, the use of collaboration and imperative 
coordination. The study shows that while some actors supported the presence of a lead actor 
to facilitate the system, they did not agree on who this leader should be. This contributes to 
debates on the relevance of a facilitative leader and on how such a leader is selected. For 
instance, it is important to note that the actors did not identify how the facilitative leader 
would emerge and whether the leader would be one or more individuals. The discussion of the 
themes that emerged from the study also sheds further light on the workings of important 
systemic features like the funding regime. This demonstrates that other factors must be 
considered aside from the prescriptions of Ansell and Gash (2008). 
The study also showed that both the Mayor and TfL play leadership roles in the 
system while enabling the process whereby actors are held to account. It was clear that the 
Mayor has significant powers as established in ‘The Act’ in Section (159) 1, which enables 
him to employ imperative coordination and regulations in getting actors in and outside of the 
system to support government initiatives. This further illustrates the degree to which the 
Mayor is powerful. The power of the Mayor was also observed while he compels boroughs to 
implement the London Plan and collect Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL). Hence, 
beyond the variables identified by Ansell and Gash (2008) to enable the collaborative 
framework, the case in London has identified crucial factors such as the nature of the funding 
regime, government policies, questions of accountability, and typologies of leadership, as 
influencing collaborative modes of governance. The study also shows the relevance of a 
strategic body (TfL) for the purpose of sustaining mass transport modes.  
 It was also noted from the study that in enabling the sustenance of mass transportation 
in London, central government transferred certain powers to actors in the system while also 
working with such actors thereby indicating joint working between actors in and out of the 
system. This further shows that collaboration is not just a systemic feature but employed 
between systemic and non systemic actors. The implication this has for public services 
provision such as mass transportation is that central government or the GLA may or may not 
employ partnership or imperative coordination to provide a service or aspects of a service, 
due to ideological motivation such as to allow the market to rule and encourage growth.  
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Chapter Six: 
The governance structure of Lagos 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the historical background to the current government structure 
of Lagos and the capacities existing to address mass transport problems in order to sustain 
mass transportation. It traces when and how government institutions were created in the state. 
Furthermore, the chapter explores the role of actors from the public and private sectors in the 
process of sustaining mass transportation. The chapter commences with a discussion of the 
evolution of government institutions in Lagos from the period the state was a colony. Sub-
sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 then explore the development of the state from 1800 to 2014. Section 
6.3 discusses the emergence of mass transportation in Lagos. Section 6.4 then goes on to 
analyse federal government – Lagos state government relations including the factors shaping 
the relations between both bodies. Sections 6.5 and 6.5.1 discuss the partnership observed in 
the system. This is followed by the summary of the key projects delivered and ongoing in 
Lagos in sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 so as to enable the answering of research question 7 (What 
capacity (within and outside each city) exists to solve these problems?). Section 6.7 then 
presents a summary of the chapter showing how the state government has emerged to 
establish institutions such as LAMATA to coordinate mass transportation.  
 
6.2 The place of local authorities in Lagos government 
 
 Like England, where local authorities have played the roles of enablers of the delivery 
of some public services, and a political instrument used for promoting local democracy, local 
authorities in Lagos state also serve as enablers and sometimes providers of public services 
including public transportation, construction and maintenance of some roads, public highways 
and the collection of some taxes. The administration of local authorities in Nigeria as a whole 
has undergone immense transformation (from pre-colonial era to the 1980s) including the 
native authority/indirect rule system, local administration system, and the period local 
authorities were democratised, thereby separating the informal traditional administrative 
system from the democratic local government system. Local authorities have therefore played 
a key role in the process leading to the development of infrastructures in Lagos.  
In understanding the place and role of local authorities in the evolution of Lagos 
government, the relevance of formal and informal institutions and age-old structures such as 
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the Obaship structure shall be examined. In addition, the impacts of democratic deficit and 
sclerotic institutions occasioned by long years of military rule and maladministration across 
all levels of government shall be discussed.  
 
6.2.1 From Colony to State (1800-1900) 
 
The governance of the area known as Lagos before the emergence of colonial rule had 
been the exclusive responsibility of Obas (Kings) who ruled absolutely over their kingdom 
and land. However, with the arrival of colonial powers who did not settle in Lagos especially 
due to the fear of being infected with malaria and yellow fever, there existed a governance 
structure made up of two administrations (colonial rule through an administrator, and 
traditional rule through an Oba). It is important to note that while colonial rule came to Lagos, 
it co-existed with the Obaship institution which was embedded in society. Lagos Island had 
become a favourite place for the Portuguese merchants in the 19
th
 century, who later named 
the place Lagos do Curamo due to its significance as a port of call for slave traders (Folami, 
1982: 8-12).  
As trade became more prominent in Lagos Island, European civilisation became more 
evident, thereby attracting people from nearby towns and villages to Lagos. The subsequent 
migration of people to Lagos created urbanisation challenges for the government. After the 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807 came the signing of several treaties with the Oba and 
chiefs (local lords) of Lagos in order to effectively put an end to the trade in humans. Lagos 
has thus witnessed several transformations, including those due to its geographical location 
and missionary impact on Nigeria (1842-1914). Due to the economic prosperity of Lagos 
since the pre-colonial period, the state has become the economic gateway to Nigeria, as 
London is to the UK. The city has grown commercially, economically and in industrial terms, 
thereby becoming Black Africa’s most populous city.  
From the middle of the nineteenth century, the administrative system used by the 
British colonial government in governing Lagos changed frequently due to changes in 
leadership. For instance, the state was governed by a British administrator from 1848-1853, a 
consular authority from 1853-1861, subsequently by a local governor from 1861-1866, then 
by the Sierra Leone governor from 1866-1874, followed by the Gold Coast governor from 
1874-1886, and finally by its own colonial governor and administrator from 1886. During the 
colonial era, commerce sustained the colony of Lagos as exports were valued at about 
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£78,000 and imports valued at £62,000 in 1862. By 1900, exports were valued at £830,000 
and imports were about £885,000. Hence, Lagos was valuable to the British colonial 
government because of its commercial potential, notwithstanding the menace of malaria and 
yellow fever which made West Africa a ‘white man’s grave’ (Peil, 1991: 9). Since the 
colonial administrators realised the commercial capability of Lagos, by 1886, they separated 
the city from the rest of Nigeria and made it a crown colony under direct rule.  
In 1892, electricity was introduced in Lagos thereby making it possible to set up other 
infrastructures like telephones. The use of telephones for business purposes consequently 
aided the commercial prosperity of Lagos. While Lagos prospered, Governor Carter in 1893 
made an attempt to introduce house and land taxes in order to meet the cost of providing 
public services, especially health service, which was in high demand at the time. In showing 
their resentment to the introduction of the taxes as they had never paid any form of service 
and property tax, the natives demonstrated at the government house. Consequently, the house 
and land taxes were abandoned (Folami, 1982: 39). At several times when the colonial 
establishment attempted to implement policies such as the house tax and water tax without the 
Obas’ support, such policies often failed because they were not implemented by the Obas’ 
known to the natives. This therefore shows that while the colonial government existed to 
govern the colony of Lagos, most Lagosians were opposed to its policies and remained loyal 
to their traditional authority.    
Notwithstanding the problems that existed between the colonial government and 
Lagosians, commercial activities in Lagos increased, and by the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, a Lagos Chamber of Commerce was established in 1897 to coordinate trade and 
commercial activities (Fry, 1976). While commercial activities increased in Lagos, the need 
for an efficient transportation system to cope with emergent challenges became imminent. 
Badejo (2011: 1) comments that transportation is a necessity due to its utilitarian roles which 
help in meeting the day-to-day political, social, economic, cultural, and even technological 
needs of the individual and society along with the obvious challenge of ensuring the 
distribution of goods and services. Subsequently, a railway was built from Lagos to Abeokuta 
in 1898 in order to facilitate trade with Abeokuta in western Nigeria while the rail network 
was further extended to Kano in northern Nigeria in order to facilitate trade. 
During the colonial period, there was also health problems linked to urbanisation. For 
instance, increasing death rates were linked to the crowded condition of Lagos, absence of 
drainage systems, lack of an embankment by the north side of the Island and the indifference 
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shown by the sick and their friends to skilled and qualified medical practitioners because most 
people believed in orthodox (traditional) medicine.   
In reviewing transport development in Nigeria including Lagos during the colonial 
period, it is imperative to note that the basic structure of the transport system was imposed 
from abroad, thereby having some implications for the design and routing of the networks. 
The British colonial government designed the transport system in Lagos and Nigeria, 
especially the railway to assist in the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. Thus, the 
transport networks were established in a way to encourage the exportation and importation of 
goods and advance colonial administration. In assessing the impacts of the colonial 
government on the development of transport infrastructures in Lagos and Nigeria, Filani 
(2011) comments that the pattern of colonial transportation development had tremendous 
implications not only for the movement of goods and services but also for the levels of 
development of the country’s rural areas and the urban centres that service them as the 
railway for instance, was developed to link centres of production thereby neglecting the rural 
areas. This according to Filani has contributed to the regional inequalities (concentration of 
infrastructures in some region as observed with rail network in Lagos) which still prevail in 
the Nigerian space-economy.   
Another consequence of the colonial transport system was evidenced in its broad 
pattern of regional specialisation as transport networks were concentrated in regions that 
produced exports for the colonial government. This therefore led to the emergence of some 
cities such as Lagos and Ibadan. Notwithstanding the socio-economic changes (for instance 
increase in trade and urbanisation) brought about by the colonial transport system, some 
features of the system shaped post-colonial transport development. For instance, due to the 
structure of the colonial transport system, there was neglect of intra-regional transport 
networks and inadequate investments to fund mass transport modes. Thus, while the transport 
network was efficient for the colonial administration, it can be argued that it was inefficient 
for the overall development of the country as the investments made into the transport system 
were aimed at facilitating exports to serve colonial government interests.   
 
6.2.2 From Colony to State (1900-1960) 
 
 The first attempt in Lagos at establishing a governmental structure was in October 
1899 when the General Sanitary Board made up of appointed nine members was created to 
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address health issues in the colony. The board commenced operations by playing an advisory 
role to Governor MacGregor. In 1909, this board was replaced by the Board of Health 
Ordinance, which included government officials as well as members representing various 
interest groups. Like its predecessor, this board carried out its functions using appointed 
members while also improving the cleanliness of Lagos through its programmes (Folami, 
1982: 170). 
The challenges of urbanisation in Lagos in the 19
th
 Century continued to be 
unaddressed throughout most of the 20
th
 Century. Thus, there was overcrowding in houses 
and on the streets, leading to poor sanitation and the spread of endemic diseases. Furthermore, 
the unwillingness of the colonial government and the Obaship institution to raise and spend 
money to address the urbanisation challenges made the problems worse (Peil, 1991: 8). 
Nevertheless, due to the position of Lagos in hosting the colonial governors and 
administrators, and also its economic advantages, its hinterland became the Protectorate of 
Lagos. It subsequently developed into the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria by 
1906 while Lagos was named as the colonial headquarters of Nigeria.  
In 1914, Governor Lugard unified the northern and southern parts of Nigeria while 
Lagos retained its administrative headquarter status thereby furthering governmental activities 
which continued until Nigeria’s independence in 1960. However, by 1914, the socio-political 
landscape in Lagos was divided into anti and pro colonial government factions, with the anti-
government faction supporting the Obas. Consequently, individuals such as Mr Kitoyi Ajasa 
supported the colonial government with his weekly newspaper (The Nigerian Pioneer) to 
disseminate the colonial government’s policies. On the contrary, those opposed to the taxes 
and water rate levy of the colonial government, for example, Dr. J. K. Randle, founded the 
first political party (The People’s Union) in Nigeria in 1908 to mobilise people to engage in 
anti-colonial activities (Folami, 1982: 43). Through the political activities in Lagos, political 
awareness increased and extended to other parts of Nigeria thereby enabling the emergence of 
nationalists. 
By 1921, a year before the Legislative Council was launched, the problem of 
increasing density in Lagos including inadequate housing and transportation could not keep 
up with urban growth. The density of north Lagos Island, for example, has always been much 
higher than the density of the city as a whole, with 19,305 people per sq km in 1921 and 
48,263 per sq km in 1963. This was greater than the density of Manhattan Island in New York 
City during the same time (Peil, 1991: 20). In 1922, a Legislative Council was launched, 
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enabling local elites to participate in electoral politics and influence the delivery of public 
services. However, the Legislative Council restricted voting to males with a declared annual 
income exceeding £100 (Peil, 1991: 9). Furthermore, most of the early members of the 
Legislative Council were Western educated Christian Yoruba immigrants and professionals in 
career-field such as law, engineering and business who later created groups which took part in 
political activities. Thus from the 1930s, the campaign for Nigeria’s independence began in 
Lagos and in a short time the nationalist elites largely displaced the ‘Black Victorians’ who 
constituted the leadership in Lagos. 
 One important feature of the elected Town Council established in Lagos is that it 
challenged the policies of the colonial administrators (Peil, 1991: 50). In 1951, Lagos lost its 
independence as a Crown Colony due to the 1951 constitution which placed Lagos under the 
Western Region. Thus, the transfer of Lagos governance to the Western Region government 
meant that local decisions affecting the state were decided at the Western Region government 
house in Ibadan (outside the geographical boundary of Lagos). This affected developments in 
the state as it led to a more bureaucratic process of policy making and implementation.  
 
6.2.3 Lagos governance from 1960 to 2014 
 
After Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the federal government retained the regional 
form of government employed by the colonial government. Lagos state was formally created 
in May 1967, through the States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 14 that 
restructured Nigeria into twelve states from a federation of four regions. The state was also 
made the capital of Nigeria. At the time, Lagos was the richest, with the best-educated 
professionals, and most densely populated state in Nigeria. The military truncated democratic 
rule (Nigeria’s First Republic) and assassinated several politicians including the Prime 
Minister in 1966. Unfortunately, once they took power, the various military regimes reduced 
the amount of power available to political office holders by suspending democratic 
institutions. They also replaced democratic institutions with military units.  
Despite the roles Lagos played while it was the capital of Nigeria for instance, through 
revenue generation from its port, and other economic benefits that accrued from the location 
of financial bodies in the state, different stakeholders presented diverse arguments on the need 
for a new central Federal Capital Territory for Nigeria which would not be under the control 
of any ethnic group.  
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The government of Lagos state is led by the executive (Governor) who also controls 
local governments within the state. At its inception, the state was divided into nineteen local 
authorities to facilitate the delivery of goods and services and encourage democratic 
participation. However, because the local authorities were too small to raise capital and 
generate revenues, they were reorganised into seven Local Government Areas (LGA) which 
included Lagos City Council, Mushin Town Council, Epe, Awori/Ajeromi, Egun/Awori, Ikeja 
and Ikorodu District Councils. Local Government structural reforms in 1976 and 1989 
increased the local authorities to eight and twelve – eight local governments for the Lagos 
Metropolitan Area and four for the rest of the state (Peil, 1991: 52-54).  
Notwithstanding the creation of local authorities in order to advance the delivery of 
public goods and services such as refuse collection management, construction and 
maintenance of some roads and bus parks, most of them were incapacitated by the lack of 
resources including funds and technology. Hence, they were not able to carry out the majority 
of their services. Despite the challenges local authorities encountered from when they were 
created till the mid 1970s before the local government reforms, they could still raise two-
thirds of their budget from local revenue (car park fees, tv licence, taxes and tenement rates), 
mainly in the form of taxes on land and buildings. For example, Lagos City Council was able 
to use incomes generated from general rates and taxes to meet 62 per cent of its total 
expenditure (Ibid), while the state government grants were used in addressing the other 
shortfall.   
In reflecting on this section, it is clear that some challenges in Lagos state experienced 
during the colonial period also pervaded the post colonial and independence period. This 
therefore shows that the various colonial administrators, politicians and military rulers that 
have governed Lagos (which was, and still is, the commercial capital of Nigeria) have failed 
to establish relevant institutions which can enable and sustain the delivery of public goods and 
services in the state. Nonetheless, while the colonial government can be credited for 
establishing mass transport modes in Lagos, subsequent indigenous governments have failed 
to consolidate the infrastructures bequeathed by the colonial government. Although Lagos 
state lost its official status as the capital of Nigeria in 1976 to Abuja (known as the Federal 
Capital Territory), it has not lost its unique significance in Nigeria as it remains the gateway 
to Nigeria’s commerce, industry and transportation (Peil, 1991: 49).  
 
135 
 
6.3 Emergence of mass transportation in Lagos 
 
This section discusses the context in which mass transportation emerged in Lagos. It 
explores the evolution of mass transport modes (mainly bus and train) and discusses the key 
challenges confronting mass transportation in Lagos. It is followed by a discussion of the 
relationship between the federal government and Lagos state government. 
The geography of Lagos played an important role in shaping the emergence of mass 
transportation in the state from the colonial period when boats were mainly employed for 
transporting people and goods in the populated area of Lagos known then as Lagos Island and 
which was also where the colonial government set up their administrative office. About 
65.4% of the population of Lagos in 1950 lived on Lagos Island, which covers about 1.55 
square miles, some of which was swampy, and is separated from the mainland by a lagoon 
and creeks. Early attempts to develop transport infrastructures thus focused on the use of 
boats to transport people and goods across the lagoon while the building of bridges was 
considered (Durrant et al., 1981).  
The emergence of mass transportation in Lagos arguably coincides with the period of 
colonial rule because it was the colonial government who first made the attempt in building a 
railway line to move people and raw materials within the colony for shipment abroad. 
Commercial mass transportation in Lagos commenced with the Lagos Steam Tramway which 
was operated by the colonial government between 1902 and 1913. This line was opened on 
the 23
rd
 of May 1902 and called the Lagos Steam Tramway.  Furthermore, in linking Lagos 
Island with the mainland to aid trade and mobility, construction work started on the Carter 
Bridge in 1896 and reached completion in 1901. 
While the colonial government pioneered and coordinated mass transportation through 
trains, mass transport through bus in Lagos was established by two Nigerians, Charlotte 
Olajumoke and Dawodu in the 1920s. After these individuals came J.N. Zarpas, which was a 
company established by some Levantine expatriates. With their investments, they dominated 
the bus mode of mass transportation in Lagos until Lagos Town Council acquired their buses 
in 1958 to create the Lagos Municipal Transport Service (LMTS), which became the first 
indigenous government owned transport company. In establishing LMTS, Lagos Town 
Council wanted to establish a monopoly in charge of bus transport in Lagos with a view to 
provide the general public with efficient transportation means while also reducing the 
challenges (arbitrariness in fares charged, lack of services to some areas and unreliable 
136 
 
service) users encountered with private bus operators. By 1960 when Nigeria gained its 
political independence, commercial mass transportation in particular through buses had 
expanded with the growth of Lagos as institutions such as the orthopaedic hospital and the 
growth of satellite towns on the mainland increased the demand for more bus services. 
The LMTS continued to function until the 1960s when many private operators went 
into commercial transport business. After Nigeria’s independence, Lagos Town Council was 
renamed Lagos City Council and the transport body – LMTS was renamed Lagos City 
Transport (LCT). From post-independence period, LCT was not able to fully meet the 
travelling demands of the increasing number of users. Nonetheless, private operators began to 
increase as they handled some percentage of mass transport delivery. In a survey of August 
1962, Benson Transport Service conveyed 14,000 passengers per day, while LCT transported 
100,000 users (Olukoju, 2003: 224). However, while the numbers of private operators 
increased, the mass transport assets and infrastructures owned by the government decreased 
as they were not managed well even as movable resources were stolen by officials and other 
public sector actors playing roles related to transportation. Furthermore, fixed assets like 
bridges and rail tracks were not adequately maintained due to the diversion of the funds meant 
for such maintenance works to the accounts of individuals and government cronies. Osoba 
(1996: 375) argues that right from the time Nigeria gained her independence; political elites 
began to use state resources to solve their dearth of private resources through the awarding of 
unsecured government loans to cronies, inflating of government contract values through 
kickbacks, and the looting of government resources.  
With a decline looming and confronting mass transportation provision across Nigeria 
after independence, rather than the government at all levels consolidating the infrastructures 
established by the colonial government, they engaged in the development of policies that they 
were unable to implement. The earliest major attempt at transport development by Nigeria’s 
federal government post-independence was the commissioning of the Standard Research 
Institute (SRI) to report on the economic coordination of transport development in Nigeria. 
The institute was charged with the responsibility of preparing an economic analysis of 
Nigerian Transport that would suggest guidelines for future action (SRI, 1961). 
The SRI report presented a detailed analysis of the transport modes (rail, river, road 
and air) within the country. Furthermore, it made projections for a ten-year traffic demand and 
some intermodal allocation of traffic which was believed would lead to a coordination of the 
Nigerian transport system. The report in essence, supposedly became the basis for transport 
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planning in the country and for the allocation of capital investment in the sector in the first 
and second Nigerian National Development Plans. For the first time in 1965, Nigeria’s 
transportation objectives were spelt out through a government White Paper on transport 
development to include coordinated development in the transport sector and by implication, 
the promotion of socio-economic integration of the country through its transport system. 
While these objectives are arguably laudable, their implementation depended on the strategy 
employed in intermodal allocation of investments, urban-rural allocation and the federal-state 
mix of responsibilities in transport matters. After evaluating the first three National 
Development Plans (1962-1968, 1970-1974 and 1975-1980), Filani (1981: 214) notes that 
there was no clearly articulated strategy for making investments and accountability in the 
transport sector in order to bring about spatial efficiency in the country’s socio-economic and 
political systems, and in coordinating the transport policies of states. Thus, although the SRI 
report made several recommendations whose implementation would have improved existing 
mass transport modes including their coordination, however, the report was never fully 
implemented. 
Although the Federal Ministry of Transport (MOT) exist and is charged with the 
responsibility of planning, managing and coordinating public policy on transportation in 
Nigeria for instance implementing the SRI report, nevertheless, this ministry has not 
discharged its responsibilities as argued by Badejo (2011). It was the view of Badejo (2011: 
14-17) that using the essential ingredients of transport management critical success factors 
including planning and policy, organising, human capacity development, coordination and 
integration, regulation, information management and budgeting, the Federal Ministry of 
Transport has failed as it does not perform most of all the key functions listed above. 
Furthermore, it was claimed that the MOT has no serious interaction or engagement with state 
governments and Ministries of Transport at the state level outside its annual National Council 
on Transportation meeting, which was last held in 2007 (Ibid: 18). This therefore shows some 
disconnection between the MOT and states.   
In order to establish a unified control for LCT, the Lagos City Transport Board was 
established in March 1964, by Federal Statute (City Transport Regulations Act of 1964), 
which empowered it to determine the policies governing transport services and to make 
provision for the administration of such services within the City of Lagos. The Lagos City 
Transport Board was constituted by six members including five persons from Lagos City 
Council and one experienced businessman chosen from the public by the Minister for Lagos. 
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Furthermore, there were three ex officio members who included the City clerk, the City 
treasurer, and the general manager of Lagos City Transport. There was also a chairman 
appointed by the Minister of Lagos affairs and who presides over the board meetings on a 
monthly basis (Williams and Walsh, 1968: 109).  The transport service was headed by a 
general manager responsible for the daily operations and administration of services, and the 
general manager was accountable to the Transport Board which appoints him or her.  
Of the three modes (trains, buses and ferries) of mass transportation in operation in 
Lagos from the 1960s, buses were the most significantly used and a key feature of the bus 
mode was the dominance of three destinations including Lagos Island, Apapa, and Ikeja. It is 
around the aforementioned destinations that the major mass transport routes lay due to the 
presence of economic features such as industries and financial organisations (Williams and 
Walsh, 1968: 108).  
The LCT operated a total of 102 buses by February 1965, increasing to 136 buses by 
July 1966 (Ibid: 109) in order to meet the demands of an increasing population. The financing 
of the LCT was mainly from the earnings generated from fares and from federal government 
subsidies. The profit made by the body went to the City council and was subsequently used 
for providing other public services (Williams and Walsh, 1968: 111). While the gross revenue 
of the LCTS increased especially due to a rise in the numbers of passengers carried from 37.4 
million in 1961-1962 to 50.1 million in 1965-1966, there was tremendous increase in wages 
and operating inefficiency.  
Notwithstanding the success recorded by the LCT as relating to its capacity in 
sustaining mass transportation, corrupt practices and the problem of pilferage reduced the 
revenue that it received. Nonetheless, it was clear that by the late 1960s public and private 
sector actors played a key role in the delivery of mass transportation in Lagos while there was 
no known government policy to regulate their activities. This observation is similar to the 
comment of Williams and Walsh (1968: 112-114) who suggest that the problem of lack of 
coordination by government agencies and standardisation of service delivery translates to 
poor transport infrastructures such as badly maintained buses and poor enforcement of 
transport regulations in Lagos. This shows that although a service such as mass transportation 
can be delivered without government regulation on a short term basis in a place such as 
Lagos, nevertheless, for its long term sustainability and effectiveness, there is need for proper 
regulations, rules and benchmarks to ensure operators deliver standardised services which 
meet user needs while also justifying fares charged. 
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In what could be termed a setback, the development of infrastructures including 
transport related capacities across Nigeria slowed down due to the civil war which occurred 
from 1967 to 1970. This war had colossal effects particularly through the insecurity it created 
in the society, and the diversion of the funds that would have been invested in transport 
infrastructures to fund the civil war. Furthermore, the incidence of military takeover of 
government hindered the establishment and growth of institutions which would have 
developed transport infrastructures in Nigeria. This led to the existence of a sclerotic transport 
structure in Lagos for a long period of time. Thus, most of the structures left by the British 
colonial government were not even consolidated, let alone sustained. 
The period after the civil war from 1970 to 1999 mainly witnessed military rule and 
the growth of private operators who have become dominant in delivering mass transportation 
in Lagos. While there was a change in the name of the state transport body from Lagos City 
Transport (LCT) to Lagos State Transport Corporation (LSTC) in 1974, private operators 
continued to increase. From the mid 1980s, the onset of structural adjustment policies, 
devaluation of the naira and liberalisation of import controls allowed for an immense 
importation of used vehicles from Europe. With the absence of regulations guiding entry and 
exit into mass transport operations, individuals who could afford to import used vehicles from 
Europe took the advantage thereby increasing the numbers of vehicles available to users. 
Olukoju (2003: 220) comments that while private operators run into tens of thousands and 
organised mainly into the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), they are so 
important that any dispute between them and government agencies often lead to them 
withdrawing their buses from operating thereby paralysing the transport system, commercial 
activities and social life in Lagos. Nonetheless, while the increasing numbers of commercial 
private operators and existing state transport body (LCT) continued to deliver mass 
transportation, it was clear that the operators could not meet users’ demands.   
While the military administered Lagos from the 1970s to 1990s, the population 
continued to grow at a growth rate of about 6% per annum even as necessary infrastructures 
such as good road networks, and maintained rail tracks and carriages were lacking. Gandy 
(2006: 374) comments that the spread of rent seeking activities on the part of the state, driven 
by a sequence of nefarious military regimes, had led by the late 1990s to an almost complete 
break-down in the public realm and an extensive collapse in the provision of basic services. 
Consequently, numerous transportation problems emerged for instance traffic congestion, 
disrepair roads, deteriorating comfort of road-based public transport, increasing levels of road 
140 
 
accidents, growing menace of robbery inside buses and sky-rocketing fares. The identified 
transportation challenges in Lagos, in addition to problems relating to urban growth caused by 
the status of Lagos as Nigeria’s economic capital as it houses the nation’s principal 
commercial sea port and airports, and financial institutions, have all pressurised existing 
infrastructures in the state. 
After the transition from military rule to democratic rule in 1999, the then Governor of 
Lagos state (Bola Tinubu) presented the case for the renewal of transport infrastructures in the 
state to the federal government and World Bank. Subsequently, the federal government 
ratified the governor’s proposal and agreed to stand as the guarantor of the loan to be taken 
from the World Bank. In order to address the challenges of urbanisation and those related to 
mass transportation delivery, the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) was conceived by 
the federal government and Lagos state government with the aim of facilitating sustainable 
and effective integrated transport system for Lagos state. In implementing the LUTP, the 
Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) discussed later in the chapter was 
created as the strategic transport authority to coordinate and implement mass transport 
policies in the state. 
The discussion of the emergence of mass transportation in Lagos thus shows that mass 
transportation evolved with the inputs of different actors, consequently having different 
outlooks at varying times. For instance, while the study shows that the colonial administrators 
established the first formal mode of mass transportation through the use of trams and trains in 
the 19
th
 century, individual entrepreneurs such as Charlotte Olajumoke and Dawodu, and J.N. 
Zarpas dominated the bus mode from the early to the middle of the 20
th
 century. Thus from its 
inception, mass transportation has been delivered in an unregulated environment (free entry 
and exit) by actors from both the public and private sectors in Lagos. The implication this has 
had for the functioning and sustainability of mass transportation has been immense. For 
instance, while the free entry and exit into the sector has enabled many Lagosians to make 
quick money through the process of profiteering from fare increments, there is the neglect of 
infrastructures and lack of maintenance thereby leading to deterioration. Also, due to the 
nonexistence of a regulatory body when mass transportation emerged in Lagos, there has been 
the establishment of a body such as the NURTW discussed later in the chapter, and which has 
established itself as the coordinator of mass transport operators across bus parks in Lagos. 
In the course of exploring the operation of mass transportation in Lagos especially 
from the colonial period till the establishment of LAMATA, it was clear that the transport 
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bodies established lacked the necessary capacity to sustain the infrastructures bequeathed by 
the colonial government and develop additional capacities to address the mass transport needs 
of Lagosians. Also, the absence of a particular body at the federal government level to 
coordinate the planning and operation of mass transportation across Nigeria in addition to the 
absence of relevant policies at all levels of government have led to a lack of standards in the 
mass transport system in Lagos prior the establishment of LAMATA. 
Arguably, the various intrinsic challenges of mass transport in Lagos have influenced 
urban planners to argue that mass transportation in the state needs unified control, planned 
development and the imposing of sanctions to offenders. The study shows that there are 
inadequate mass transport infrastructures for buses, trains and ferries, which undermine the 
effective delivery of mass transport in Lagos in the long term. Also, while the Nigeria 
Railway Corporation (NRC) has existed since the 1960s, it has operated at a deficit due to 
operational, resource and capacity problems. Furthermore, while there has been a series of 
National Development Plans (1962-68, 1970-74 and 1975-80), none of them has had a clearly 
articulated strategy for making investments in the transport sector to bring about spatial 
efficiency in the country especially Lagos (Filani, 1981: 214). Thus, although the emergence 
of mass transportation in Lagos dates back to the colonial period, factors such as corruption, 
lack of competency and political instability have adversely affected the development of the 
capacities that could have sustained mass transportation in Lagos. 
To conclude this section, it is clear that, the inability to maintain the infrastructures 
developed by the colonial administrators, in addition to factors such as the lack of effective 
institutions and political instability due to military rule after Nigeria’s independence have 
hindered the sustainability of mass transportation in the country, and particularly in Lagos. It 
is clear that government, from the colonial authorities to post-colonial governments and 
military administrators, has played different roles relating to mass transportation in Lagos. In 
order to further understand these roles, the relationship between the federal government and 
Lagos state government is explored in the next section.  
6.4 Federal government – Lagos state government relations and partnership 
 
 This section considers the relations between Nigeria’s federal government and the 
Lagos state government due to the importance of both actors and their roles in sustaining 
mass transportation and other related public services in Lagos. Also, the incidence of 
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partnerships, with particular emphasis on the BRT Lite partnership, is examined in other to 
shed light on their importance in the system.  
 
6.4.1 Federal government – Lagos state government relations 
 
  The relations between the federal government of Nigeria and the different 
governments that have governed Lagos state have been shaped by diverse factors such as 
socio-economic, political, strategic and funding influences. For instance, it was clear from the 
discussion in sections 6.2.3 and 6.3 that the federal government has always been influential in 
taking key decisions relating to infrastructures since the creation of Lagos state in 1967 as the 
state was the capital of Nigeria thereby prompting the interest of the federal government in 
the state. Furthermore, section 6.5 discusses the incidence of the partnership which delivered 
the BRT Lite scheme in Lagos. In discussing the partnership, the significant powers of the 
federal government in enabling and supporting the planning of the Lagos Urban Transport 
Project (LUTP), which delivered the BRT Lite scheme, and in currently implementing the 
Lagos rail project was observed. Thus, the study shows the incidence of partnership between 
the federal government and Lagos state government during the process whereby major 
schemes are delivered. Nonetheless, conflicts also persist between the two actors, especially 
when the ruling political party in government (president) at the federal level is different from 
the party of the governor at the state level. 
 The study of the relations between the federal government and Lagos state 
government focuses on the period since 1967 when Lagos state was created. From 1967 when 
the military took over the governance of Lagos state, the federal military government sought 
to make its presence felt in the state by locating two military barracks in the city. This could 
be argued to be important for the military government in suppressing political rallies 
organised by protesters and demonstrators opposing the military government. Thus, at the 
inception of the state, the federal military government was particularly concerned with the 
protection of its interests including those linked with socio-economic capacities and revenues 
present in Lagos.   
 In relating to the state government, the federal government employs bodies such as the 
Federal Ministry of Transport (MOT) whose role is to reach out to stakeholders from both the 
public and private sectors playing roles relating to the sustenance of mass transportation. 
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Badejo (2011: 17) comments that unfortunately, the Federal Ministry of Transportation has 
narrowly defined the radius of its relationship to incorporate only federal institutions. 
 Another means of evaluating the relations between the federal government and Lagos 
state government is by comparing the political stance of the party at the federal government 
level to that of the party at the state government level especially since the return of the 
country to democratic rule. Since 1999 when Nigeria transited to democratic rule, the key 
issues shaping the relationship between the federal government and Lagos state government 
as with other states are linked with resource control and disagreement over the revenue 
sharing formula among the 36 states in the federation. In a situation where the political party 
of the President is different to that of the Governor of Lagos state, there is always conflict 
between them. One instance was the period from 1999 to 2008 when President Obasanjo 
(PDP political party member) was in power at the federal government level and Governor 
Tinubu (AD political party member) was the Governor of Lagos state. During this period, 
both leaders questioned the other’s commitment to the development of infrastructures in 
Nigeria, with the latter leader frequently accusing the President and his political party of not 
doing enough to accelerate and sustain socio-economic development through investment in 
infrastructures and capacities such as energy, roads and security.  
 Notwithstanding the degree to which ideological and political differences shape the 
relationship between the federal government and Lagos state government, it is clear that due 
to the concentration of powers (for instance ability to raise tax, statutory powers, control over 
material and human resources, and control over the armed forces) in the federal government, 
government at that level is able, for example through its funds, to influence the state 
government. For instance, the federal government including the Federal Ministry of 
Transportation were instrumental in drafting the TOR and the framework of the proposal of 
the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) which is delivering the BRT-Lite buses and Lagos 
Rail. Another example is that the federal government guaranteed the loan LAMATA 
requested from the World Bank. This shows that while the actors disagree on certain issues, 
they tend to work together on issues identified by both of them as pertinent for sustaining 
public services including mass transportation in Lagos. 
 To conclude, this section has identified the factors that constitute and shape the 
relations between the federal government of Nigeria and the Lagos state government. The 
section also shows that such relations arguably determine the degree to which some policies 
would be made and implemented as decisions relating to the building of infrastructures to 
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support mass transportation in Lagos were seen to be influenced by government ideology, 
political and socio-economic factors and the powers of the federal government.  
It is thus clear that the federal government through its powers controls the relations 
between both actors. Nonetheless, evidence of partnership working was observed between 
both governmental actors especially for the purpose of establishing the LUTP, which created 
LAMATA as a strategic transport authority. To further understand the relations in the system, 
partnership is discussed in the next section with particular focus on the partnership which 
delivered the BRT-Lite scheme. 
 
6.5 Partnership   
 
 Since the establishment of LAMATA in 2002, the state government has attempted to 
both create partnerships and enter into partnership with relevant bodies for the purpose of 
attaining its transport policy aim, which is to develop intermodal mass transport system in the 
state. This section discusses the incidence of partnerships relating to mass transportation in 
Lagos. To aid analysis, the partnership delivering the BRT-Lite scheme is discussed. The 
study of the case of Lagos shows partnership between the federal government, Lagos state 
government, LAMATA, World Bank and operators for the purpose of combining resources in 
order to deliver the BRT-Lite scheme.  
6.5.1 BRT-Lite partnership 
 
The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT-Lite) scheme is a new form of BRT focused upon 
delivering a system to meet key local user needs while aiming to improve the quality of life, 
economic efficiency and safety within a clearly established budget framework. It was 
delivered at a cost of $1.7million per km and it carries about 200,000 people per day through 
the use of high capacity buses despite a capacity that does not allow it to satisfy all forecast 
demands (LAMATA, 2009: iii). The BRT-Lite network consists of a 22km route that is 65% 
physically segregated and 20% separated by road markings. The scheme was implemented to 
address the mass transport problems in Lagos including those relating to capacity and 
crowding. 
To better understand the argument for the BRT-Lite scheme, by 2006, the population 
of Lagos was estimated at between 15 and 18 million, and projected to grow to more than 25 
million by 2025. This would place Lagos as the third largest agglomeration in the world, after 
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Tokyo and Mumbai (LAMATA, 2009: 1). Mobility in Lagos during the period relied on a 
large fleet of approximately 75,000 mini-buses (danfo) in addition to much smaller numbers 
of midi-buses (molue) and shared taxis (kabu-kabu) which all add to the traffic congestion 
and traffic-related emission. The qualities of these forms of transport are appalling in terms of 
journey experience, and the variable fares charged by their operators. In addressing these 
challenges, the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP), was employed to set the strategic 
framework for building capacity to manage the transport system in the state and identify 
priority actions, investments and enabling measures for improving it. 
  In addition to the aforementioned capacity issues, there was no mechanism to 
coordinate and regulate the entry and exit of operators. Thus, LUTP enabled the creation of 
the Lagos Metropolitan Transport Authority (LAMATA) in 2002. Once established, 
LAMATA then drew the Terms of Reference (TOR) and framework for the BRT-Lite scheme 
while relying upon technical assistance and funding from the World Bank. 
The partnership that delivered the BRT-Lite scheme included LAMATA (coordinator 
and regulator), Lagos state government (provided $35 million counterpart contribution for 
infrastructure development), World Bank (provided technical advice and $100 million credit 
facility used for infrastructure development), the federal government of Nigeria (guaranteed 
$100 million credit facility from the World Bank and provided additional grants) and the 
National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). In implementing the BRT-Lite 
scheme, the aforementioned actors entered into a partnership where each body delivered 
aspects of the scheme while LAMATA coordinated the framework of the partnership and 
ensured relevant targets were met.  
In assessing the BRT-Lite scheme which was completed in the autumn of 2008, it is 
clear that users now save more journey time while travelling in more comfortable and safer 
buses. Furthermore, the success of the BRT-Lite scheme has been promoted by the World 
Bank and used as model for other countries including Ghana and Japan. However, there are 
some negativities associated with the BRT-Lite scheme. These include inadequate buses and a 
lack of proper maintenance of the buses. Nevertheless, the evaluation done by LAMATA 
(2009: iii-iv) claims that the scheme is an unprecedented success because it meets the needs 
of users and is delivered within budget and established time frame. The researcher, however, 
is of the view that the operation of the BRT-Lite scheme can be considered to be successful in 
terms of the alternative (secured bus, comfortable seating arrangement and high capacity) and 
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value for money (affordable and stable fares) it presents to users of mass transportation in 
Lagos as compared to the services delivered by private operators. 
 
6.5.2 LAMATA, NURTW and Eco bank partnership 
 
Another partnership was observed to be employed for the purpose of supporting the 
NURTW to run routes on the BRT-Lite network. This was to enable the union to be part of 
the mass transportation reform process in the state so as to prevent any likely opposition to the 
BRT-Lite scheme by the union or from any of its affiliates. The partnership was constituted 
by LAMATA (regulator and guarantor), NURTW (operator) and Eco Bank (funder). In 
commenting on the relevance of the partnership, interviewees including Desmond 
Amiegbebhor and Olukayode Taiwo (both from LAMATA) commented that due to the 
significant role the NURTW plays in the delivery of mass transportation before the 
emergence of LAMATA, it was in their interest to support the NURTW in the state to 
participate in the process of mass transport delivery through franchising in order to ensure the 
union support the acceptability and sustenance of the BRT Lite scheme. While the NURTW 
had grown in membership size from the 1960s due to the free entry and exit of operators into 
the bus mass transport mode, the membership size of the union was significant for instance, 
when they go on strike, the economy of Lagos state comes to a standstill. Furthermore, as 
NURTW was the only body which coordinated bus operations at bus parks and terminals 
across the state, the body was well established.  
Interviewees including Desmond Amiegbebhor and Olukayode Taiwo noted that the 
previous mass transportation scheme implemented in 2006 in Lagos Island failed because the 
NURTW were not involved in the process. Hence, the support given to the NURTW by 
LAMATA in terms of standing as a guarantor for the body in order to secure loan to purchase 
BRT buses in running certain routes was observed by the researcher to be responsible for the 
low incidence of conflicts relating to the implementation of the BRT-Lite scheme. The 
interviewees at LAMATA confirmed that NURTW paid up their loan before the loan term 
and made profits by running the route allocated to them on the BRT-Lite network. Hence, 
while LAMATA stood as guarantor for the loan given to NURTW by Eco bank, NURTW 
operated on the routes assigned to them while also abiding by franchising terms. Through this 
means, LAMATA was able to work with NURTW while also been rewarded with the stability 
of the BRT-Lite scheme as one of the stakeholders (NURTW) in the sector has a stake in its 
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operations. Thus, while the partnership aimed at supporting the NURTW to run routes on the 
BRT network was implemented, each of the partners gained.   
Notwithstanding the incidence of partnership between LAMATA, the NURTW and 
financial institutions, it was reported by Desmond Amiegbebhor and Taiwo Salami that the 
NURTW independently collects illegal revenues from operators in motor parks across Lagos 
state, thereby depriving the state of revenues that could be employed in funding capacity 
development. The researcher’s view on this development is that it could be possible that 
relevant government enforcement officers do not have the power to confront the members of 
the NURTW engaging in the illegal collection of fees, or there is the possibility that the 
government has deliberately turned its face away from them since most of the people 
engaging in the collection of the illegal fees are employed for electioneering. Theroux (2010) 
in his documentary titled ‘Law and disorder in Lagos’38 demonstrate how members of the 
NURTW collect illegal fees from bus drivers, cyclist and traders claiming such money are 
NURTW ticket fees. Furthermore, Theroux (2010) shows that some members of the union 
relate with the governor and some enforcement agencies in the state. This all illustrate the 
roles and relevance of NURTW in the governance process in Lagos.    
While partnerships exist in the system, Bawa-Allah noted that, since LAMATA was 
created on January 13
th
 2002, it has consistently competed with the Lagos State Ministry of 
Transportation as to which organisation is best placed to coordinate, regulate and strategically 
plan mass transportation in Lagos, and this has given rise to conflict between the two 
organisations (for further discussion, see Chapter 7).  
To conclude, the study shows that the creation of LAMATA which was due to the 
partnership which implemented the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) has been able to 
address some of the challenges faced by users of mass transportation in Lagos in terms of the 
need for a decent mass transport mode to address capacity issues. Furthermore, the creation of 
LAMATA and partnerships as observed has been able to facilitate joint-working among 
different actors and bodies. This has furthered the acceptability of the public of the mass 
transport schemes implemented by LAMATA thereby increasing the chances of the 
sustainability of the scheme and other related ones. Having discussed how partnership is 
                                                          
 
38
 http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xycnw8_law-and-disorder-in-lagos_lifestyle 
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employed in Lagos to deliver schemes, some completed and ongoing projects aimed at 
addressing capacity issues are highlighted in section 6.6 below. 
6.6 Key projects delivered and ongoing  
 
 In sustaining mass transportation capacities in Lagos, the Lagos Urban Transport 
Project (LUTP) has identified some projects whose implementation will enable the attainment 
of government policies relating to sustaining mass transportation in the state.  
 
6.6.1 LAMATA 
 
 LAMATA was created by LUTP to address problems of insufficient capacity in order 
to meet user demands, and also to coordinate, plan and implement policies to sustain mass 
transportation in Lagos state. LAMATA’s structure consists of five key departments: 
Corporate planning, Public transport, Roads, Traffic management and Finance. Furthermore, 
other elements of the five departments including safeguards, external relations, internal audit, 
information technology, corporate and legal, procurement and human resources are mainly 
responsible for administering LAMATA in order to coordinate mass transportation in Lagos 
(LAMATA, 2006: 8-10). Once created, the institution identified and implemented schemes 
such as the BRT-Lite project and Lagos Rail, which it perceived as vital for delivering 
integrated and intermodal mass transportation in Lagos state. The study shows that LAMATA 
has achieved most of its aims; for instance, it has increased the mass transport capacity 
available in the state by establishing a bus route franchising scheme while ensuring private 
sector organisations participate in the process of increasing capacity through partnerships. In 
addition, LAMATA has also been able to revamp water mode of mass transport in the state 
while working with relevant government and non-governmental bodies during the reform 
process. Notwithstanding these achievements, the study shows that the institution has not 
been able to address all the challenges in the transport sector in Lagos especially that of 
curtailing the excesses of NURTW whose members have breached established transport laws 
in the state and those relating to the use of the buses of some private operators for robberies. 
Despite these challenges, it is clear that LAMATA has advanced the operation of modes of 
mass transportation in the state thereby enabling users to get value for the fares they pay while 
commuting from one point to the other. 
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 In attaining its accomplishments, various factors were identified to have enabled 
LAMATA. The study shows that factors including the presence of technocrats as members of 
staff, in addition to the use of reputable and competent consultants for professional advisory 
assistance have all enabled the success of the body. Interviewees from LAMATA also 
established that the use of targets and benchmarks for members of staff and contractors have 
played a key role in the success achieved by the organisation. Arguably, the personnel 
employed by LAMATA are thus responsible for the high quality of projects executed by the 
body, and recognised by the World Bank as one of its key successful projects in Africa. 
Furthermore, interviewees at LAMATA confirmed that their success is due mainly to their 
separation from the core bureaucracy of government, thereby enabling them to implement 
policies they deem fit to enable the sustenance of mass transportation in the state. More 
importantly, all the interviewees at LAMATA unequivocally established that the political will 
and support of the Governor in ensuring non-interference with their work and processes  by 
politicians is mainly responsible for the degree of success they have accomplished in 
developing transport infrastructures in the state.  
 
6.6.2 BRT-Lite 
 
 BRT-Lite was implemented to address the lack of adequate means of mass 
transportation in Lagos. It offers high capacity rapid transit services carrying 10,000 to 30,000 
passengers per hour in each direction, and mostly on segregated lanes.
39
 The BRT-Lite 
scheme offers users an alternative to the other means of mass transport in the state which is 
through the use of mini-buses whose conditions are not user friendly in terms of the interior of 
the buses, their safety and their fare variability. BRT-Lite buses are better placed due to the 
exclusive right of way they have, the regulations that guide their operations thereby making 
them secure and comfortable, and their use of about 4,000 high capacity buses which have 
low emission. However, the study shows that the quality of the services delivered by BRT is 
depreciating as some of the buses in the BRT fleet are due for maintenance while others need 
the upgrading of facilities such as chairs. 
 
                                                          
 
39 Available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/109230659/LAMATA-LAGOS-METROPOLITAN-AREA-TRANSPORT-AUTHORITY-
Improving, Accessed on 26th May 2014. 
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6.6.3 Lagos Rail Mass Transit 
 
 In attaining the goal of the delivery of integrated mass transportation including buses, 
trains and ferries, LAMATA after its creation set out to implement the Lagos Urban Rail 
Network (LURN). LURN was conceived as a network of urban rail-based systems covering 
seven major corridors of high commuter traffic demand. The lines are to link the major 
population and activity centres in the state while integrating the network with planned and 
existing BRT-Lite routes and water routes. The first part of the project signed in March 2005 
is between the Lagos state government and LEMNA International Inc. of the United States, 
and it is a ‘Build, Own and Transfer (BOT)’ contract agreement for the delivery of the first 
phase of the light rail scheme along the western corridor Mile 2 – Okokomaiko/Agbara axis. 
This is estimated to cost $240 million and has an implementation period of 48 months.
40
 Like 
most other schemes in the state, the light rail scheme has not been delivered based on the 
forecast of 48 months implementation as the MD of LAMATA recently in a press release 
suggests that Lagos rail may begin operations in 2014. Nonetheless, it was observed during 
the study that construction work is ongoing thereby indicating that the project is not 
abandoned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
40
 Additional details available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/109230659/LAMATA-LAGOS-METROPOLITAN-
AREA-TRANSPORT-AUTHORITY-Improving, page 24 
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6.7 Chapter conclusion 
 
 This chapter has explored the factors linked to the emergence of government 
institutions and mass transportation in Lagos. It was clear that the geography of Lagos, in 
addition to the colonial establishment, all played different roles which enabled the emergence 
of modes of mass transportation, including trains, boats and buses. It was shown that the 
colonial government (before Nigeria’s independence) and federal government (after Nigeria’s 
independence) played key roles in terms of funding transport schemes in Lagos. The chapter 
has also shown that Lagos played numerous roles as the capital of Nigeria before and after 
independence due to several reasons including its economic capability and the political 
atmosphere it provided for the nationalists who advocated Nigeria’s independence. 
 During the period both civilian and military personnel governed the state, the study 
shows that the policies conceived by the government were significantly influenced by the 
federal government because of its powers and the grants it gives to the state. It was also 
shown from the study that, although Lagos state was created as a state within Nigeria’s 
federal system, it does not have financial independence as it relies on the monthly revenue 
allocation distributed by the federal government and seeks federal government approval for 
most capital projects. This therefore demonstrates a relationship between the state and federal 
government. 
 The chapter has also shown that arguably, the low incidence of partnerships in Lagos 
is due to the long years of military rule in the state. Nonetheless, while the two cases of 
partnerships discussed, which relate to the sustenance of mass transportation illustrate some 
collaboration among actors in Lagos, it is also clear that the actors constituting these 
partnerships benefit from the implementation of the partnerships. This therefore shows that 
the partnerships delivering mass transportation in Lagos are arguably shot-gun partnerships, 
as defined by Harding (1997: 74) to be a collaboration determined by the need of an 
organisation to ensure that organisational targets are met. In the two partnerships discussed, 
LAMATA could be seen as the organisation ensuring mass transport targets are met as its 
management determined the relevant institution(s) and body it partnered with in order to 
deliver sustainable mass transportation. Notwithstanding the partnership type adopted by 
LAMATA, the study shows that the body while collaborating with other actors has been able 
to implement its mass transport policies by relying on internally generated revenues, grants 
from the federal government and donors, as discussed further in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter Seven:  
Discussion of themes and findings in the case of Lagos 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter discusses findings related to the governance of mass transportation in 
Lagos. In order to aid analysis and comparison, the structure generally follows that used with 
regard to London. Building upon the information provided in Chapter 6, the discussion begins 
with an explanation of the government and governance structure in Lagos and how it relates 
to appropriate organisations, especially those concerned with mass transportation governance. 
Thereafter, the goals of some relevant organisations are considered. In addition, the key 
themes that emerge are examined in order to ascertain their significance to the study. The 
vulnerabilities of the collaborative governance model presented by Ansell and Gash (2008) 
are then presented drawing on findings from the case in Lagos. 
As indicated in Chapter 2, information was collected from a number of actors: Dr 
Frederic Oladeinde (Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority, hereafter LAMATA); Dr 
Desmond Amiegbebhor (LAMATA); Dr Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transport); 
Engr. Dr Bawa-Allah (Consultant to Lagos State Government and initiator of School of 
Transport at Lagos State University); Engr. Olabanji Omotosho (Lagos State Ministry of 
Transport); Prof. Olukayode Taiwo (LAMATA); Engr. Frederic Olofin (Lagos State 
Waterways Authority - LASWA); Prof. Akin Mabogunje (Federal Government consultant). 
All of these individuals provided evidence on how the organisations they work for seek to 
advance mass transportation in Lagos. The primary evidence provided by the interviewees 
was further validated using secondary sources of data, such as LAMATA’s reports and 
publications, and the presentations of actors to audiences that have interest in mass 
transportation in Lagos, for example the presentation of the Managing Director (Dayo 
Mobereola) of LAMATA to the World Bank Group and representatives of businesses 
operating in the system in Lagos. As discussed in the methodology chapter, it was not 
possible to collect data from other significant actors, for example, the Governor of Lagos state 
and the Minister for Transport of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, on the roles of such actors 
in the system. Nonetheless, a significant proportion of the data that might have been provided 
directly by such actors was gathered from secondary sources, such as the Report of the 
Presidential Committee on Redevelopment of Lagos Mega-City Region (Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 2006). 
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7.2 Overview of the governance structure of mass transportation in Lagos 
 
As outlined in Chapter 6, Lagos state government is directed by the executive 
(Governor). The executive includes the governor’s office, in particular Governor Akinwunmi 
Ambode (the current political leader of Lagos, who was elected in May 2015), as he 
coordinates the making and implementation of policies aimed at sustaining socio-economic 
activities in the state while engaging with relevant actors through partnership and 
consultations. Thus, the executive arm of government, under the leadership of the Governor 
(Ambode) and his deputy (Idiat Adebule), who represents the Governor at events within and 
outside the state, is primarily responsible for the daily administration of the affairs of the 
state. Also, there are thirty-seven commissioners who head various parastatals/departments, 
such as transport and health, who are responsible for the delivery of public services to 
Lagosians. The Governor gets political power and legitimacy through elections held every 
four years, and is responsible for appointing the members (commissioners) of his cabinet 
(executive). The thirty-seven commissioners appointed by the Governor run various 
departments such as the Ministry of Transport. These commissioners implement projects that 
are in harmony with the overall policy programmes of the Governor. Thus, in practice, the 
decisions and projects of the commissioners are significantly shaped by the stance of the 
Governor who appoints them, and the ideology of the party in government in the state. In 
implementing projects and providing public services such as mass transportation, the 
Governor of Lagos state (hereafter known as the Governor) works with actors including the 
federal government, private sector organisations, and other non-governmental actors, such as 
the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), through the implementation of 
schemes like the Bus Rapid Transit Lite (BRT Lite)
41
 system, which involves the use of buses 
on certain parts of some dedicated roads. Due to the strategic nature of the functions of the 
Governor, his political legitimacy and the powers attached to his office, such as the power to 
raise revenues within the state in the form of tax, he is able to influence the activities of 
organisations in the system.  
                                                          
 
41 The BRT Lite scheme became operational in Lagos on 17th March 2008 and was delivered with the aim of improving quality of life, 
economic efficiency and safety within a clearly defined budget. It consists of a 22km route that is 65% physically segregated and 20% 
separated by road markings. As observed from secondary data (LAMATA, 2010: iii), the success of the BRT Lite scheme is due to the use of 
an holistic approach that involved re-organisation of the bus industry, financing of new bus purchase, and creation of a new institutional 
structure and regulatory framework to support the scheme, while also training personnel to drive, maintain, enforce and manage BRT Lite 
buses. 
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There also exists a thirty-nine member Lagos State House of Assembly, headed by Rt. 
Hon. Mudashiru Obasa (Speaker of the House), the primary role of which is making laws, 
including to enhance service delivery in the state. For instance, ‘A law to provide for road 
traffic administration and make provisions for road traffic and vehicle inspection in Lagos 
State and other connected purposes’ was enacted in 2012 by the state legislature to regulate 
the modes of transport using roads. However, in commenting on that piece of legislation, all 
interviewees were of the view that, while the law is useful in principle, implementing such 
laws is often problematic due to the culture of Lagosians, discussed later in this chapter. 
While most of the proposed legislations are initiated from the executive (Governor), others 
are from bodies like LAMATA and the Ministry of Transportation. The draft legislations then 
goes through review stages in the Assembly before it is either quashed or enacted as law. 
Unlike its equivalent in London, the Lagos State House of Assembly plays a relatively limited 
role in scrutinising the actions of the executive. However, while the researcher did not gather 
any data which might suggest that the State House of Assembly has challenged or defeated 
any of the policies initiated by the governor in the past, it was noted that relevant committees 
in the Assembly, such as the Public Accounts Committee and Transport Committee, do 
investigate the projects implemented by ministries and agencies in the state. The work of 
these committees is discussed in the accountability section later in this chapter. The judiciary 
is the third arm of the state in Lagos, and is responsible for interpreting its laws.  
The extent to which the governance system in Lagos is influenced by the federal 
government was discussed in Chapter 6. For instance, it was noted that the federal 
government plays a prominent role, especially through the resources (mainly the monthly 
revenue allocation) it provides for the delivery of services in the state. Notwithstanding the 
resources (grants) provided by the federal government, the State and Local Government 
Programme (SLGP
42
) is of the view that, due to the need to provide and sustain public 
services in Lagos, and the limited allocation from the federal government, there is increasing 
need for the state government to source and rely on internally generated revenue within the 
state, in particular in the form of tax revenue. Currently, the federal government allocates 
                                                          
 
42 The State and Local Government Programme (SLGP) is a programme delivered by DfID in partnership with the Lagos State Internal 
Revenue Service with the aim of improving the tax system within Lagos in order to raise revenues to fund public services. Additional 
information is available at http://www.slgpnigeria.org/uploads/File/lago_case_study.pdf 
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26.72% of all the incomes generated by Nigeria to the 36 states of the federation including 
Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (Federal Ministry of Finance Nigeria, 2012). From the 
Lagos state budget for 2011, it was shown that while the federal government contributed 
25.50% (statutory allocation as 13.10% and value added tax as 12.40%) of the revenue of the 
state, the state government funded the remaining 74.50% revenue from sources including the 
Lagos Internal Revenue Services (54.50%) which is from forms of taxes such as property tax, 
tenement rates and company tax, Internally Generated Services (10.30%), Dedicated Revenue 
(7.40%) and Extra Ordinary Revenue (2.30%). The implication of the federal government 
allocations to the system in Lagos is discussed further in the section on funding regimes.  
Furthermore, it was also clear that, due to the absence of independent scrutiny 
organisations such as London Travel Watch, which operate as watchdogs of transport 
operators in London, and regulatory bodies performing functions similar to those of the 
National Audit Office and DfT, certain actors, in particular operators in the system linked to 
the delivery of transport services, have more freedom to engage in activities like profiteering 
and the delivery of poor services. Thus, conflicts in Lagos are partly linked to lack of capacity 
to create and enforce relevant, effective and appropriate rules. 
 
7.3 The goals of relevant actors and conflict in the system 
 
 This section begins with a discussion and illustration of the actors that constitute the 
system in Lagos. Thereafter, the goals of the actors and others (non systemic actors) who 
work with them are discussed. Next, the occurrence of conflict among actors is also 
considered. While Figure 4 shows the systemic and non systemic actors in Lagos, Table 9 
present a summary of the key goals of the actors in and out of the system. 
Figure 4 shows the categories of actors that play roles relating to the sustenance of 
mass transportation in Lagos. The importance of this was clear from the study; for instance, 
the analysis of the funding regime showed that LAMATA and the Governor placed great 
emphasis on the use of PPPs in implementing mass transport projects in Lagos as they have 
employed such mechanisms in implementing key projects including BRT Lite, Lagos Ferry 
services and Lagos Rail. In addition, Figure 4 shows that key actors including the Governor 
and LAMATA form the main component of the system and coordinate the work of other 
actors at different levels so as to execute the transport policy of the Governor. The leadership 
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and strategic roles of both the Governor and LAMATA thus make these actors constitute a 
level (main component) in the system.  
It was also noted that secondary actors such as governmental bodies (State Ministry of 
Transport) and non-governmental bodies (LCCI and NURTW) constitute another level in the 
system while also relating to other actors thereby showing a mix of actors in the system. 
These actors are recognised as secondary actors because of their roles, explained later in this 
chapter and their importance to the delivery and sustainability of mass transportation. 
Furthermore, another level of actors includes the Federal Ministry of Transport, World Bank 
and French Development Agency. These bodies mainly play funding and advisory roles. 
Furthermore, they are non-systemic actors because they do not play daily roles which directly 
affect mass transportation delivery in Lagos. Notwithstanding the levels of actors in the 
system, the analysis of the delivery of the BRT Lite scheme discussed in Chapter 6 shows that 
the World Bank, French Development Agency, the Lagos state government and the Federal 
Ministry of Transportation all work together in planning, funding and during the process of 
implementing mass transport schemes in Lagos.  
 The actors identified by the researcher as constituting the main component of the 
system in Lagos are LAMATA and the Governor as without them the system cannot function 
effectively. LAMATA’s expertise relating to mass transportation strategy, planning and 
implementation, including their role in enhancing capacity, makes this actor key, for both the 
short term and long term survival of the system. Furthermore, the Governor plays key roles in 
funding and setting the overall policy framework. Other actors, including LASTMA and 
LAGBUS, play roles such as enforcing traffic rules and sustaining mass transport operations.  
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For clarity, the actors responsible for sustaining mass transportation in Lagos are illustrated in 
Figure 4 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Network diagram of actors inside and outside the system in Lagos. 
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7.4 The goals of the actors inside and outside the system 
 The goal of the Governor of Lagos state (a primary actor) is to achieve effective 
healthcare, integrated modes of mass transportation, and the security of life and property. The 
Governor’s office, which was created by Decree No. 14 promulgated by the Federal Military 
Government in 1967, assists the Governor in the discharge of his duties while also 
coordinating projects to realise his policy plans.
43
 The researcher observed that a significant 
proportion of the Governor’s policy plans have been implemented, in particular the 
establishment of integrated mass transport modes in the state as evidenced with the operation 
of BRT-Lite buses and ferries, and ongoing development of the capacity to support the 
operation of Lagos rail.
44
 
The goal of LAMATA (a primary actor) is to enable the delivery of integrated mass 
transportation in the state by means of strategies and schemes which address capacity issues 
and sustain mass transportation. As discussed in Chapter 6, it was shown that LAMATA was 
established to address the transport challenges in Lagos state. As discussed elsewhere in this 
chapter, LAMATA carries out transport planning and coordinates the sustainability of mass 
transportation modes in Lagos.  
The goal of the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation (a secondary actor) is to 
establish a mass transit system which can address the transport problems in Lagos. 
Nevertheless, the research shows that the ministry has not been able to consistently implement 
its goal as it has been to some extent incapacitated by a lack of resources and technocrats. 
Also, there was considerable duplication of roles between the ministry and LAMATA until 
the passage of the New LAMATA Act in 2006, which defined LAMATA’s function to 
include planning, regulating and co-ordination of all travel modes within Lagos 
(http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/pagemenus.php?p=116&k=38).  
The goal of another secondary actor, the Lagos state Traffic Management Authority 
(LASTMA), is to stabilise traffic by managing and enforcing traffic rules. In carrying out this 
goal, members of LASTMA educate and enlighten the public, including for example 
operators and motorists, on the proper use of the highways (http://lastma.gov.ng/about-
                                                          
 
43 Available at http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/entities.php?k=175 
44 Available at http://www.lamata-ng.com/LAMATA%20BROCHURE3updated%20%20latest%20track%changes%accepted.pdf 
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us/responsibilities/). While all interviewees stressed the importance of the work of LASTMA 
in managing traffic in Lagos, the study showed that in performing its roles it clashes with the 
enforcement officers of the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), another secondary 
actor, who enforces traffic rules on federal highways. This furthers the incidence of conflict 
between LASTMA and the FRSC thereby affecting mass transport operations.  
The goal of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), another secondary 
actor, is to promote trade and industry by organising public-private dialogue sessions and 
roundtable series to address its members’ priority issues, while also representing the interests 
of local businesses to the Lagos state government and investors 
(http://www.lagoschamber.com/index2.php?page=profile). The researcher observed that the 
LCCI sometimes facilitates trade, for example through its introduction of the cashless 
payment scheme on the BRT system.  
The goal of the Lagos State Water Authority (LASWA) (a secondary actor) is to 
provide clean and safe waterways for transportation (http://web.laswa-
ng.com/authority/about-us) by protecting, restoring and preserving Lagos waterways through 
the education of Lagosians and the enforcement of relevant laws. The research shows that 
LASWA has enabled the delivery of water transport in the state as it has developed additional 
jetties and terminals through PPP joint ventures with organisations such as MTN.  
The Lagos State House of Assembly (SHOA) is another secondary actor which aims 
to represent Lagosians by passing laws that enable socio-economic development and the 
provision of infrastructures in the system. Furthermore, the SHOA, through its committees, 
such as the Public Accounts committee, is able to scrutinize mass transportation projects 
executed by organisations in the state.
45
 
In addition to the primary and secondary actors constituting the system, and discussed 
above, the Federal Ministries of Finance and Transport, and international organisations 
including the World Bank and French Development Agency (FDA), constitute important 
external actors to the system. For instance, the external actors constitute the principal funders 
(capital) of the system in Lagos. Furthermore, bodies such as the World Bank and FDA 
provide technical assistance in the form of strategy and policy advice.  
                                                          
 
45 Available at http://www.lagoshouseofassembly.gov.ng/?in=&up=comd&comid=26 
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The primary aim of the Federal Ministry of Transport is to set the policy framework 
that guides transport authorities across Nigeria and fund identified major transport schemes. 
Interviewees including Frederic Oladeinde (LAMATA) and Frederic Olofin (LASWA) 
presented the view that the Ministry has not delivered its goals due to its lack of technocrats 
to aid the development, implementation and sustenance of the policy framework to maintain 
mass transportation in Nigeria.   
In view of the strategic role of bodies as they relate to the system, the former 
Governor of Lagos state (Babatunde Fashola) stressed that the implementation and attainment 
of mass transport policies and schemes in Lagos will be delivered through PPP framework 
between organisations in and out of the system. LAMATA, in partnership with actors such as 
the NURTW, seeks to influence the Ministry of Transportation at the federal level by offering 
advice which supports the implementation of mass transportation. An instance indicating such 
advice and partnership was before the purchase of BRT Lite buses, when the NURTW, 
LAMATA and the Lagos state government asked for an import duty waiver from the Federal 
government for the high capacity buses imported into the country to allow for the purchase of 
more buses. Furthermore, LAMATA and the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation are 
responsible for awarding franchises to operators, and so are able to influence operators, 
through incentives, to operate on less profitable routes. 
 Alongside LAMATA, there exists the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation (a 
secondary actor), which is also partly responsible for formulating and implementing mass 
transport policies in Lagos. The draft Transport Policy of the state Ministry of Transportation 
states that the Ministry is one of the key bodies that influence mass transportation, and that it 
has three aims which include: to set up a mass transit system, to tackle chaotic mass transport 
operations by awarding franchises to relevant operators, and to plan the implementation of 
mass transport policies. While this Ministry was established to coordinate the planning and 
implementation of mass transport policies in the state, its operations have been marked by a 
lack of human and material resources over the years, and by corruption as discussed in 
Chapter 6. Given the problems of the Ministry, it is perhaps understandable that the 
government chose to create a new agency (LAMATA) instead of reforming the Ministry. In 
confirming the similarities between the two organisations, LAMATA (2006: 25) comments 
that the roles and responsibilities of the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation are similar to 
those of LAMATA, and that this overlap in roles, together with factors such as inadequate 
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regulations and capacity, constitutes a major impediment to the sustenance of mass 
transportation in Lagos. 
The members of the Lagos State House of Assembly are responsible for enacting laws 
aimed at regulating the behaviours of actors in the system and empowering bodies such as 
LAMATA and transport operators to perform their roles. While the Assembly does not 
engage in delivering mass transportation, the laws that it passes set the framework for other 
actors, including organisations providing services that affect mass transportation provision. 
For instance, through its legal backing for committees in the Assembly, the Transport and 
Public Account Committees of the Assembly audit contractors, ministries and agencies, in 
order to make on-the-spot assessments of the various developmental projects embarked upon 
by the government.  
The NURTW also influences the workings of the system. For instance, through its 
membership strength (about 1.5 million in the country) and the use of means such as strike 
actions or the threat of them, it is able to negotiate with actors in the system for policies that 
will favour its members. Thus, the NURTW, both at the national and state levels, is 
sometimes consulted by the state government before and during the process of implementing 
mass transport policies. For example, during the planning process for the introduction of BRT 
Lite buses in Lagos, some of the members of the NURTW were selected by LAMATA as part 
of the team that visited Bogota, Colombia, to study how its mass transport system, which is 
mainly through the bus mode, is planned and delivered. Also, due to the influence of the 
NURTW on the operation of mass transportation, and the role the union plays in mobilising 
votes for politicians during elections, LAMATA supported the NURTW in playing a key role 
in the system, especially by acting as a guarantor for the loan facility for the union to enable it 
to secure a franchise to operate certain routes on the BRT Lite network. The working between 
LAMATA and NURTW was aimed at getting the union including its members and affiliates 
to support LAMATA’s schemes.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, previous attempt at implementing mass transportation 
project in Lagos failed because the NURTW was not consulted and engaged as a partner in 
implementing such projects. Olukayode Taiwo (LAMATA) argued that in the interest of 
sustaining mass transportation, the NURTW must be supported to act as an operator in order 
for them to take ownership of the BRT Lite Project. Also, the interviewee was of the view 
that it was imperative for LAMATA to partner with the union as the latter coordinates the 
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activities of operators in bus parks across the state. Thus, by engaging the NURTW in the 
system, the incidence of conflict, especially those between operators and other actors related 
to mass transportation delivery was minimised. It is therefore clear that the NURTW plays 
key roles relating to mass transport operations while also delivering mass transportation 
through the BRT Lite network. Nevertheless, Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of 
Transport) and Desmond Amiegbegbhor (LAMATA) claim that, due to the involvement of 
the NURTW in the transport system, especially as relating to the collection of illegal proceeds 
by the NURTW, together with the Lagos state government own inadequate capacity for 
checking the collection of revenues from unions and their affiliates, the government has not 
been able to collect substantial revenues in the transport sector. This view was further 
sustained by Theroux (2010) in his documentary entitled ‘Law and disorder in Lagos’, where 
it was shown that the unofficial money collected by members of the NURTW ends up with 
the state treasurer (MC) of the union, and is spent by the treasurer on whatever he deems fit, 
such as giving donations to religious organisations and buying exotic cars. Nevertheless, 
while there may be certain legitimacy issues related to some of the activities of the NURTW, 
the organisation is a significant actor in the system due to its roles. 
The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) works with the state and 
federal governments through the provision of evidence and information which addresses the 
economic and transport needs of business organisations in the state. An example of such 
information provided by the LCCI is its report entitled ‘Cashless Lagos’46, which explores the 
challenges and benefits of implementing cashless payment initiatives on the BRT Lite system 
in the state, as payment for services in the transport sector is mainly through cash exchange. 
Through the cashless Lagos scheme, the LCCI was able to enter into a contract with 
organisations including financial institutions such as Sterling Bank, LAMATA and operators 
as regards the collection of fares through cashless means, and the disbursement of such 
earnings for mass transport schemes. The bodies that delivered the cashless payment system 
include Sterling Bank which provide the funds for the purchase of necessary technology, and 
LAMATA, which set the regulatory framework, while the operators ensured that the 
technology worked effectively. The Chamber also works with policy makers and 
                                                          
 
46 In its analysis of the Lagos Cash-less policy initiated by the Central Bank of Nigeria, the LCCI found that the Cash-less policy initiative 
reduced risk of cash related crimes while also reducing revenue leakage, for instance, in the collection of mass transportation fares. The full 
Lagos Cash-less policy report is available at http://www.lagoschamber.com/admin/docs/Cashless%20Lagos%20Report.pdf accessed on 18 
April 2013. 
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organisations through business meetings and conferences so as to present the transport 
demands of the private and public sectors to politicians, investors and other key actors in the 
state. An instance of such meetings is the Business Environment Roundtable (BER) series 
held to address members’ priority transport challenges and how it impacts on their businesses. 
As in London, where business organisations through London First and the London Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry contribute to transport initiatives that advance the interests of 
organised business, it was observed that in Lagos private sector organisations, such as Eco 
bank, may fund transport projects that facilitate their business activities by providing loans for 
schemes in the state. Hence, relevant needs of business organisations and the Lagos Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry are met (which is also useful for users of BRT Lite, as witnessed 
with the implementation of the cashless payment scheme on the BRT Lite network).  
Local authorities (the equivalent of London boroughs) in Lagos state are seen as 
partners by actors in the system, and especially LAMATA, as playing consultative roles 
during the process of implementing projects at the community level, while also engaging with 
local people on how to address their needs, which include the availability of mass 
transportation, healthcare and education.
47
 The study shows that, while local authorities do 
not constitute a part of the system as they do not play any daily role which affects the 
planning and implementation of mass transport schemes, they are relevant for disseminating 
information about schemes in order to ensure the acceptance of mass transport projects by the 
public. 
Another actor that relates closely to the system in Lagos is the federal government, 
which operates through bodies such as the Federal Ministries of Transport and Finance. Both 
ministries, working closely with other bodies such as the National Assembly, are responsible 
for ensuring that institutional and legal frameworks are put in place to support state Ministries 
of Transport to deliver mass transportation across the country. However, due to the inability 
of the Federal Ministry of Transport and their counterparts at the state level to develop and 
coordinate the modes (train, buses and ferries) of transport in Nigeria, mass transportation 
within each state as well as between states has lacked coordination. Notwithstanding the 
supposed strategic role of the federal government, some actors in the system, for example 
Frederic Olofin (LASWA) and Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transport), presented 
                                                          
 
47 Available at http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/pagemenus.php?p=60&k=32 
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the view that federal government agencies such as the National Inland Waterways (NIWA) 
and the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), have become ineffective over the years due to 
low investment in infrastructures and human resources. Also, corruption was identified by 
Desmond Amiegbebhor (LAMATA) as a key factor working against the delivery of mass 
transportation in Nigeria including Lagos, as public servants were alleged to misappropriate 
public funds and siphon government resources. These factors, were argued by the 
interviewees identified above to have influenced the inability of the Federal Ministry of 
Transportation to implement its primary goal, which is to create the policy framework for 
mass transport initiatives across Nigeria. 
As shown in the funding regime section later in this chapter, both the World Bank and 
French Development Agency (FDA) (external actors) were seen to have provided the majority 
of the funds used by LAMATA in implementing the BRT-Lite scheme. Furthermore, the 
World Bank has provided technical support in the form of planning, budgeting and 
evaluation, for projects implemented by LAMATA, and in particular the BRT scheme. Thus, 
although the World Bank and FDA are external actors to the system, it is clear that these 
bodies enable the sustenance of the system through their roles. 
Drawing on the analysis of the goals of actors and the incidence of conflicts in the 
system, the researcher provides an expression of the goals of actors inside and outside the 
system in Lagos in Table 9 below. 
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Table 9: The distinctive goals of the actors constituting the system in Lagos and other 
external actors. 
Actor Stated primary goal(s) 
Lagos 
Metropolitan 
Transport 
Authority 
(LAMATA) 
To do strategy and planning for the provision of rapid, affordable, efficient 
and effective public transportation accessible to all in metropolitan Lagos 
(http://www.lamata-ng.com/vision&mission.htm). 
The Governor 
of Lagos State 
To enable the renewal of the infrastructure of the state by investing in 
projects that increase the capacity and effectiveness of health, education, 
transport and socio-economic infrastructures that are critical for economic 
growth and poverty alleviation in the state. As regards transportation, the 
Governor aims to develop and sustain integrated mass transportation (an 
integration of road, rail and water modes of transport) in the state through 
LAMATA to transform Lagos into Africa's model mega-city 
(http://www.tundefashola.com/about/tunde/index.html). 
The Lagos 
State House of 
Assembly 
(SHOA) 
To enable socio-economic development in the state by passing laws and 
scrutinising actors including the Governor and bodies operating in the 
system 
(http://www.lagoshouseofassembly.gov.ng/?in=&up=comd&comid=26). 
Ministry of 
Transportation, 
Lagos 
To set up a mass transit system which can tackle the chaotic transportation 
problems in the State (http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/entities.php?k=38).  
Lagos State 
Water 
Authority 
(LASWA) 
To protect, restore and preserve Lagos waterways. The body educates 
Lagosians on water transport while enforcing relevant laws in order to 
provide for clean and safe waterways for transportation, recreation and 
enjoyment (http://web.laswa-ng.com/authority/about-us). 
National 
Union of Road 
Transport 
To ensure favorable conditions for its members, including owners and 
employees of operators across Lagos state and Nigeria. 
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Workers 
(NURTW) 
Lagos State 
Traffic 
Management 
Authority 
(LASTMA) 
To manage and enforce traffic rules. The body educates and enlightens the 
public on the proper use of the highways, traffic safety and accident 
management while also promoting alternative methods of traffic 
management and road safety (http://lastma.gov.ng/about-
us/responsibilities/). 
Lagos 
Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Industry 
To promote, support or oppose legislative or other measures affecting trade, 
industry, commerce and agriculture as well as representing the opinion of the 
business community on the above matters in particular, and on the economy 
as a whole (http://www.lagoschamber.com/index2.php?page=profile) 
Federal 
Ministry of 
Transportation 
To set the policy framework for the modes of transport and inter modal co-
ordination. The policies and budgets of the ministry are implemented 
through its various agencies including Nigeria Railway Authority, Nigeria 
Ports Authority, Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency 
(NIMASA), Nigeria Shippers Council, National Inland Waterways 
Authority, and Nigeria Institute of Transport Technology 
(http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/politics/38206-government-alone-cannot-
fund-the-transportation-system) 
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7.5 The incidence of conflict in the system 
 The discussion of conflict here draws significantly on the literature employed while 
discussing conflict in the case of London. Key actors in Lagos, including the Governor and 
LAMATA, have not been able to address both potential and incidences of conflicts among 
actors in the system. To be specific, conflicts existing in the system in Lagos are discussed 
under two categories including pre-LAMATA (conflicts during this period were due mainly 
to the absence of a regulating institution due to the effects of military rule) and those 
witnessed post-LAMATA (conflicts were linked to competition between actors as each 
sought to outdo the other in delivering mass transport services). Conflicts were mainly linked 
to the duplication of organisational roles and the processes through which actors attempt to 
achieve their individual goals.  
On the whole as was the case in the system in London, non-antagonistic conflict (Mao, 
1968) appears more common than antagonistic conflict in the case of Lagos. The study shows 
that conflicts exist relating to the similar roles performed by the Lagos state Ministry of 
Transportation and LAMATA. Effectively, the two organisations have acted as rival 
establishments for developing and implementing mass transport policies because of the 
absence of clear rules stating how they should operate. The study shows that while LAMATA 
was created, there was no attempt by the government to establish mechanisms and policy 
framework to guide the operations of the body while another transport body (Lagos state 
Ministry of Transportation) existed. Bawa-Allah (consultant to the state government), argued 
that the lack of key institutions to regulate and coordinate organisations had furthered the 
incidence of conflict among actors before the establishment of LAMATA. He also presented 
the view that conflicts still exist in the system and are linked to absence of rules and effective 
enforcement agencies, in addition with competition among actors, for example between the 
State Ministry of Transport and LAMATA. Furthermore, he stated that other problems 
confronting mass transportation in Lagos are linked to the lack of joint working amongst 
actors in the system and caused by the fall-out of military rule which did not allow for the 
strengthening of democratic institutions and partnership working across sectors and levels of 
government. In his view, this lack of joint working could be linked to the ‘culture of 
competition among organisations’ and ‘show off by some actors to get the attention of the 
governor’. Nonetheless, the researcher observed from the study that the absence of key 
institutions such as watchdog bodies to scrutinise and hold actors to account, may also be 
responsible for the incidence of conflict in the system.  
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Furthermore, all interviewees suggested that additional conflicts in the system were 
linked to the effects of long years of military rule, which witnessed the weakening of 
government institutions and agencies responsible for service delivery, especially through the 
use of the command hierarchy of the military, which employed its own structure (military 
administrators and tribunals) as a replacement for democratic institutions such as the 
legislature for the purpose of coordinating the governance process. The period of military rule 
was before the emergence of LAMATA and was characterised by the absence of effective 
democratic institutions. Thus, while the military ruled, they established an elite clique which 
benefitted financially from the regime, thereby aiding the spread of corrupt practices (see also 
the discussion of the implications of military rule in Chapter 6). 
Evidence from all interviewees in Lagos suggests that the incidence of conflict has 
mainly worked against the sustenance of mass transportation. However, with LAMATA’s 
emergence and growth, conflicting elements in the system, such as the NURTW’s illegal 
collection of revenue, have been identified and acted upon by LAMATA and the Lagos State 
House of Assembly (SHOA) through the ‘New Lagos Traffic Law’. Notwithstanding the 
efforts of LAMATA and the SHOA, analysis shows that the incidence of conflict has not been 
fully addressed due to the lack of political will by the government to enforce laws which 
could criminalise offenders, including members of the NURTW, and prohibit them from 
collecting unlawful charges from bus operators. Thus, while the government put in place 
relevant policies to prevent such activities by the members of the NURTW, members of the 
union still persist in their illicit revenue collection, which is known to most actors in the 
system as certain established policies are not fully implemented (as reported in Punch 
Newspaper, September 1
st
 2012)
48
. Hence, inadequate resources, policies and institutions to 
coordinate, regulate and prosecute erring organisations in the system in Lagos are partly 
responsible for the problems and conflicts inherent in the system.  
  Conflicts were observed only between organisations in the system, unlike in London, 
where conflicts existed also within the roles of an individual, namely the Mayor. The 
Governor does not directly control actors by chairing the board of key organisations as is the 
case in London, thus conflict in his roles was less likely.  
                                                          
 
48 The evidence presented by Punch Newspaper is available at http://www.punchng.com/feature/crime-digest/nurtw-men-touts-defy-new-
lagos-traffic-law/ accessed on 18th April 2013. 
169 
 
In the course of examining the data gathered from LAMATA and the Lagos state 
Ministry of Transportation, it became clearer that certain conflicts in the system were linked 
to the differences between the two organisations, their varying roles and the strategic powers 
they had. For instance, the state Ministry of Transport lacks the powers to implement the scale 
of the projects executed by LAMATA as it is underfunded. Also, it was noted that the 
personnel at the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation did not have similar access to the key 
actors that could advance their work, such as the World Bank and French Development 
Agency. Hence, in addressing the key challenges of the Lagos state Ministry of 
Transportation, Taiwo Salami suggested that “the only way is, rather than competing, the 
government should coordinate intra sector activities and get more professionals to the state 
Ministry of Transportation to enable the planning and implementation of the schemes of the 
Ministry”. As discussed earlier, this suggests that there is a dearth of human and capacity 
resources in certain parts of the system and lack of joint-working. 
The researcher observed that conflicts in the system have also enabled actors to 
develop partnerships as a viable means for addressing key irregularities relating to inadequate 
capacity, as witnessed in the partnership between LAMATA, World Bank, FDA, the state 
government and the NURTW while developing the BRT Lite system (LAMATA, 2009: 19). 
Another irregularity at the delivery level in the system causing conflict between operators and 
bus drivers is fares pilferage, and this was addressed with the implementation of the cashless 
scheme initiated by the LCCI in partnership with other actors as identified in Chapter 6. 
Furthermore, the cultures of people that have grown in an environment where there is little 
regard for rules, in addition with lack of clearly understood rules have also enabled conflicts 
in the system. It is therefore clear that some conflicts have stimulated actors to push for 
additional laws and coordination, such as ‘The new Lagos traffic law’ and cashless scheme 
referred to earlier. Thus, Healey’s (2004, 2006: 318) suggestion that conflict offers 
government the opportunity to develop co-ordination among relevant actors was observed in 
the system in Lagos.  
In seeking to draw together the discussion in this section, it is apparent that conflicts 
linked to organisations in the system, a lack of systemic coordination and effective 
enforcement agencies, and lack of clearly understood rules, have significantly affected the 
sustenance of mass transportation in Lagos. The baleful activities of the NURTW illustrate 
the weakness of existing enforcement agencies in the state and the lack of political will by the 
Governor to address the activities of the body and the capacity issues facing the state Ministry 
170 
 
of Transportation. Thus, interviewees including Desmond Amiegbebhor (LAMATA) and 
Taiwo Salami (Lagos state Ministry of Transport), suggested that joint working between the 
principal organisations in the system is key for the planning, implementation and sustenance 
of mass transportation. Furthermore, due to the strategic role of the Governor, it is important 
for him to create and strengthen relevant institutions. 
To conclude the discussion of conflicts in the system in Lagos, the evidence examined 
suggests that key issues furthering conflicts between actors in the system include duplication 
of roles by organisations in the system, the inability of the government to address existing and 
emerging occurrences as witnessed in the baleful influence of the NURTW, and inadequate 
capacities linked to military rule. Hence, achieving collaboration across the system in Lagos 
was observed to be a difficult task, especially due to the unwillingness of some actors to work 
with others when they observe that they will not benefit from such collaboration. The 
researcher therefore concludes that conflicts are likely to continue to shape the extent to 
which organisations collaborate in the system in Lagos as its occurrence has led to the 
passage of some laws and more coordination in the system. Nevertheless, all interviewees 
presented the view that the establishment of relevant institutions and enforcement agencies 
which regulate actors in the system will reduce the effects of conflicts relating to disregard for 
rules. 
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7.6 Key themes that emerged from the study 
 
The key themes that emerged from the study of Lagos include ‘culture’, ‘leadership’, 
‘funding regime’ and ‘accountability’. These are considered in subsequent paragraphs, 
together with an examination of the position taken by systemic and non-systemic actors on 
each of the themes.  
 
7.6.1 Culture 
 
Culture featured prominently during the collection of primary data as one of the 
factors affecting the system and the sustenance of mass transportation in Lagos. This section 
explores how culture in Lagos is understood and the role it plays in the system. Lastly, recent 
attempts by the government and other relevant organisations to eradicate some of the negative 
influences of culture in the system are assessed.  
Interviewees in Lagos construed culture as the practices and norms that Lagosians, 
including individuals and bodies in the system, regard as general ways of life. The concept 
can be understood according to Tylor’s (1881: 54, and 1913: 1) definition, which suggests 
that culture is a complex whole that includes knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by people in society. In Lagos the researcher observed 
two types of culture: culture from the perspective of the general public and culture from the 
perspective of an organisation. In the former case, evidence gathered from interviewees and 
through the observation of some members of the public shows that most people were initially 
opposed to mass transport reform change, for example as witnessed through the 
implementation of the BRT Lite strategic plan, as this required individuals in Lagos to change 
their travelling behaviour. For instance, Desmond Amiegbebhor (LAMATA) and Bawa-Allah 
(consultant) presented the view that, during the introduction of the BRT Lite scheme, the 
project was initially opposed by some Lagosians, especially individual car drivers and 
owners, as they were banned from using the dedicated road routes assigned to the BRT Lite 
buses. Hence, culture as relating to the general public in Lagos shows how they may resist 
certain government policies which they view as not beneficial to their daily ways of life, 
especially when such policies are related to transportation and taxation.  
In the case of organisations, interviewees, including Frederic Oladeinde (LAMATA), 
Olukayode Taiwo (LAMATA), Akin Mabogunje (Federal Government consultant) and Taiwo 
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Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transport), presented the view that there exist negative 
organisational cultures, such as corrupt practices (as briefly identified earlier in this chapter), 
whereby individuals take from the resources of the state and organisations for their personal 
use, and unmeritocratic recruitment processes, whereby people are employed based on family 
ties and friendship rather than on merit or professional qualifications. This was discussed by 
Healey (2006: 228-230) as clientelism, and the study shows that it has led to the moribund 
status of some past transport agencies in Lagos, and indeed in Nigeria generally. In contrast, 
Frederic Oladeinde and Olukayode Taiwo (both from LAMATA) suggested that the 
organisational culture at LAMATA was one of transparency, professionalism, credibility and 
commitment. Akin Mabogunje (consultant to the Federal government) also suggests that the 
achievements of LAMATA are due mainly to the calibre of the staff that constitutes the 
organisation, and their openness.  
In the case of Lagos, organisational and public cultures were therefore identified as 
key factors shaping the extent to which mass transportation would succeed due to factors 
identified earlier. Furthermore, prior to the emergence of LAMATA, certain practices had 
developed, such as indiscriminate fare increases by operators due to a lack of established fare 
pricing, and practices by the public such as poor driving, including disregard for traffic rules 
and regulations. In attempting to address these practices LAMATA initially encountered 
opposition from some people who doubted the usefulness of the BRT Lite scheme in 
addressing mass transport problems relating to overcrowded buses and arbitrary fare 
increases. However, the organisation has been able to enlighten the public, for example 
through media programmes and advocacy campaigns, thereby gradually changing some of the 
previous negative culture of the public.  
With the emergence of LAMATA and its strengthening with the LAMATA Act 2006, 
the institution has been able to coordinate the activities of operators delivering services 
through its franchising process. For instance, it was observed that while the NURTW 
controlled the bus mode of mass transportation delivery prior to the establishment of 
LAMATA while also charging high fares for lucrative routes, through its franchising system 
LAMATA has been able to ensure the functionality of most mass transport routes (profitable 
and non profitable) while ensuring that flat fares are charged on most routes in order to 
increase the delivery of mass transportation to Lagosians. Furthermore, LAMATA has been 
able to partner with enforcement agencies such as KAI, LASTMA and the Nigerian police to 
ensure violators of traffic laws are arrested. While there have been instances when military 
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traffic offenders have resisted arrest, as evidenced by the clash between men of the Nigerian 
Police force and those of the Nigerian Navy in the Apapa area of Lagos on the 25
th
 of January 
2013 over the enforcement of the new traffic law
49
, the previous Governor (Fashola) has 
lobbied the State House of Assembly to pass additional laws to empower enforcement 
agencies to prosecute road traffic offenders. 
The previous state government has not only enacted laws, but has also invested 
additional capacity and resources in media programmes, aimed at the reorientation of the 
negative attitudes of Lagosians and organisations in the system in other to support cultures 
that advance and sustain intermodal mass transportation. The interviewees at LAMATA 
presented the view that these initiatives, such as BRT’s half hour programme on radio Lagos, 
broadcast every Sunday (repeated on Tuesday), informs the public on how LAMATA is 
developing capacities and infrastructures and on the effects of such initiatives on road users 
and Lagosians generally.  
To conclude the discussion in this section, the study of Lagos has shown evidence of 
the significance of culture, especially on how it can enable or hinder the sustenance of mass 
transportation. While the evidence provided by interviewees supported the creation of 
relevant rules and institutions to re-orientate actors in the system in doing away with negative 
cultures, it is clear that new rules will be confronted by various factors, including the 
organisations and persons that would like to oppose new ways of joint-working in order to 
preserve the former ways of working in the public sector (as witnessed by the initial 
opposition of some Lagosians to the implementation of the BRT Lite project). Nevertheless, 
the researcher’s view is that while there may be the creation of more appropriate institutions, 
and the enactment of laws, of significant importance is the enforcement of laws and the 
enabling of established institutions to perform their tasks. Furthermore, the political will of 
the Governor in tackling the bad political culture of NURTW and other bodies will be 
important in addressing the occurrence of negative individual and organisational cultures. 
 
                                                          
 
49 For additional information, consult http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/lagos-police-to-prosecute-military-traffic-offenders/ accessed on 
26th July 2013. 
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7.6.2 Leadership 
 
 Interviewees in Lagos unanimously held the view that the failure of past governments 
in Lagos state and Nigeria to establish key institutions and invest in relevant capacities to 
sustain mass transportation and other public services, in addition to other factors such as 
corruption, is largely responsible for the underdevelopment of the mass transport sector in the 
state. Thus, all interviewees supported the view that good leadership will among other things 
enable the building of infrastructures to address public needs while including the public 
through consultations in the governance process. Drawing on the definition of leadership as 
discussed in the case of London, this section examines the process through which leadership 
increases or reduces the occurrence of conflicts in the system in Lagos. Thereafter, the 
leadership roles played by actors such as the Governor shall be examined. Lastly, conclusions 
are drawn for the practice and sustainability of the system.  
   As discussed earlier, Northouse’s (2013: 5) definition of leadership as a process 
whereby an individual influences a group of people to achieve a common goal is adopted in 
the discussion here. In the case of Lagos, it is clear that the Governor influences actors in the 
system, including those who compete for his attention in the process of providing public 
services such as health-care and mass transportation through his funding and political powers. 
As an elected official, the Governor has strategic and political leadership powers. His 
strategic powers include the power to raise tax within the state, the power to raise money 
through the capital market, and the power to plan and implement policies in the state. His 
political powers include the power to devolve authority to local authorities and bodies, and 
the power to get his political party members who constitute a majority in the State House of 
Assembly to support and vote for his policies. Through this means and others, especially the 
use of PPPs, the Governor is able to plan and implement mass transport schemes. In addition, 
the existence of groups of commissioners chosen by the Governor, and technocrats in some 
agencies, present the Governor with alternative elements to be employed for a variety of 
projects delivered through partnership in the state.  
 Due to his leadership position, and the powers he wields, he is able to play different 
leadership roles (political, through his expertise, and strategic, through his policy making and 
planning abilities). Nevertheless, some interviewees argued that LAMATA should lead and 
coordinate the system in Lagos due to its strategic expertise in transport planning but others 
disagreed. For instance, Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transportation) was of the 
175 
 
view that the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation should be the key organisation 
coordinating the system. However, the view of the researcher as regard leadership for the 
mass transport governance system is that the capacity and professional expertise possessed by 
LAMATA puts the organisation in a better position to coordinate and regulate the system in 
Lagos. Thus, while the Governor may possess the political power in the state, a body such as 
LAMATA possess strategic and planning powers. 
The study shows that most agencies and institutions in the system are significantly 
influenced through the Governor’s powers to award grants, some of which specify that 
recipients must engage in the PPP framework in order to be eligible. It was also observed in 
Lagos (as in London) that the Governor, as the political leader of the state, appointed a 
technocrat and professional to head LAMATA. This then indicates the presence of two forms 
of leadership. First, the Governor is a political leader with some strategic powers which 
enable him to make decisions, while also using means such as funding powers to either 
support an organisation like LAMATA or not fully support an agency of the state as 
exemplified by the State Ministry of Transport. As the political leader, the Governor 
influences the policies to be implemented in the state in order to ensure such policies are 
consistent with established political ideology and party manifesto pledges. Second, LAMATA 
also plays strategic leadership roles in the system as it is responsible for planning and 
implementing schemes aimed at delivering mass transportation while also coordinating actors 
to minimise the incidence of conflicts.  
The Commissioner of Transport, who heads the State Ministry of Transport, plays 
some leadership roles as he ensures the goals of the Ministry are achieved, for instance 
through the authorisation of projects relating to transportation. The study shows, however 
that, due to their lack of transport expertise, such commissioners have not been able to 
provide the leadership that would enable the Ministry to discharge its responsibilities 
effectively. For instance, Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transport) bemoans the 
inexperience of a commissioner (Kayode Opeifa), whom he describes as a biologist. He 
suggests that in a situation whereby ‘round pegs are not fit into round holes’ then there would 
be problems such as those confronting the Ministry. He further argued that it is not right for 
him with a significant knowledge of transport planning to be taking orders from the head of 
the Ministry whose educational background is in biological science. 
 Although the Governor has the powers to restructure the State Ministry of Transport, 
he has not done so. This may be because the Ministry, like some other agencies, serves the 
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purpose of rewarding patrons of the Governor through political appointments to positions in 
the agencies. Taiwo Salami (State Ministry of Transport) presented the view that most of the 
commissioners that have been appointed to head the ministry, with the exception of Prof. 
Badejo (previous Lagos State Commissioner of Transport), are not technically and 
professionally fit for the position. On the other hand, the managing director of LAMATA 
(Dayo Mobereola) has extensive expertise in transport planning, implementation and 
regulation. This therefore places him in a strong position to lead LAMATA. 
The federal government also plays a leadership role in the state, especially through the 
establishment of the policy framework that guides elements of the governance system in the 
state, such as its recommendation for the planning of the redevelopment of the Lagos 
megacity region and through its grants used by the state for capital projects such as the 
construction of the third mainland bridge completed in 1990.  
In concluding the discussion of the theme of leadership, unlike in London where many 
actors appeared to be interested in leading the system, the evidence gathered from 
interviewees in Lagos suggests that LAMATA and the Governor are playing leadership roles. 
However, of these two actors, most interviewees except Taiwo Salami and Olabanji 
Omotosho (both of Lagos State Ministry of Transport) presented the view that LAMATA is 
more suited to make and implement mass transport policies in Lagos due to its capacity and 
expertise. Drawing on the evidence collected, it is argued that a leader is important, especially 
for coordinating and managing the system towards the attainment of systemic goals. It was 
noted from the study that while both political leadership by the Governor and strategic 
leadership by LAMATA exist in Lagos, both rely on each other in sustaining mass 
transportation. For instance, while LAMATA depends on the Governor for its funding and 
political support, the Governor also relies on LAMATA’s expertise in delivering mass 
transportation projects in order to attain the policy priorities of the government as relating to 
mass transportation which subsequently enable him in seeking re-election to retain his 
leadership position in the state. Thus, the joint-working between the Governor and LAMATA 
in particular can be argued to have enabled the feats achieved in the transport sector in Lagos 
state as evidenced with BRT Lite, Lagos rail and ferry services. Nevertheless, it is clear from 
the study that the existing leadership in Lagos has not been able to address the criminal 
activities of NURTW relating to the illegal fees they collect from operators and the conflicts 
between organisations, for instance between LAMATA and the State Ministry of Transport.   
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7.6.3 Funding regime 
 
 During earlier discussion in this chapter it was emphasised that in Lagos the system 
relies on funding from various actors such as the federal government, Lagos State government 
and World Bank. This section aims to investigate the actors constituting the funding regime 
and how they influence the system. Furthermore, the sources of the funds used in the system 
and the priority areas catered for by the state budget are also highlighted. While the evidence 
in Table 10 shows that LAMATA receives most of the allocations to transport agencies in 
Lagos, it is also clear that grants from the federal government and other donors to Lagos state 
constitute a significant proportion of the funding available for mass transportation. Due to the 
reliance on such grants, interviewees, especially those from LAMATA, presented the view 
that a more diverse funding stream feeding into the Transport Fund managed by LAMATA is 
essential for sustaining mass transportation in Lagos in the face of current and future 
government cuts. 
 The actors that constitute the funding regime are a mix of governmental and non-
governmental actors as shown in Figure 4. The governmental actors identified include the 
federal government, comprising its agencies such as the Federal Ministry of Transportation 
and Ministry of Finance (funding through grants), and the Lagos state government (funding 
through grants). The World Bank (funding through loan), French Development Agency 
(FDA) (funding through grant) and private sector organisations like Eco Bank and Sterling 
Bank (funding through loan) constitute the non-governmental actors. Aside from these actors, 
interviewees at LAMATA noted that other funds employed for sustaining mass transportation 
include secondary income, such as the proceeds from the Motor Vehicle Administration, 
earnings from licenses, and concessions and savings in the Transport Fund established and 
monitored by LAMATA. Unlike in London, where income from fares constitutes a significant 
component of the funding regime and goes to TfL, in Lagos, most of the fares income goes to 
operators who then pay established fees for franchises/licenses to deliver mass transportation.  
As discussed earlier, it was noted that members of the NURTW collect illegal fees 
from operators. This fee arguably constitutes part of the income that would have gone to the 
coffers of either LAMATA or operators to sustain mass transportation. While some of the 
funds LAMATA gets go through the state government, others, for example grants from 
donors such as the FDA and fees earned from route franchises issued, are transferred into the 
Transport Fund managed by LAMATA. It was clear from the study that LAMATA was able 
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to secure its first loan from the World Bank by collaborating with the state and federal 
governments on the technicalities and planning of LUTP. Having identified the actors that 
constitute the funding regime, the researcher observed from the study that such actors fund 
the system in different ways. For instance, funds from the federal government take the form 
of allocations, which go through the Lagos state government to LAMATA, while others, as 
indicated above, go directly to LAMATA. 
 In exploring how funds are gathered and spent on mass transportation projects, key 
reports and budgets were examined. While it was not possible to access the budget of 
LAMATA due to reasons explained in Chapter 2, aspects of the Lagos state government 
budget were employed for analysis. See Table 10 below for information extracted from the 
2012 budget of the Lagos state government.  
 
Table 10: Sectoral Allocation to Transport Agencies in the 2012 Budget 
Function, Budget Group and Agency Budget Y2012 Budget Y2011 
(Revised) 
Lagos State  Ministry of Transportation 3,582,673,001 3,064,890,773 
Lagos State Traffic Management Agency 270,000,000 - 
Motor Vehicle Administration 696,196,037 2,635,863,211 
Lagos State Metropolitan Area Transport 
Authority (LAMATA) 
28,969,105,864 24,411,268,220 
LAGBUS 1,680,000,000 1,796,000,000 
Lagos State Waterways Authority 1,162,020,000 1,677,703,875 
Total for Transportation 36,359,994,902 33,585,726,079 
Note: Figures in the tables above are extracted from the Year 2012 Budget of Lagos state 
 It is clear that the Lagos state government is the key funder. In his 2012 budget speech 
to the State House of Assembly, the then governor (Babatunde Fashola) emphasised that, due 
to the reduction in the grants received from the federal government, the state government is 
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looking inwards and relying on tax revenue to fund developmental projects. While presenting 
his view, the governor asserts that,  
“Self-sufficiency through tax compliance has certainly proven more reliable than 
depending on oil revenues which are proving increasingly unstable, as the key to 
building our prosperity” (Babatunde Fashola, 2012).  
While the state relies on federal government grants, it also relies heavily on tax revenues 
generated within the state. In the 2012 budget of Lagos state, federal government grants 
(110,158 billion naira) constituted about 27.6% of the total income proposed, thereby 
highlighting the federal government’s role in the funding regime, with other income being 
internally generated from sources such as investments and tax, and loans and grants from 
external partners. From Table 10, it is clear that LAMATA received the highest budgetary 
allocation of all the agencies in the Transport sector in Lagos state. With an allocation of 
28,969,105,864 naira, this constitutes about 79.7% of the total funds allocated to the transport 
sector in the budget. Also, it was noted that various transport projects constitute part of the 
budget expenditure on economic affairs, which represents 31.52% of the state total budget. 
This shows the extent to which the state government support the activities of LAMATA and 
the degree of the responsibilities of the institution in the system.  
The previous Governor reiterated in his 2013 budget speech that the government will 
continue to pursue public-private partnerships as means of getting private sector funding for 
projects in the public sector. This explains the finding that the government in Lagos plays a 
significant role in the initiation of partnerships, as bodies such as LAMATA take the lead role 
in identifying strategic partners (international donors and private sector funders) with funding 
powers to assist in advancing systemic and operational capacity while also sustaining the 
funding regime. The data gathered from interviewees at LAMATA suggests that the strategic 
funding partners of LAMATA are identified based on their capacity to fund LAMATA’s 
projects and the degree to which relevant expertise can be transferred to LAMATA.  
The study also shows that there exists a relationship between the funding regime and 
conflicts in Lagos. For instance, as LAMATA receives the lion’s share of grants from the 
state government, other actors that receive fewer grants, such as the State Ministry of 
Transportation and LASWA, complain about this. For instance, Frederick Olofin (LASWA) 
argued that LAMATA receives more funding than other agencies because it is favoured by 
the Governor. This observation is sustained by the evidence of Bawa-Allah (Consultant to 
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Lagos state government). Thus, while LAMATA is considerably funded, other bodies 
disagree with the attention and funding LAMATA gets. However, it is the view of the 
researcher that the funding received by LAMATA is linked to the technical and coordinating 
roles the organisation plays in the system as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
Also, it was noted that, irrespective of the political party governing at the federal 
government level, and due to the challenges of providing necessary capacities in Lagos, the 
federal government supports the government of Lagos state through separate grants for 
developmental projects such as that given for the building of an embankment for the bar 
beach on the Island while also collaborating with the government on schemes such as the 
construction of the Light Rail Transit project and the granting of right of passage for the 
implementation of the BRT Lite scheme.  
As indicated in Chapter 6, partnerships play an important role in the funding regime as 
they are employed by the state government and LAMATA for the purpose of funding mass 
transport projects and sustaining mass transportation. The study shows that partnerships in 
Lagos are not as established as in London, because it was not until the establishment of 
LAMATA in 2002 that attempts were made to employ partnership with actors outside 
government in raising funds and to solicit for inputs to sustain mass transportation in Lagos. 
Before the emergence of LAMATA, the state government paid all the public funds for the 
provision of mass transportation through the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation.  
Nonetheless, with the establishment of LAMATA, it was clear to the actors in the 
system that partnership with organisations across sectors in the state was necessary to raise 
additional funding. Hence, for example, organisations including LAMATA, NURTW, and 
financial institutions such as Eco bank, established a partnership to deliver some of the buses 
used on the BRT Lite network. While the practice of employing partnerships for the purpose 
of transport policy planning, implementation and evaluation in Lagos is still developing, due 
to the limited experience and period of existence of relevant organisations, in reflecting on the 
understanding and practice of partnerships in Lagos, Desmond Amiegbebhor (LAMATA) 
presented the view that the state government understands Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
as a means to transfer the funding responsibilities of government to the private sector. In 
commenting on this stance, the interviewee suggested that the government should not transfer 
all its responsibilities to the private sector as the private sector in Lagos and Nigeria is in a 
developmental phase and also vulnerable to political uncertainties and the absence of relevant 
copyright laws. This view was supported by Frederic Olofin (LASWA), who indicated that 
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the state government had reduced its budgetary allocation and tasked the agency (LASWA) to 
seek funding from the private sector to finance planned initiatives for water transport in the 
state. This then indicates that, while the federal and state governments constitute the key 
funders of mass transport initiatives in Lagos, due to inadequate resources, the state 
government is employing partnerships with organisations in the private sector to raise private 
sector equity funding to further the sustenance of mass transportation.  
To conclude, the discussion of the funding regime in Lagos has shown that, since the 
emergence of LAMATA, the funding regime in place has influenced the emergence of 
partnerships in the system while the latter also shape the former in sustaining mass 
transportation, for instance the partnership between LAMATA, NURTW and Eco bank, 
funded some of the BRT Lite buses operated by the NURTW. Furthermore, the study showed 
that PPPs were employed for funding mass transport schemes and projects due to the limited 
capacity of the grants that came from the federal government to the state government. Thus, 
the researcher is of the view that the success of the funding regime in Lagos is partly linked to 
the Governor’s leadership as exemplified through his use of PPPs in raising funds aimed at 
implementing initiatives such as the BRT Lite scheme and the Light Rail project which have 
increased mass transport capacities in Lagos thereby sustaining socio-economic activities and 
users mobility. It is thus clear from the study of Lagos that the Governor of the state plays a 
key role in raising funds employed for financing projects aimed at sustaining the system.   
 
7.6.4 Accountability 
 
This section discusses the process by which actors are held to account for their roles 
and actions by others. As in London, interviewees in Lagos interpreted accountability as the 
process through which an actor holds another actor to account for their roles and resource use 
while the latter actor also gives an account of his or her use of resources. The structure of the 
accountability framework in Lagos was found to be similar to that in London in terms of the 
forms of accountability found. The discussion in this section explores accountability of two 
kinds: electoral accountability, which is from politicians to electorates, and administrative 
accountability, which is from all actors to those responsible for scrutinising their performance.  
In the course of exploring how actors are held to account in the system in Lagos, it 
was noted that politicians, and in particular the Governor, are held to account by citizens 
mainly through elections. The Governor is also held to account through administrative means, 
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for instance, the State House of Assembly, especially its Transport Committee and Public 
Account Committee, scrutinises the Governor’s budget and investigates his policy initiatives 
and ongoing projects. The 39 elected members of the Lagos State House of Assembly are also 
accountable to the electorates who voted them into office. 
An instance of administrative accountability is evidenced in the 2002 LAMATA’s 
Act, which stipulates that the leadership of LAMATA shall be accountable to the Governor. 
The interviewees at LAMATA stressed that the organisation is held to account by the 
Governor of the state through the use of performance targets set in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) establishing LAMATA. In addition, the study shows that the State 
Ministry of Transportation is accountable to the state government as the former was 
established through the 1967 Decree No. 14 promulgated by the Federal Military 
Government, which also created the state and established that the state government is 
responsible for funding all ministries in the state and also for holding the ministries to account 
for their use of resources. However, because the heads of the ministries are political 
appointees, the holding to account of such heads is at the discretion of the Governor. 
In addition to the use of statutes in holding certain actors to account, another 
administrative means of holding to account is through committees in the Lagos State House of 
Assembly. For instance, the Public Accounts Committee and Committee on Works and 
Infrastructure audit some of the projects implemented by ministries and agencies in the state 
based on the terms of reference and contractual details of such projects. For instance, after 
touring the construction of Ariyo-Ira-Muwo-Tedi-Abule Oshun Bridge in Ojo Local 
Government, the Committee on Works and Infrastructure summoned the contractor in charge 
of the project over its failure to finish the scheme on schedule. Hon. Rotimi Olowo, Chairman 
of the Committee on Works and Infrastructure further commented  
“You have collected a large sum of money from the coffers of the state to execute this 
project, and this job has been on over four years. To date you have not delivered up to 
75% of the work: I see no reason why the contract should not be revoked and why it 
should not be awarded to another firm and I learnt that you have a bad record as a 
company with the state”50.  
                                                          
 
50 Available at  http://www.lagoshouseofassembly.gov.ng/?in=&up=newsd&evid=88, accessed on 15th July 2013 
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Thus, it is clear in Lagos that, while elected officials are held to account by citizens through 
elections, the State Assembly officials also hold the government and its agencies and other 
bodies delivering any services in the state to account for their use of resources. The study 
shows that offenders are rarely prosecuted thereby showing a weakness in the process by 
which actors are held to account.  
The Governor and the members of the State House of Assembly are held to account by 
other actors, including the opposition parties (electoral accountability), based on the policies 
promised by the Governor in his manifesto before being elected. Furthermore, it was noted 
that opposition parties and civil society groups have used petitions to hold the government to 
account. For instance, the Democratic Peoples’ Alliance (DPA) party petitioned the State 
House of Assembly on the controversy surrounding the legality of the purchase of the 
Sunborn Yacht at the cost of 25 million Euros, and renamed Lagos Yacht Hotel. However, 
while an inquiry was carried out into the details of the contract, the details of the findings of 
the inquiry, like most other inquiries in the state, were not published or communicated to the 
public. In commenting on the inaction of the committee charged with the inquiry, the DPA 
party argued that Lagos state would be better governed with greater accountability and less 
impunity if all of the Governor’s actions were scrutinised by the House of Assembly.  
To show his intention to strengthen accountability, the previous Governor employs the 
mass media to give an account of his use of resources every 100 days in office. On the 6
th
 of 
June 2013 at the Lagos State University (LASU), the Governor gave another account of his 
stewardship on spending 2,200 days in office. In the forum, he reassured Lagosians that the 
government is focused on service delivery while also informing academics of the need to 
access the 1.5 billion naira research fund created in the state’s budget, thereby indicating that, 
while the government is committed to the process of giving an account of its use of resources, 
it also aims to inform the public on how they can engage with the government, in this case 
through grants for research purposes. Another instance where the Governor accounts for his 
use of resources is during the annual budget speech delivered at the chamber of the State 
House Assembly. For instance in his Year 2012 budget speech, the Governor established that 
“Our focus would be to continue and complete as many on-going projects as we could, 
whilst starting only critical ones that we could fund, with the intention of leading our 
Party to victory at the general elections with great optimism that our performance 
score card would be good enough to secure a return for us” (Babatunde Fashola, 
2012). 
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This therefore makes it clear that, due to factors such as the need to gain and maintain 
political power, the Governor engages in a variety of activities that are designed to indicate 
his openness and answerability for resource use. 
 Administrative accountability was also observed from the study of Lagos through the 
process whereby actors, including the staff of LAMATA, LAMATA’s contractors and other 
partners are held to account by their organisations. For instance, the staffs of LAMATA are 
held to account by their employer against contracts and established performance indicators. 
Also, it was clear that LAMATA holds its contractors and staff to account based on set Terms 
of Reference (TOR’s) for contractors and performance targets for staff.  
The research identified an absence of significant established ‘watchdog’ institutions 
(such as London Travel Watch and the National Audit Office in UK, which scrutinise relevant 
aspects of the operations of the actors in the system in London).  
While there may be a number of challenges in relation to accountability in Lagos, 
often reflecting institutional cultures and practices, the government realising the need for an 
effective institution, established LAMATA with the 2002 LAMATA Act of the Lagos State 
House of Assembly to be accountable to the Governor. This Act was amended in 2006, 
specifying that LAMATA is responsible for coordinating and implementing mass transport 
policy planning in Lagos (LAMATA, 2009: 17). The 2006 LAMATA Act also established 
that the institution shall be called as and when necessary by the State House of Assembly to 
present evidence relating to its work. While no specific time frames were given for such 
meetings, the evidence presented by interviewees (Desmond Amiegbebhor, Kayode Taiwo 
and Frederic Oladeinde) at LAMATA suggests that the institution works with relevant 
members and committees of the State House of Assembly while sponsoring bills and, in the 
process, educating legislators on aspects of mass transportation planning and policy making. 
LAMATA’s 2006 Act also shows that the organisation is accountable to the Lagos state 
government and the Governor through the submission of its annual reports and budget 
performance against proposed transport projects.  
In considering the process used in holding LAMATA to account, aside from the 
Governor demanding an account of LAMATA’s workings and projects, it was clear that 
committees in the State House of Assembly use meetings to question the leadership of 
LAMATA on resource use. Nonetheless, while the researcher was not able to observe any 
copy of the report of the review/audit of LAMATA by the State House of Assembly, the 
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previous Governor, Babatunde Fashola (2009: i) in his review of the activities of LAMATA 
comments:      
“The remarkable success of the BRT Lite initiative delivered by LAMATA has 
demonstrated clearly that the hitherto seemingly intractable transportation problems of 
Lagos such as the gridlocks of erstwhile Oshodi or the bottlenecks previously 
experienced in Apapa, Iyana-Ipaja, Ikorodu road to the heart of Lagos Island are 
indeed surmountable…. May I commend the efforts of LAMATA for the safe delivery 
of the first BRT in the whole of Africa, and which has since become a reference point 
for other cities” (Babatunde Fashola, 2009: i). 
From the quote, it is clear that the Governor endorses the activities of LAMATA.  
To conclude the discussion of accountability in Lagos, relations between actors 
holding others to account and actors being held to account show that partnership is employed 
for various purposes including as a means to gather information used in the holding to 
account process. Also, additional relations were observed by the researcher between the 
Governor and Lagosians through the 100 days in office media parley he holds, and where he 
answers questions linked to his performance and service delivery.  
It is noted that the means of holding actors to account as discussed above all have 
benefit and cost implications for the performance of the system. For instance, while the cost 
associated with the use of statutes and contracts in holding actors to account includes that of 
putting in place relevant systems such as an independent and effective judiciary including 
structures for assessing performance, benefits of using statutes and contracts relate to the 
support and structure they provide for implementing contractual agreements. For instance, in 
LAMATA, the use of contracts and performance targets provides guidance to staff across 
various departments, thereby furthering the delivery of elements of the BRT Lite project. 
Thus, although there are different units in LAMATA, they work together to implement 
LAMATA’s goals. Furthermore, it was noted that the use of statutes, contracts and 
performance targets enabled the establishment and strengthening of enforcement agencies. 
Nonetheless, the researcher observed that certain costs, such as the high price of building 
capacities for the judiciary, are associated with the process of holding actors to account. Also, 
the case of Lagos, where the judiciary is funded by the state government, raises questions 
concerning the degree to which the judiciary is independent of government influence. To 
sustain this argument, the former Chief Justice of Lagos state, Justice Inumidun Akande, 
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urged her successor to strive to strengthen the cause of an independent judiciary in the state 
(Adesomoju, 2012)
51
. 
To summarise the discussion of accountability, Figure 5 and Table 11 below indicate who is 
accountable to whom, for what and how.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Accountability Framework of the System in Lagos 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
51 Available at Punch Newspaper online http://www.punchng.com/news/outgoing-lagos-cj-advises-successor-on-independent-judiciary/ 
assessed on 21/10/2013. 
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Table 11: The accountability framework of the mass transport system in Lagos  
Nos Name of 
actor 
(organisati
on) 
Who actor is accountable to and 
what for 
How the organisation or body is 
held to account 
1 LAMATA Answerable to its funder 
including the Governor and to 
SHOA for its use of resources. 
Held to account through meetings and 
inquiries by Committees in the SHOA. 
Its annual report is also scrutinised by 
the SHOA. 
2 Lagos State 
government  
Accountable to the Federal 
government, State House of 
Assembly and public for its use of 
resources and exercise of power 
Held to account based on its delivery 
of relevant projects through questions 
and answer session at the SHOA, and 
through electoral means.  
3 Lagos State 
Ministry of 
Transportati
on 
Answerable to the State House of 
Assembly on how it has used 
appropriated funds in the state 
budget 
Held to account through questioning 
by Committees in the State House of 
Assembly and through an on-the-spot 
check of its projects  
4 LASWA Answerable to the SHOA and 
Governor for its use of resources 
Held to account through questioning at 
the SHOA on the extent to which it 
has implemented the Governor’s 
transport policies 
5 Governor Answerable to the SHOA, 
Lagosians, Federal government 
and other institutions like the 
World Bank for its use of 
resources 
Held to account through question and 
answer session at the SHOA, through 
the media forum he organises, and 
through electoral means  
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While Table 11 shows how bodies and actors are held to account and who they are 
accountable to, Figure 5 illustrates accountability relations in the system. Furthermore, Figure 
5 shows that at the heart of the process of holding to account is the Governor who also play 
leadership roles in the system. This then indicate the relations existing among actors in the 
system and between the roles played by certain actors.   
The discussion in this section has shown that political and administrative kinds of 
accountability exist in Lagos. However, of these two kinds, it is clear that administrative 
accountability is more employed due to its flexibility and ability to be used at any given time. 
Furthermore, it was also clear that certain actors such as the Governor are held to account by 
both political and administrative kinds of accountability as committees in the State House of 
Assembly hold him to account for the extent to which he implements his policies and projects 
while Lagosians use elections as a means to hold the Governor to account based on the degree 
to which he has delivered his electoral promises and manifesto.  
Analysis of the study shows that due to the powers possessed by the Governor, he is 
able to circumvent certain processes which affect the sustenance of mass transportation. For 
instance, the Governor’s inaction to revamp the State Ministry of Transportation which 
performs similar functions to that of LAMATA raises certain questions relating to the 
commitment of the governor in supporting institutions and agencies in the state to sustain 
mass transportation. Furthermore, the government’s inability to act against NURTW as a 
body and its members for collecting illegal fees in bus parks also raises additional questions 
concerning the Governor’s dealing with the NURTW and its members.  
 
7.7 Testing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model in the case of Lagos 
 
As with the case in London, in testing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model, the evidence 
gathered from Lagos demonstrates a number of weaknesses in the propositions of the authors 
with regard to their essential ingredients of collaborative governance. In subsequent 
paragraphs, these propositions are examined based on how they exist in the system in Lagos. 
The themes identified through the study to be fundamental for sustaining collaborative modes 
of governance in the system in Lagos shall also be highlighted.  
 The evidence from this study suggests that rather than actors being influenced by a 
prior history of collaboration or conflict as postulated by Ansell and Gash (2008), actors in 
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Lagos were mainly motivated by what they stood to gain from the collaborative framework 
and the government (primarily in the form of the Governor). For instance, the bodies 
constituting the partnership between LAMATA, NURTW and Eco Bank participated in the 
partnership because of what they perceived as the gains for them. While LAMATA 
participated in order to involve the NURTW in the transport reform in the state, so as to 
enable the acceptability of the mass transport reform by majority stakeholders, NURTW 
worked with the other partners in order to get funding to obtain franchise for running a mass 
transport route. Similarly, Eco Bank took part in the partnership because of the potential 
profits it would make. Thus, the case in Lagos shows that actors do not necessarily participate 
in partnerships because of a prehistory of cooperation or conflict.  
The study showed that the Governor and LAMATA play leadership roles in the 
system while enabling the process where mass transport policies are implemented. The study 
also points to the significant powers (funding and statutory) of the Governor, and how such 
powers are used to influence systemic and non-systemic actors. Furthermore, as Ansell and 
Gash (2008) did not identify how the facilitative leader would emerge and whether the leader 
would be one or more individuals or bodies, the study has provided some evidence which 
suggests that some actors in the system in Lagos want different actors to constitute the 
leadership of the system, due to the expertise and powers of each of the actors. This has 
furthered the understanding of how leadership modes (political and strategic) can be 
employed to enable and sustain the delivery of public services such as mass transportation. As 
was the case in the system in London, forms of leadership were found in Lagos that were not 
noted in the Ansell and Gash (2008) model. The researcher observed that both the Governor 
(political leadership) and LAMATA (strategic leadership) played significant roles in 
sustaining relations in the system and transport capacities. 
 While Ansell and Gash (2008: 555) argued that factors such as basic protocols and 
ground rules are critical for sustaining the collaborative process, the system in Lagos shows 
that ground rules and basic protocols by themselves cannot sustain the collaborative process, 
as there were incidences of both a lack of sufficient rules and an inability to enforce some 
rules. The study shows that the existing culture in Lagos arguably plays a fundamental role in 
sustaining or hindering the collaborative process responsible for maintaining transport modes. 
The system in Lagos demonstrates the challenges of enforcing some rules as some people (for 
example, some military personnel) see themselves as above the law. Thus, although Ansell 
and Gash (2008) identified the relevance of basic protocols and rules, the case in Lagos shows 
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that basic protocols and ground rules lacking enforcement powers might not attain necessary 
results relating to sustaining collaboration. The discussion of partnerships in Chapter 6 shows 
that key actors such as the Governor and LAMATA influence who participates in PPPs aimed 
at delivering mass transport schemes. Thus, rather than the Ansell and Gash (2008) model of 
collaborative governance, the system in Lagos shows the existence of only a few partnerships 
with restricted memberships and which could be argued to be successful as all the constituents 
of each partnership benefitted from their operations. 
From Figure 1, Ansell and Gash (2008) show that variables including trust building, 
face-to-face dialogue, commitment to process, and shared understanding are important for 
sustaining the collaborative system. While the case in Lagos demonstrates the existence of 
some of these variables, for instance, shared understanding by actors, in terms of the need to 
develop more transport capacity in order to enable transport sustainability, the study 
highlights that in addition to face-to-face dialogue, other means of communication, 
particularly through social media and information technology (IT) were employed. 
Furthermore, while Ansell and Gash (2008: 558) suggest that direct dialogue allows for 
‘‘thick communication’’ which is necessary for stakeholders to identify opportunities for 
mutual gain, the case in Lagos shows that stakeholders communicate directly and indirectly 
through representative bodies such as NURTW representing operators. 
 As shown in Chapter 6, the study of partnerships in the system in Lagos shows that 
collaboration develops among organisations not just because of the need to focus on ‘small 
wins’ that deepen trust as suggested by Ansell and Gash (2008), but because of the need to 
attain over-arching government policies through PPPs, and the quest of organisations to meet 
needs they cannot achieve individually. Thus, the evidence from Lagos has shown that rather 
than variables such as starting conditions and face-to-face dialogue, the key actors identified 
to influence collaborations in the system include the Governor, LAMATA and other actors 
constituting the funding regime. The study also shows that the means of accountability 
constitutes one of the factors that sustain the collaborative framework in the system. While 
discussing accountability earlier in this chapter, it was suggested that it helps enable 
collaboration among actors. However, the Ansell and Gash (2008) model failed to consider 
this factor, and others, which shape the system in Lagos. Drawing on the evidence from the 
study, it is argued here that majority of the ingredients argued by Ansell and Gash (2008) to 
enable collaborative governance are not valid in systems with characteristics such as those in 
Lagos and London, where key influential actors such as the Mayor and Governor, ensures that 
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the scope and operations of partnerships are aligned towards the attainment of their policy 
priorities. The prescriptive nature of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model developed from cases 
explored in the United States, within a socio-political and cultural context arguably different 
from elsewhere, also demonstrate the weakness of the model.      
Another limitation of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model is its failure for not 
considering the influence and relevance of culture in shaping collaborative frameworks as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The evidence gathered from the study of the case in Lagos, as 
discussed in Section 7.6.1, shows that existing cultures (public culture and organisational 
culture) affect the system and the sustenance of mass transportation. For instance, potentially 
problematic cultures were observed, as with the resistance to reform and the violation of 
transport rules, and some negative organisational cultures in the form of corrupt practices and 
unmeritocratic recruitment processes. 
Clearly, some of the propositions of Ansell and Gash (2008) were seen in Lagos, as 
with the relevance of facilitative leadership that was observed in the system. Nevertheless, the 
study has shown some evidence that differs from many of the variables proposed by Ansell 
and Gash (2008). Hence, beyond the variables identified by Ansell and Gash (2008) as 
presented in Figure 1 to enable and sustain collaborative frameworks, the study of Lagos has 
identified crucial factors, such as culture, the nature of the funding regime, government 
policies, accountability and leadership types, as influencing collaborative modes of 
governance. By identifying these factors, our understanding is enhanced on the possible 
factors that shape collaborative frameworks. 
 
7.8 Chapter conclusion 
 
The discussions in this chapter have shed further light on the factors crucial for 
sustaining the system in Lagos. The study of Lagos shows that while actors supported the idea 
of having a leader to coordinate the system, they did not agree on who is best suited to play 
this role. This then shows an incidence of divergence between actors on the leader of the 
system. Notwithstanding the views of actors on the leadership of the system, the leaders 
(Governor and LAMATA) are able to employ their powers in influencing actors to implement 
government policies and deliver schemes through partnerships. Hence, while the Ansell and 
Gash (2008) model identified facilitative leadership as one of the key variables that enables 
the collaborative governance framework, the model failed to illustrate how the leader would 
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emerge and whether systemic leadership is best constituted by an individual, organisation or a 
combination of both. 
The chapter has particularly shown that while the ingredients identified by Ansell and 
Gash (2008) as required for collaborative governance are insufficient, and cannot be applied 
to all collaborative frameworks, for instance the cases explored in this study, other crucial 
factors, such as culture, government policies, means of holding to account, and funding 
regime were identified as playing fundamental roles in enabling collaborative modes of 
governance. Discussions in the chapter also focused on the roles of actors in Lagos, the ways 
actors interpret partnerships, as well as how and why conflicts emerge among actors. The 
study of the system in Lagos shows that culture plays a key role in shaping phenomena such 
as corruption, conflicts and cooperation.  
 As in London, it was noted in Lagos that the government plays an interventionist role 
while employing delegation and partnership working with organisations for the purpose of 
public service delivery. For instance, in supporting LAMATA’s work, the Governor delegated 
to LAMATA the power to make regulations subject to the Governor’s approval (LAMATA, 
2009: 18). Also, in implementing the LUTP, the Governor emphasised the use of public-
private partnership as the means for funding the delivery of mass transportation in the 
framework in which, while LAMATA provides the enabling infrastructures, including the 
traffic systems, private sector organisations would provide funding (loans and capital) and 
operators would accept the regulatory enforcement (LAMATA, 2011: 5). This all point to the 
strong influence of the government in the system in Lagos. 
 While the immediate past Governor has indicated his resolve to fund and sustain the 
provision of capacities that would enable mass transportation in the state, as seen with the 
operation of BRT Lite and investment in the Lite Rail project, the lack of policy guidance at 
the federal government level has impeded the sustenance of mass transportation in the state. 
Nonetheless, the creation and strengthening of LAMATA as the strategic transport authority 
responsible for coordinating mass transportation is yielding dividends as illustrated with the 
operation of BRT Lite whose success has been commended by the World Bank and used as a 
model for mass transport initiatives in countries such as Ghana and Japan, and also in other 
Nigerian cities including Port Harcourt, Ibadan and Kano. LAMATA’s (2009: 37-38) 
evaluation of BRT Lite shows that the scheme has improved the quality of lives not only of 
those using it along the Ikorodu road corridor, but also those who travel along the corridor by 
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other modes (cars and motorcycles). Nevertheless, challenges remain, including the need to 
establish appropriate regulations to ensure compliance among actors in the system (Ibid).  
The chapter also discussed how overlaps in the functions of certain organisations (in 
particular LAMATA and the State Ministry of Transportation) furthered conflicts. While 
interviewees emphasised that actors in the system competed against each other, especially for 
a leading role in the system, the study shows that conflict has had both positive and negative 
effects on the development of mass transportation in Lagos. The negative effects include the 
competition it causes in the system, which has allowed for more coordination among actors 
and the enactment of laws to regulate actors. On the other hand, key actors in the system, in 
particular LAMATA and the Governor have embraced PPPs as a means for addressing 
funding problems in the system, although the latter’s interpretation of PPPs was criticised by 
some interviewees in the system thereby questioning the validity and relevance of PPPs in 
Lagos. The evidence from the study also suggests that the incidence of conflict in Lagos 
furthered the emergence of partnerships. The implication of this for the practice of 
collaborative governance is that, although all the interviewees in the system deplore the 
occurrence of conflicts, the observed positive and negative effects of conflicts have provided 
additional evidence for understanding its role in the collaborative framework.   
To conclude, the study of the system in Lagos has identified key themes such as 
culture, leadership, funding regime and accountability as important in influencing the degree 
to which mass transportation will be sustainable. The study and discussion in this chapter 
have shown that these themes relate to one another and do not necessarily exist in isolation. 
For instance, it was clear that key actors such as the federal government and Governor, who 
all constitute the funding regime, also play leadership roles in the system. These same actors 
are involved in the process in which actors are held to account thereby indicating the relations 
between actors in and out of the system. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This study set out to assess the occurrence of collaborative modes of governance in the 
systems of governance of mass transportation in London and Lagos, by focusing on the 
relationships among actors. The motivation for the study was the desire to better understand 
the dynamics of the relations among actors in both systems and the relevance, if any, of 
collaboration, conflicts and collaborative governance to the sustenance of mass transportation. 
The research thus began with an interest in the idea of collaborative governance in both 
analytical and normative senses. In the course of analysing the literature on collaborative 
governance, the researcher observed the fluid nature of the concept and contrasting definitions 
of partnership and governance, which together constitute the concept of collaborative 
governance. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of how the research questions of the study have 
been addressed (section 8.2). Thereafter, section 8.3 compares the key empirical findings 
arising from the attempt to apply the Ansell and Gash (2008) model in both cases 
investigated, identifying the similarities and differences in both cases to contribute to the 
development of a more robust model of collaborative governance. There is then a concluding 
remark on the model focusing on its normative stance, the problem of generalisation, and 
definitional problems, drawing on the discussions in Chapters 3, 5 and 7. The chapter then 
goes on to list the contributions of the study and its policy implications in section 8.5. Section 
8.6 then presents the final conclusion of the study. 
 
   8.2 Addressing the research questions 
 
 The research questions generated for the study are of two types (primary and 
supplementary questions), and discussed in Chapter 2. The primary questions relate to the 
meaning and use of collaborative governance. They include: What is meant by collaborative 
governance? How useful is the concept of collaborative governance for understanding mass 
transportation in London and Lagos? How far can collaborative governance contribute to 
improving mass transportation? These questions were addressed in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
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The supplementary research questions focus on the manifestation of collaborative governance 
and they include: What forms of collaborative governance can be identified? What are the 
mass transport problems? How are these problems actually addressed? What capacity (within 
each city) exists to solve these problems? These questions were addressed using the data 
gathered from the study, drawing on primary (use of in-depth semi-structured interviews) and 
secondary (use of publications and other soft resources in electronic form) sources. The 
answers to these questions can be found in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
In addressing the first research question (What is meant by collaborative 
governance?), the review of the literature on collaborative governance highlights the variety 
of sometimes contrasting definitions. Nevertheless, two definitions stood out: firstly, that of 
Ansell and Gash (2008: 544), with collaborative governance seen as a governing arrangement, 
with one or more public agencies directly engaging non-state stakeholders in a collective 
decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative, in order to make 
or implement public policy or manage public programmes or assets; secondly, that according 
to  the NPCC (2010), which defined the concept as the process in which a leader engages with 
all sectors (public, private, non-profit, citizens) in order to develop effective, lasting solutions 
to public problems that go beyond what any sector could achieve on its own.  
The definitions considered above relate to cases of collaborative governance in the 
US, and elsewhere academics have worked extensively on the use of partnerships for public 
services delivery, and, as noted by Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 9), it is possible that the 
principles of collaborative governance advocated by Ansell and Gash (2008) and NPCC 
(2010) might not be applicable and useful in some other political contexts. For instance, the 
study of the systems in London and Lagos shows that some systemic actors and other 
stakeholders playing roles related to the sustenance of mass transportation are not always 
necessarily motivated by a desire to implement public policies related to sustaining mass 
transportation, but are primarily motivated by what they stand to benefit from the 
collaborative framework. The discussion of the Barclay’s cycle scheme partnership, and of 
the LAMATA, NURTW and Eco bank partnership, both demonstrate how participants in a 
partnership stand to gain from its implementation. 
The definitions above also point to some elements of collaborative governance 
existing in both systems and explored in this study. For instance, while the use of joint-
working and a leader (facilitator) was observed in both systems, there are also elements of 
collaborative governance, as defined by Ansell and Gash, which do not exist in either of the 
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cases. For instance, collective decision does not exist in either of the cases as it was up to the 
political leader in each city to determine and make compulsory the key decisions relating to 
mass transport planning, strategy and schemes after consulting with individuals or a group (or 
groups) of actors perceived to play roles relevant for the sustenance of mass transportation. 
This, then, shows that rather than a particular definition of the concept, there exist different 
views as to what constitutes collaborative governance and how it is employed.  
 Drawing on the data gathered for the study, the exploration of the literature has shown 
that the concept of collaborative governance was particularly useful, especially due to the 
insight it provided as to how the characteristics of collaborative governance, including a 
facilitative leader, networks, and joint-working, are employed to sustain mass transportation 
in both cities. 
 It was clear from the study that at the heart of the mass transport governance systems 
in both cities were key actors, perhaps most notably the Mayor of London and the Governor 
of Lagos state. These actors play leadership roles (political and strategic) and significantly 
influence the degree to which collaborative governance exists in both systems. Due to the 
powers of both leaders, they were able to significantly decide and influence the workings of 
partnerships aimed at sustaining mass transportation and thus enable the attainment of their 
policy aims. Hence, the study shows that some of the actions of the leaders such as the 
Mayor’s use of ‘imperative coordination’ for implementing the Community Infrastructure 
Levy (CIL) in order to raise the GLA’s counterpart funding for Crossrail 1 disregarded a 
principle of collaborative governance such as collective decision making as propounded by 
Ansell and Gash (2008). Nevertheless, public-private partnerships as a principle of 
collaborative governance as argued by Evans (2007: 15-16) was observed in both cases. 
In demonstrating the occurrence of collaboration in both systems, the classification of 
the concept by Harding (1997: 74), including defensive collaboration and shot-gun 
collaboration was observed in both systems, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. Furthermore, 
vertical and horizontal partnerships, as identified by Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 315), were 
also observed in the cases, as actors entered into collaborations with systemic actors and non-
systemic actors across governmental levels. Similarly, governance as defined by Stoker 
(2004: 3) as rules and forms that guide collective decision making was observed in both 
systems. Furthermore, while the hierarchical and co-governance modes of Kooiman (2003) 
were evidenced in both cases, the latter’s self-governance mode and Rhodes’ (1996) 
governance as self-organising networks were not observed.  Thus, the view taken here is that 
197 
 
the concept of collaborative governance is useful for understanding the relevance of 
partnerships and rules, including how they exist to sustain public goods and services such as 
mass transportation.  
By understanding and addressing the first and second research questions, it was clear 
that collaborative governance presents a framework which can be employed to analyse the 
sustenance of public goods and services and schemes, especially those relating to mass 
transportation as explored in this study. Consideration of the third research question (How far 
can collaborative governance improve mass transportation?) enabled an in-depth 
understanding of the relevance of collaborative governance to the sustenance of mass 
transportation.  
Drawing on the discussion of collaborative governance in Chapter 3 and the analysis 
of the cases in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, it is clear that collaborative governance, as defined by 
Ansell and Gash (2008), does not really exist in the two cases. Both cases demonstrate how 
the political leaders (Mayor and Governor) mainly employ their powers and influence in 
attaining their policy priorities. For instance, in raising its financial contribution for the 
funding of Crossrail 1, the Mayor mandated London boroughs to levy upon developers a fee 
known as the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), which is in line with the regulations of 
the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Furthermore, the Deputy 
Mayor for Transport, acting on behalf of the Mayor, is responsible for approving the Local 
Implementation Plans (LIP) of all London boroughs, which must be consistent with the 
delivery of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS), in order to receive transport related grants 
from TfL. This exemplifies how the Mayor is able to control and influence actors that may be 
claimed to be collaborating with him in the system in London. Nevertheless, the study also 
shows evidence of collaboration in the system through the Barclay’s cycle scheme 
partnership, which has reduced the numbers of users of the Underground, and by so doing, 
has improved integrated mass transportation in London. 
The system in Lagos demonstrates how the Governor’s lack of political will in not 
curtailing the excesses of the members of the NURTW in the state (in relation to their illegal 
activities) points to the non-implementation of some rules and the lack of others to address 
emergent problems. Furthermore, the governor’s interpretation of PPPs as a means of 
transferring governmental responsibilities to the private sector, as suggested by Desmond 
Amiegbebhor (LAMATA), demonstrates the human and capacity problems confronting the 
system. Thus, due to the absence of some of the practices (the collective decision making 
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process, consensus orientation and the leader engaging with all sectors) of collaborative 
governance as proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008) and NPCC (2010) in the system in Lagos, 
and other issues related to the absence of key institutions, it was not surprising to observe few 
incidences of partnerships in the state. Nonetheless, key systemic actors, with the support of 
non-systemic actors, have implemented partnerships such as the BRT-Lite partnership 
discussed in Chapter 6, which has significantly improved mass transportation in Lagos state. 
Thus, the system in London and Lagos has shown that not employing the principles of 
collaborative governance as identified in the literature for the purpose of public service 
delivery will not necessarily translate to service failure. The study shows that rather than 
collaborative governance, the ways of joint-working initiated by both leaders enabled the 
sustenance of mass transportation in both cases.  
The second category of questions focused more on empirical data, unlike those 
discussed above, and were designed to gather data which would provide in-depth 
understanding about the occurrence, if any, of collaborative governance in both cases. The 
questions also sought to identify existing problems of mass transportation, and the capacities 
employed to address those problems, in both cities. In addressing these supplementary 
questions, the data (primary and secondary) gathered from the study, and discussed in 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, were very useful. 
In addressing the first question (What forms of collaborative governance can be 
identified?), instead of forms of collaborative governance, the study identified forms of 
collaboration as noted by Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) and discussed in Chapter 3. These 
included, in both cases public-private collaboration, public-voluntary sector collaboration, and 
multi-level ‘vertical’ collaboration. For instance, while the partnership which delivered the 
Barclay’s cycle scheme is an example of public-private collaboration, the partnership which 
delivered the BRT-Lite scheme typified a multi-level vertical collaboration. The study also 
shows the occurrence of vertical and horizontal partnerships, as defined by Lowndes and 
Skelcher (1998: 315). Nonetheless, the analysis of partnerships in the study, as discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 6, show that most of them are influenced by political leaders (Mayor or 
Governor) in order to attain their policy priorities. This then raises a question about the 
autonomy of partnerships in both systems and the degree to which partnership tasks are 
shared and not forced on collaborators, as observed in the study. 
The second supplementary question (What are the mass transport problems?) was 
clearer, as it was observed that the partnerships established in each city, and which plays 
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significant roles in the governance process, aimed to address some of the problems 
confronting mass transportation, such as the overcrowding of carriages and inadequate mass 
transport infrastructures. For instance, in London the latter problems were mainly addressed 
through the upgrade of the Underground and the implementation of the Crossrail 1 scheme. 
Furthermore, the discussion of the key projects, delivered and ongoing, in Chapters 4 and 6 
point to how operational problems were addressed. At the strategy level, similar problems 
recognised as confronting mass transportation in both cities included inadequate funding to 
implement mass transport schemes, the influence of key governmental actors such as the 
Mayor and Governor on the systems, and the manipulation of partnerships by certain actors 
playing key roles in the funding regime, as well as the process of holding other actors to 
account. As regards the system in Lagos, a key problem appeared to be the inability of 
enforcement agencies to enforce transport laws and traffic rules as some stakeholders see 
themselves as being above the law. Furthermore, some of the actions of the NURTW, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, demonstrate how the actions of the body has added to the problems of 
coordinating mass transportation in Lagos. 
In addressing the third supplementary question (How are these problems actually 
addressed?), this research has found that while some problems have been addressed through 
the implementation of schemes, for instance, Project Horizon, which was implemented by 
TfL as part of its cost reduction strategy in order to fund mass transport schemes, others have 
been addressed through the use of modes of partnerships (defensive collaboration, offensive 
collaboration and shot-gun collaboration) proposed by Harding (1997: 74). Also, as suggested 
by Kennedy et al. (2005), it was found that the existence of a strategic transport authority in 
both cases, and the nature of a funding regime in addition to the funds it delivers, proved 
instrumental in addressing mass transport problems linked to land-use, franchising, planning 
and forecasting, the maintenance of infrastructures, the delivery of rolling stock and services, 
and the deployment of resources to sustain mass transportation. 
In both cities, the study shows that the main capacities existing to address mass 
transport problems include rules (franchising agreements) that guide the behaviour of actors 
(Stoker, 2004), government (leadership), and a strategic transport authority (TfL in London 
and LAMATA in Lagos). A watchdog body (London Travel Watch) was also observed in 
London to address mass transport problems in order to enable user satisfaction. In sustaining 
and strengthening these capacities, interviewees made the case for various factors. For 
instance, the interviewees in London argued that the Mayor should be given more power and 
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control over mainline trains and taxation. Also, while interviewees made the case for 
leadership for the system in London, they disagreed on who the leader should be and on the 
criteria for selecting such a leader. This latter finding was also observed in Lagos, as 
interviewees were undecided as to whether LAMATA, the Governor or the state’s Ministry of 
Transportation should lead the system. In terms of strengthening the capacity of both systems, 
interviewees also emphasised that there must be clear accountability lines to address the 
occurrence of overstepping of existing boundaries, especially in the system in London. 
Similarly, interviewees in Lagos argued for the reorientation of the culture of Lagosians in 
order to reduce the incidence of corruption in the state and mass transport governance system. 
Interviewees in both cases also presented the view that there should be substantial investment 
made in mass transport schemes due to the utilitarian role of transport in enabling socio-
economic development.  
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8.3 Comparative analysis 
 
 In comparing both cases, key empirical findings relating to starting conditions, 
institutional design, and facilitative leadership, arising from the application of the Ansell and 
Gash (2008) model are examined below.  
 
8.3.1 Starting conditions 
 
 In the course of discussing the relevance and occurrence of the variables proposed by 
Ansell and Gash (2008) in Chapters 5 and 7, it was established that starting conditions such as 
the prehistory of cooperation or conflict, which constitute one of the variables identified by 
the authors as enabling collaborative governance, did not play any significant role in 
determining whether actors would engage with one another in the collaborative frameworks 
responsible for sustaining mass transportation in both London and Lagos. While the study of 
the system in London shows that some actors collaborate with other actors due to what they 
perceive as potential gains for themselves, the influence of governmental actors, especially 
the Mayor of London and key bodies such as Transport for London (TfL), were observed to 
be the most significant factors which determined the degree to which stakeholders would 
work with other potential partners. As regards the system in Lagos, the researcher observed 
that, rather than systemic actors being influenced by starting conditions, as proposed by 
Ansell and Gash (2008), actors were again seen to collaborate with other actors that they 
would benefit from cooperating with. As in London, where the Mayor employs his powers to 
influence the workings of the mass transport system, the Governor of Lagos state and 
LAMATA were seen to play key roles in influencing the establishment and workings of 
partnerships. Both systems thus show the presence of key governmental actors and strategic 
transport authorities as the primary enablers of the governance of mass transportation. The 
implications of the roles played by key actors in both cases, notably the Mayor and Governor, 
and both strategic transport authorities, is that such actors can play a major role in enabling 
and influencing collaborative modes of governance. Hence, in both cases the key factor was 
not the starting conditions relating to prehistory of cooperation and conflict, but the influence 
and powers of the primary actors and some secondary actors, as presented in Figures 2 and 4. 
  
   
202 
 
8.3.2 Institutional design 
 
 In the attempt to apply the institutional design proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008) for 
sustaining a collaborative governance framework, some similarities and differences were 
identified in both cases. While institutional design issues such as commitment to process and 
shared understanding were proposed by the authors and identified in both cases, other 
institutional design factors, including systemic characteristics, capacities and challenges, were 
identified from the study as shaping the degree to which the collaborative framework would 
work. These will be employed in subsequent paragraphs to compare both cases investigated in 
the study.  
 The discussion and analysis of both cases as presented in Chapters 4 to 7 shows that 
the majority of the actors engaged in the partnerships showed a commitment to the 
partnership process due to a variety of factors, including what they stood to gain from the 
partnership and the policy stance of the government. Furthermore, actors engaged in 
partnerships in each of the systems were seen to share some agreements with other 
stakeholders, especially on the need to provide more capacities to sustain the mass transport 
system and on the need for a leadership for the system. This demonstrates that leadership and 
sustainable capacities are relevant for enabling public services delivery such as mass 
transportation. 
 Systemic characteristics in terms of the existence of both conflict and collaboration 
were observed in the two systems, thereby sustaining the argument of Haugaard (2002: 308) 
suggesting that conflict and consensus exist as systemic phenomena. While the study of the 
system in London shows the existence of conflicts in the Mayor’s role and between London 
Travel Watch and the Transport Committee of the GLA, conflicts in the system in Lagos were 
seen to be mainly linked to competition between actors for the governor’s attention, and in 
establishing the most relevant actor to lead the system. Hence, although conflicts were 
observed in both systems, they were manifested in different forms, as indicated earlier. 
Relations were also identified between actors due to the workings of the funding regime 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 and the process of holding actors to account. Furthermore, it is 
also clear that the funding regime which finances schemes enables joint-working during the 
process whereby stakeholders engage with one another in order to raise funds for capacity 
development and improvement.  
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Also, certain characteristics unique to each system appear to be responsible for the 
level of institutional development and available capacities. For instance, in Lagos there was a 
negative culture, highlighted by factors such as corruption and disregard for traffic laws, 
manifesting at organisational and individual (general) levels as discussed in Chapter 7. On the 
contrary, in London there was a positive culture, highlighted by factors such as Freedom of 
Information (accessibility to data) and regard for traffic laws. 
 Systemic capacities in the form of human and material resources are essential for the 
survival and sustenance of any organisation, scheme or development. While the study shows 
that both systems have, and are, still developing capacities, as shown in Chapters 4 and 6, it is 
clear that the capacities available in London are more advanced than those available in the 
system in Lagos. The differences observed between the systems are linked to the roles the 
economic and socio-political history of each city plays in shaping existing capacities. For 
instance, the system in London benefits from the presence of a pool of experts who have 
assisted at one time or another in building and maintaining the mass transport modes in 
London. On the contrary, few experts abound in Lagos due to lack of capacity building to 
sustain mass transport modes over the years, and the incidence of corruption. 
 The study of the cases in London and Lagos shows that both systems are confronting 
particular and similar systemic challenges, for example, conflicts linked to the goals and roles 
of organisations in each of the cases. There are problems specific to each of the systems. For 
instance, the overbearing influence of the NURTW, including its members, over the operation 
and coordination of bus parks, especially through their illegal collection of fees from 
operators, is a key problem for actors (including LAMATA and operators) in Lagos. Also, the 
effects of general (breaking of traffic rules) cultures are particularly severe in the case of 
Lagos. The particular issue identified in the case of London is linked to the additional power 
some actors advocated for the Mayor. This advocacy is contrary to the views of some other 
actors who think the Mayor is already too powerful and who therefore advocated that two or 
more actors should lead the system in London. 
 There is also the problem of holding some actors to account, especially those who play 
different roles with blurred boundaries in the system. This problem was emphasised by some 
interviewees in London who claimed that it is almost impossible to hold some actors in the 
system to account, especially the Mayor. Similarly, ‘holding to account’ is also a problem in 
the system in Lagos as interviewees commented that most bodies and actors in the public 
sector are not obliged to provide information relating to their budget expenses or render an 
204 
 
account of their use of resources to the public. Hence, it is more likely that actors and bodies 
in the public sector will be involved in corrupt practices and maladministration as they are not 
mandated to disclose their budgets and spending to the public for purposes of accountability 
or audit.  
 Another systemic challenge relates to the existence of a funding regime not able to 
independently fund the sustenance of mass transportation without recourse to external actors 
associated with the systems. This was also seen as a problem, in the sense that major funders 
of both systems often attach conditions to their grants. For instance, the cost cutting measure 
implemented by TfL, known as ‘Project Horizon’ (discussed in Chapter 5) was in response to 
the Comprehensive Spending Review of central government, tying central government grants 
to cost reduction plans and schemes. While the system in London is reliant on central 
government funding to enable the execution of projects like Crossrail 1 and Underground 
upgrade, the system in Lagos also relies on federal government monthly revenue allocations 
and key grants to enable the implementation of key projects such as the BRT-Lite bus scheme 
and Lagos rail, again requiring adherence to grant conditions. However, this problem also 
points to the incidence of joint-working across levels of government in both cities, as the 
GLA and central government work in partnership to implement schemes such as Crossrail 1, 
while the Lagos state government works in partnership with the federal government and 
World Bank to implement the BRT-Lite scheme. 
  
8.3.3 Facilitative leadership 
 
   Leadership as defined by Northouse (2013: 5) is a process whereby an individual 
influences others to achieve a common goal. This was observed in both London and Lagos. 
For instance, both the Mayor and Governor use their leadership powers to instigate and enable 
the employment of partnerships in the system to implement mass transport schemes. While 
the Mayor of London is involved in the operation of the GLA Group, such as by chairing the 
Board of Transport for London (TfL), in Lagos the Governor delegates his authority to the 
heads of government agencies, including LAMATA. Notwithstanding the different leadership 
styles observed, both actors use their powers to influence the groups and individuals they lead 
towards the attainment of set mayoral and government policy goals. Furthermore, the study 
shows that some systemic actors expressed contrasting views on who should lead the system, 
for instance in London, while some actors made the case for central government to lead, 
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others wanted the Mayor to have more power. This further illustrates the divergence among 
actors in the system. 
 The study also shows two types of leadership, political and strategic, common to both 
systems. While the former is mainly performed by the Mayor and Governor, as they derive 
their powers from the GLA Act (1999) and the Nigerian 1979 constitution, the latter (strategic 
leadership) is mainly executed by the strategic transport authorities in both cities (TfL and 
LAMATA) due to their technical know-how and expertise. This demonstrates that, 
irrespective of the differences existing between the two systems, both require political and 
strategic forms of leadership to sustain mass transportation. Furthermore, the study made clear 
that both leaders employ their powers for the purpose of coordinating the system, especially 
through the use of policies such as the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), used in the 
system in London to raise funds to co-finance Crossrail 1, and in Lagos, the fines used in the 
system to partly fund the maintenance and building of infrastructures.  
206 
 
8.4 Concluding remarks on the Ansell and Gash (2008) collaborative governance model 
  
 In the course of this study, the idea and occurrence of collaborative governance was 
explored focusing on the systems of governance of mass transportation in London and Lagos. 
In concluding the evaluation of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model, the discussion here 
focuses on three factors: the overly normative stance of the model as observed through the 
variables argued to enable collaborative governance, the inability to generalise from the 
model, and the definitional problems associated with ‘collaborative governance’. 
From the discussion of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model in Chapters 3, 5 and 7, 
different factors and variables (ideal factors) were identified and argued to enable the 
occurrence of collaborative governance. However, the empirical chapters of this study have 
shown that the majority of the variables and the alleged enabling factors identified by Ansell 
and Gash (2008) cannot be relied upon to be responsible for the incidence of collaboration in 
the cases explored in this study as each case has unique factors which influence the degree to 
which collaboration exists and its nature. Hence, although some particular variables might be 
relevant in enabling collaborative modes of governance in a certain context, this does not 
necessarily mean that such variables will be useful for enabling collaborative modes of 
governance in other socio-political contexts.    
 Closely related to the normative problem (preconception on the ideal standard to 
enable collaborative governance) of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model is the inability to 
generalise from the model, including as a result of its vagueness in defining collaborative 
governance. The complex nature of the concept of ‘collaboration’ as outlined earlier in the 
thesis while discussing Sullivan and Skelcher’s (2002: 80-93) typologies of collaboration, 
demonstrates one aspect of the challenges inherent within collaborative modes of governance. 
The study has also highlighted the challenges in both cases of identifying genuine 
partnerships which in turn questions the extent to which the Ansell and Gash model can be 
generalised. It is clear that certain actors, due to the powers they possess, can enable, hinder 
or manipulate the operations of partnerships and collaborative modes of governance to serve 
their policy aims by employing a mix of collaboration, contractual agreements and imperative 
coordination. This demonstrates why the preconceived idea of collaborative governance by 
Ansell and Gash cannot be generalised. The dynamics relating to the roles and types of 
leadership (political and strategic) observed in both cases in this study, as discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 7, also demonstrate that the leadership of both systems influenced systemic 
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workings. This further illustrate why the Ansell and Gash model cannot be generalised as 
their preconceived idea of how collaborative governance should work did not consider the 
relevance of political and strategic leadership which both played fundamental roles in the 
cases investigated.    
In addition, the Ansell and Gash (2008) model, as highlighted by Emerson et. al, 
(2012), suffers from the fact that the definition of collaborative governance remains 
amorphous and that there is inconsistency in its use. However, notwithstanding the problems 
identified and associated with the model, and its lack of suitability as a normative framework, 
this study has found that the variables proposed by the model may be seen to be useful tools 
and even to provide a framework for analysing collaborative modes of governance in different 
socio-political contexts.  
 
8.5 Contributions of the study and its policy implications 
 
 The study of collaborative governance was undertaken at both theoretical and 
empirical levels. At the theoretical level, the review of the literature shows the divergence 
among authors on their views regarding the concept. The literature focused on the increasing 
use of partnerships, interpreted in different ways, and the relevance of leadership for the 
practice of collaborative governance. The study highlights that there are a variety of forms of 
partnership and working together, varying from some relatively genuine partnerships to those 
arrangements that are driven more by contractual or other mandatory requirements. The 
findings from the study, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, have shown that some of the 
propositions for example, starting conditions, of Ansell and Gash (2008) relating to 
collaborative governance are not relevant in the cases investigated. While some of the 
propositions of the authors regarding the relevance of facilitative leadership and commitment 
to process were observed in both cases, key factors such as a sustainable funding regime and 
means of holding to account emerged from the study as playing key roles in sustaining 
collaborative governance modes in the systems investigated. 
 The study indicates that leadership, accountability and a sustainable funding regime 
are key factors for the governance of mass transportation in cities such as London and Lagos. 
Leadership (strategic and political) is key, especially due to the need to ensure coordination 
by one or more actors tasked with the planning of policies and schemes aimed at sustaining 
services delivery such as mass transportation. Ansell and Torfing (2015: 327) suggest that the 
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identification of what kind of leadership, for example, is required to scale collaborative 
governance up or down, is likely to become more prominent in the years to come due to the 
relevance of leadership for sustaining services delivery. The study thus highlight the 
relevance of strategic leadership (TfL and LAMATA) and political leadership (Mayor of 
London and Governor of Lagos state) as playing crucial roles in the governance system. 
Accountability is important in order to ensure good use of resources and reduce the abuse of 
power. Schedler (1999: 14) argued that accountability embraces different ways of preventing 
and redressing the abuse of power and resources by subjecting those controlling resources to 
the threat of sanctions, while also requesting them to justify their actions. Lastly, a sustainable 
funding regime which can mobilise necessary funds for providing capacities aimed at 
sustaining mass transportation is also vital. Interviewees in both cases made it clear that the 
funding regime in place must be sustainable while having a diversified income source. This is 
due to, first, the limited levels of funding available from the UK central government and 
Nigeria’s federal government, and the challenge of increasing fares (the major income earner 
for TfL) and franchise fees (the major income earner for LAMATA) incomes. 
 Based on the findings from this study, especially in the case of Lagos, culture from the 
perspective of both an organisation and the public domain, was identified as an important 
factor influencing the planning and implementation of policies aimed at sustaining public 
goods and services such as mass transportation. While the cultures existing in the system in 
London do mainly support partnerships and good practices, the same cannot be said for the 
system in Lagos. Hence, further research is needed to enhance our understanding of the 
factors that enable positive cultures, and how negative cultures can be turned to positive 
cultures, both to address the issue of corruption generally, and the character of some 
Lagosians relating to disobeying traffic rules more specifically.  
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8.6 Concluding remarks 
 
This study had the aim of better understanding how the systems of governance of mass 
transportation in London and Lagos work, including the incidence of partnerships in both 
cases. While the study shows that governmental actors in both London and Lagos are 
increasingly employing policies featuring what are alleged to be ‘partnerships’ for the purpose 
of delivering and sustaining mass transportation, the analysis of both cases shows that a 
significant proportion of the mass transport policies implemented employ a variety of ways of 
working; these include partnerships and other mandatory arrangements. This then suggests 
that, rather than collaborative governance, what exists in the systems investigated is a variety 
of ways of working together. In addition, it is clear that organisations in both systems work 
with one another on issues which will benefit them, and do otherwise if they do not perceive 
any gain. 
One of the strengths of this study is that it is a cross-systemic case study approach, 
providing insights into how systems in different contexts function. The study of the systems 
in London and Lagos has not only provided new data on both systems, but also highlighted 
the features of the complex relationships existing among actors in each of the systems. The 
actors who took part in the in-depth semi-structured interviews provided a mix of answers to 
many of the questions asked. For instance, it was observed from the responses of interviewees 
in both cases that, while they all supported the presence of a leader for the system, they 
expressed contrasting views as to the criteria that should be used for choosing the leader of 
the system, and also on the issue of whether the leader must be an individual or a mix of 
actors. 
 It was also noted from the study that in enabling the sustenance of mass transportation 
in London and Lagos, both the UK central government and Nigeria’s federal government, 
transferred certain powers to actors in the systems while working with such actors, thereby 
indicating joint working between actors across different governmental levels. This further 
shows that collaboration is not just an internal system feature in both cases, but also occurs 
between actors inside and outside the system. The implication this has for public service 
provision such as mass transportation is that governments may employ partnership or other, 
mandatory arrangements to enable, or not, the provision of a service or aspects of a service 
such as mass transportation, depending on their ideological motivation (such as to allow the 
market to rule and encourage growth). 
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 Finally, the study of the systems in London and Lagos has identified key themes 
including culture, leadership, funding regime and accountability as important for influencing 
the degree to which mass transportation is sustainable. It was shown in Chapters 5 and 7 that 
these themes relate to one another and do not exist in isolation. For instance, it was clear that 
key actors such as the federal government, central government, Mayor and Governor, who all 
constitute the funding regime, also play leadership roles in the system. These same actors are 
involved in the process by which actors are held to account, thereby indicating relations 
between actors, in and out of the system. The discussion of the findings, together with an 
analysis of the themes recurring in the study, offer significant insight into the factors that 
shape and influence the systems of governance of mass transportation in both cases, and the 
degree to which collaborative governance exists. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: 
 The research questions generated for the study    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Main Research Questions 
1 What is meant by collaborative governance?  
2 How useful is the concept of collaborative governance for understanding mass 
transportation in London and Lagos?  
3 How far can collaborative governance improve mass transportation?  
Questions Posed to Respondents 
 What forms of collaborative governance can be identified? 
 What are the mass transport problems? 
 How are these problems actually addressed? 
 What capacity (within each case) exists to solve these problems? 
 
 
(Research questions for the cases of London and Lagos. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
213 
 
Appendix 2a:  
Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport 
Bodies 
 
 
                                                                                      Olanrewaju Olaoye 
                                                                         Email: oolaoye@lincoln.ac.uk                                     
                                                                  School of Social Sciences 
                                                           University of Lincoln 
                                        LN6 7TS 
                                                                   Lincoln, United Kingdom 
Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies 
Potential Interview Outcome – By the end of each interview session with a policymaker, politician or 
relevant transport stakeholder, I should have gotten important direct information from the perspective 
of a key stakeholder on the role of the government and other partners during the delivery of public 
services especially mass transportation. In addition, I should have received relevant data explaining 
how the government steers the process of public service delivery especially through partnership 
working with stakeholders in an atmosphere of trust and accountability. 
Topics to be covered with interviewees include:  
1. Multiscalarity and government role in service delivery e.g. mass transportation 
(Enabler or Provider of services) 
2. Public involvement in the consultation and mass transportation policy making process 
3. Effectiveness of partnerships or collaborations for the delivery of mass transportation 
4. The accountability of service providers and policy makers 
5. Measuring effectiveness and performance of modes of mass transport (Output) 
6. Measuring how feedback leads to policy learning (Input) 
7. Relevance of a facilitator in developing and implementing rules of the game 
8. Addressing problems (conflicts) and challenges of mass transportation service 
delivery 
9. Formation of partnerships 
10. Legitimacy of partnership vis-a-vis democracy and stakeholder representation 
11. Resources and funding 
Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies 
Note: Mass transport is construed in this research as the movement of large numbers of 
people from one point to another. Its key modes include Bus, Train and Tube (Underground) 
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1. How would you describe the responsibilities of your organization with regard to mass 
transport? 
2. How would you describe your particular responsibilities within your organization? 
3. What do you think are the responsibilities of stakeholders including Central 
Government, GLA, Boroughs, Private and Third sectors with regard to mass transport 
in London? 
4. In your opinion which organization should be primarily responsible for the overall 
strategy policy making of delivering mass transportation in London: 
 Central government 
 GLA 
 Boroughs 
 Private sector organization 
 Third sector organization 
 Combination of above (Indicate the combination and which organization, if 
any, should lead it). 
5. Could you explain to me, from your perspective, how the modes of mass transport in 
London are financed? 
6. What are the challenges experienced from the current method of financing? 
7. In your opinion, how should the modes of mass transportation in London be financed? 
8. How are policy makers responsible for the delivery of mass transportation in London 
held accountable to tax payers, the government and public? 
9. How do you think you and other relevant institutions concerned with the delivery of 
mass transportation in London should be held accountable? 
10. How far are transport users involved in making decisions about mass transportation in 
London? 
11. How far do you think transport users should be involved in making decisions about 
mass transportation in London? 
12. In your opinion, how far are the general public involved in the decision making 
process of mass transportation in London? 
13. In your opinion, how far should the general public be involved in the policy process 
affecting mass transportation in London? 
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14. What are the main challenges over the short term, medium term and long term with 
regard to mass transport in London? 
15. In your opinion, how do you think each of the challenges (short, medium and long 
terms) identified above can best be resolved? 
16. Who do you think should have the main responsibility for resolving the short term, 
medium term and long term challenges identified above? 
17. Who else should have responsibility for resolving the challenges identified above and 
why? 
18. How do you work with other stakeholders involved in the delivery of mass transport in 
London? 
How does your organization work with other relevant organizations in the delivery of mass transport 
in London? 
19. In your opinion, what would be the best possible way by which organizations and 
institutions can work together to improve mass transport in London? 
20. What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of mass 
transportation in London/Lagos in order to gauge its effectiveness and performance?  
21. How does your organization measure the effectiveness of the delivery of mass 
transportation in London? 
22. In your opinion, what are the performance indicators by which the delivery of mass 
transport in London should be measured? 
23. Do you think the use of performance targets confines innovation or enhances 
innovation? Why? 
24. What is your overall view of recent occurrence in mass transport in London? 
25. What is your overall view of the future of mass transport in London? 
Thank you very much for your time and valuable answers. 
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Appendix 2b:  
Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies 
 
 
                                                                                         Olanrewaju Olaoye 
                                                                              Email: oolaoye@lincoln.ac.uk                                     
                                                                       School of Social Sciences 
                                                                University of Lincoln 
                                             LN6 7TS 
                                                                        Lincoln, United Kingdom 
Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies 
Potential Interview Outcome – By the end of each interview session with a policymaker, politician or 
relevant transport stakeholder, I should have gotten important direct information from the perspective 
of a key stakeholder on the roles of the government and other partners in sustaining the mass 
transportation governance system. In addition, I should have received relevant data explaining how the 
government steers the process of public service delivery especially through partnership working with 
stakeholders in an atmosphere of trust and accountability. 
Topics to be covered with interviewees include: 
1. Multiscalarity and government role in service delivery e.g. mass transportation 
(Enabler or Provider of services) 
2. Public involvement in the consultation and mass transportation policy making process 
3. Effectiveness of partnerships or collaborations for the delivery of mass transportation 
4. The accountability of service providers and policy makers 
5. Measuring effectiveness and performance of modes of mass transport (Output) 
6. Measuring how feedback leads to policy learning (Input) 
7. Relevance of a facilitator in developing and implementing rules of the game 
8. Addressing problems (conflicts) and challenges of mass transportation service 
delivery 
9. Formation of partnerships 
10. Legitimacy of partnership vis-a-vis democracy and stakeholder representation 
11. Resources and funding 
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Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies 
Note: Mass transport is construed in this research as the movement of large numbers of 
people from one point to another. Its key modes include Bus, Train and Boat. 
1. How would you describe the responsibilities of your organization with regard to 
mass transport? 
2. How would you describe your particular responsibilities within your organization? 
3. What do you think are the responsibilities of stakeholders including Federal 
Government, Lagos state government, Local governments, and Private and Third 
sector organizations with regard to mass transport in Lagos? 
4. In your opinion which organization should be primarily responsible for the overall 
strategy policy making of delivering mass transportation in Lagos: 
 Federal government  
 Lagos State House of Assembly 
 Local Governments 
 Private sector organizations 
 Third sector organizations 
 Combination of above (Indicate the combination and which organization, if 
any, should lead it). 
5. Could you explain to me, from your perspective, how the modes of mass transport 
in Lagos are financed? 
6. What are the challenges experienced from the current method of financing? 
7. In your opinion, how should the modes of mass transportation in Lagos be 
financed? 
8. How are policy makers responsible for the delivery of mass transportation in 
Lagos held accountable to tax payers, the government and public? 
9. How do you think you and other relevant institutions concerned with the delivery 
of mass transportation in Lagos should be held accountable? 
10. How far are transport users involved in making decisions about mass 
transportation in Lagos? 
11. How far do you think transport users should be involved in making decisions 
about mass transportation in Lagos? 
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12. In your opinion, how far are the general public involved in the decision making 
process of mass transportation in Lagos? 
13. In your opinion, how far should the general public be involved in the policy 
process affecting mass transportation in Lagos? 
14. What are the main challenges over the short term, medium term and long term 
with regard to mass transport in Lagos? 
15. In your opinion, how do you think each of the challenges (short, medium and long 
terms) identified above can best be resolved? 
16. Who do you think should have the main responsibility for resolving the short term, 
medium term and long term challenges identified above? 
17. Who else should have responsibility for resolving the challenges identified above 
and why? 
18. How do you work with other stakeholders involved in the delivery of mass 
transport in Lagos? 
19. How does your organization work with other relevant organizations in the delivery 
of mass transport in Lagos? 
20. In your opinion, what would be the best possible way by which organizations and 
institutions can work together to improve mass transport in Lagos? 
21. What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of mass 
transportation in Lagos in order to gauge its effectiveness and performance?  
22. How does your organization measure the effectiveness of the delivery of mass 
transportation in Lagos? 
23. In your opinion, what are the performance indicators by which the delivery of 
mass transport in Lagos should be measured? 
24. Do you think the use of performance targets confines innovation or enhances 
innovation? Why? 
25. What is your overall view of recent occurrence in mass transport in Lagos? 
26. What is your overall view of the future of mass transport in Lagos? 
Thank you very much for your time and valuable answers. 
Please who else can you recommend for me to approach and interview? 
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Appendix 3: 
Sample of Introductory Letter Sent to Potential Interviewees 
Dear ..............., 
  
Good day to you. I am undertaking research for a PhD in the School of Social Sciences, 
University of Lincoln and my research is concerned with an examination of 'collaborative 
governance and mass transportation'. 
 
As part of this research I am seeking to interview a number of key individuals about the 
processes of policy making, collaboration and stakeholder participation in relation to the 
development of mass transportation in London and Lagos. These interviews will be conducted 
on a confidential basis and the anonymity of participants will be maintained in published 
work which results from the research, unless they specifically approve otherwise. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could find the time to meet with me and answer some short 
questions about your views on these topics. Perhaps the easiest way of arranging a meeting 
would be for you to provide me with your time and date availability and I will then be happy 
to meet you at the place of your convenience. 
 
I should perhaps mention that I will share the outcomes of the research with all of the 
individuals and organisations that participate through a brief report, and will be happy to 
provide further feedback should that be of interest. If you would like any further information 
about this project please do not hesitate to contact me. 
   
Thank you for your kind reply. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
Olanrewaju Olaoye 
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Appendix 4:  
Table showing potential interviewees, interviews conducted and documentary evidence. 
No Potential Interviewees 
(organisation) 
Status of 
Interview 
Secondary data 
(organisation) 
1 Caroline Pidgeon, GLA Declined  
2 Valeria Shawcross, GLA Declined  
3 Richard Tracey, GLA Conducted  
4 Jenny Jones, GLA Declined  
5 Boris Johnson, GLA Declined  
6 Tim Steer, GLA Declined  
7 Laura Warren, GLA Declined but 
provided 
secondary data 
Transport Committee 
reports, GLA 
8 John Barry, GLA Declined  
9 Derek Kotz, RMT Union Declined  
10 Tim Bellenger, London Travel 
Watch 
Conducted. Also 
provided 
secondary data. 
Reports and publications of 
London Travel Watch 
11 Charles Belcher, TfL Declined  
12 Isabel Dedring, TfL Declined  
13 Sir Mike Hodkinson, TfL Declined  
14 Bob Oddy, TfL Declined  
15 Patrick O’ Keeffe, TfL Declined  
16 Tony West, TfL Declined  
17 Keith Williams, TfL Declined  
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18 Peter Hendy, TfL Declined  
19 Mike Brown, TfL Declined  
20 Leon Daniels, TfL Declined  
21 Michele Dix, TfL Declined but 
recommended 
Rhodri Ball who 
was interviewed 
Rhodri Ball also provided 
the 2010 Mayor’s Transport 
strategy 
22 Roger Evans, GLA Declined but 
recommended 
Jonathan Hollis 
who was 
interviewed 
 
23 Paul Garnish, London Underground Conducted  
24 Stewart King, Third Sector Declined but 
provided 
secondary data 
Conference presentations on 
collaboration 
25 Rob Fox, London First, Represent 
Private Sector 
Conducted. Also 
provided 
secondary data. 
Rob Fox provided several 
policy reports and document 
of projects commissioned by 
London First  
26 Andrew Phipps, City of London 
Corporation 
Conducted  
27 Victoria Borwick, GLA Declined  
27 Tony Travers, LSE Not available  
28 First Group Declined  
29 Stage Coach Declined  
30 Arriva London Declined  
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31 Metroline Declined  
32 Go-Ahead Declined  
33 London United RATP Group Declined  
34 First Capital Connect Declined  
35 John Horncastle, Association of 
Train Operating Companies 
Declined  
36 Collin Stanbridge, London 
Chamber of Commerce 
Declined  
37 Cllr. Catherine West, London 
Councils 
Declined  
38 Cllr. Mike Fisher, London Councils Declined  
39 Jasmine Anigbogu, London 
Underground 
Declined  
40 Sir Robin Wales, Mayor of 
Newham 
Declined  
41 Joanne McCartney, GLA Declined  
42 Murad Qureshi, GLA Declined  
43 Steve O’ Connell, GLA Declined  
44 Department for Transport Declined  
45 Prof. Akin Mabogunje, Federal 
Government of Nigeria Consultant 
Conducted Prof. Akin Mabogunje 
provided the Report of the 
Presidential Committee on 
Redevelopment of Lagos 
Mega-City Region which he 
chaired. 
46 Prof. Olukayode Taiwo, Deputy Conducted Prof. O. Taiwo also 
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Director - LAMATA  provided other documents 
including LAMATA 
programme of event for a 
stakeholder meeting; 
Frequently Asked Questions 
on Bus Rapid Transit 
(BRT); Lagos BRT-Lite 
47 Engr. Frederick Olofin, Director of 
Projects – Lagos State Waterways 
Authority 
Conducted  
48 Engr. Dr. Bawa-Allah, Dean 
School of Transportation, Lagos 
State University and Consultant to 
the Lagos State Government 
Conducted Engr. Bawa-Allah provided 
a manual titled ‘Transport 
and National Development: 
Issues, Challenges and the 
Way Forward’ 
49 Dr. Taiwo Salami, Director – 
Transport Planning Unit, Ministry 
of Transportation, Lagos State  
Conducted Provided the National Urban 
Transport Policy for Nigeria 
50 Engr. Olabanjo Omotosho, 
Ministry of Transportation, Lagos 
State 
Conducted  
51 Mr Kayode Opeifa, Honourable 
Commissioner for Transport Lagos 
State 
Partly Conducted  
52 Dr. Frederic Oladeinde, Technical 
Advicer – Transport Planning,  
Conducted  
52 Dr. Desmond Amiegbebhor, 
Deputy Director – Bus Services, 
LAMATA 
Conducted  
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(Table showing potential interviewees, Status of interviews and documentary evidence)  
Appendix 5:  
University of Lincoln Consent Form 
 
University of Lincoln 
Consent Form 
 
Name of participant:  
 
Name of interviewer: Olanrewaju Olaoye 
 
Title of the project: Collaborative governance: The case of mass transportation in Lagos and London. 
 
 
I confirm that I am willing to participate in the research project named above. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, or not 
answer any individual question posed, without specifying a reason. 
 
I confirm that I am/am not willing to allow the interview to be recorded.  
(Delete as appropriate) 
 
I understand that the transcript of the interview with myself, will be used by the postgraduate 
student named above for research purposes.  
 
Signature of Participant:     Date: 
 
Signature of Researcher:     Date: 
 
Signature of Witness:                    Date: 
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Appendix 6:  
List of key secondary data 
Nos. Author and Year Title 
1 Johnson, B. 2010 Mayor’s Transport Strategy 
2 Badejo, B. 2011 Transportation: Removing the 
Clogs to Nigeria’s 
Development 
3 Central Rail Users’ Committee, 1996 Handling Complaints Better: 
Proceedings of a Seminar to 
Promote Good Practice on the 
Passenger Rail Industry 
4 Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2006 Report of the Presidential 
Committee on 
Redevelopment of Lagos 
Mega-City Region 
5 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Federal Urban Mass 
Transit Agency 
National Urban Transport 
Policy for Nigeria 
6 Filani, M. Transport and National 
Development: Issues, 
Challenges and the Way 
Forward 
7 Her Majesty Courts Service (HMCS), 2010 Transforming Public Services 
Through Collaboration 
8 LAMATA, 2009 Programme of Event for a 
Stakeholder Meeting to 
Commemorate the First 
Anniversary of BRT Lite 
9 LAMATA Lagos BRT-LITE: Africa’s 
First Bus Rapid Transit 
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Scheme 
10 London Assembly Transport Committee, 2009a The Big Squeeze: Rail 
Overcrowding in London 
11 London Assembly Transport Committee, 2009b Too Close for a Comfort: 
Passengers’ Experiences of 
the London Underground 
12 London Assembly Transport Committee, 2010 Report of Transport 
Committee Seminar: ‘The 
Future of London’s Buses’ 
13 London Travel Watch, 2011 Annual Review 
14 London Transport Users Committee, 2002 Good Riddance to Bad 
Rubbish: An Action Guide 
for Passengers and Others 
15 London Transport Users Committee, 2002 London on the Move: 
Transport Policies for a 
Liveable London 
16 London Travel Watch, 2006 Getting to the Station 
17 London Travel Watch, 2010 Bus Passengers’ Priorities for 
Improvements in London 
18 London First, 2010 Greater Returns: Transport 
Priorities for Economic 
Growth 
19 London First, 2009 Holding the Line: The 
Economic Benefits of 
Modernising the Tube 
20 London First, 2010 World Class Infrastructure for 
a World City 
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21 London Data Archive available at 
(http://data.london.gov.uk/taxonomy/categories/trans
port) and UK Data Archive available at (www.data-
archive.ac.uk) 
Statistical Data 
22 Sakthi Suriyaprakasam, 2010 Transforming Public Services 
Through Collaboration 
23 Webcast of London Assembly and Transport 
Committee meetings, GLA, Public Sector, 
(secondary data) 
London Assembly Meeting, 
and London Assembly 
Transport Committee 
Meeting 
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